Lessons Learned in Protection of the Public for the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

What insights can the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant provide in the reality of decision making on actions to protect the public during a severe reactor and spent fuel pool emergency? In order to answer this question, and with the goal of limiting the consequences of any future emergencies at a nuclear power plant due to severe conditions, this article presents the main actions taken in response to the emergency in the form of a timeline. The focus of this paper are those insights concerning the progression of an accident due to severe conditions at a light water reactor nuclear power plant that must be understood in order to protect the public

Strategies of Political Institutions and Civil Society Actors in the Post-3/11 Era: The Case of Japan

Japan is at a crossroads of public administration and disaster management, especially in the aftermath of the catastrophic events of March 11, 2011: a major earthquake near Tōhoku, and the subsequent tsunami and nuclear reactor meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility. There have been advocates for more top-down governance to handle such crises (and the ongoing residuals of such crises), while others have touted more decentralization—that is, more governance at the local level. Nevertheless, Japan still faced myriad public policy challenges three years after the catastrophic events. This article investigates the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Japan’s local governance in the aftermath of March 11, 2011, addressing broadly the theme of disaster management and, more specifically, the impact (or lack thereof) of NGOs (nonprofits) on the local governance processes in Japan in the midst of the debates regarding top-down and bottom-up approaches to disaster management

World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

Two years after the Fukushima disaster started unfolding on 11 March 2011, its impact on the global nuclear industry has become increasingly visible. Global electricity generation from nuclear plants dropped by a historic 7 percent in 2012, adding to the record drop of 4 percent in 2011. This World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 (WNISR) provides a global overview of the history, the current status and the trends of nuclear power programs worldwide

The Influence of Historical Processes of Haiti and Japan on the Effects of the Earthquakes

Looking at the societies of Haiti and Japan after the earthquakes, the effects of the disasters to each society are not the same. This research paper discusses that the effects of a disaster on society are the result of social conditions. Utilizing the theories of world-system perspective and risk society, this paper tries to understand how historical process contributes to contemporary social structure and how a holistic approach is important to the discussion of different experiences of the earthquakes in Haiti and Japan. As a method, comparative historical method is utilized with the focus of within-case method, and major sources for this research are collected from historical documents from both primary and secondary sources. Discussions include brief histories of Haiti and Japan, the world position of Haiti and Japan within world-system perspective, the effects of the earthquakes occurred in Haiti and Japan, and different experiences and effects of the earthquakes on each society as well as their struggles

What can we learn about “engineering thinking in extreme situations” from the testimony by the Fukushima Dai Ichi plant manager?

International audienceThe concept of engineering thinking in emergency situations addresses an epistemological gap in the field of safety sciences, following the accident at Fukushima Dai Ichi. Institutional bodies have not grasped the need to study the conditions in which the plant’s teams had to work to maintain the integrity of the facilities. However, an understanding of the situation as it unfolded is crucial to understanding the deci-sions taken by the actors during the crisis. It is clear that the description of the accident and its representa-tion, as it is presented in reports prepared by various official agencies fails in this respect. The testimony of Masao Yoshida, director of the plant, helps to fill in some gaps. Transcripts of his testimony provide detailed information that is key to understanding the sequence of events triggered by the earthquake and tsunami of 11 March, 2011. This article shows the importance of the study of his testimony and highlights the relationship between the management of the nuclear accident and the concept of engineering thinking in emergency situations

Fukushima - The Triple Disaster and Its Triple Lessons: What can be learned about regulation, planning, and communication in an unfolding emergency?

On 11 March, 2011 a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the North-eastern coast of the Japanese main island of Honshu. Although reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant shut down as expected, the 15m tsunami which followed caused a loss of power which disrupted the cooling systems. Over the next few days, four of the six reactors experienced catastrophic events, requiring the evacuation of plant personnel and residents of nearby villages in a 20km radius. Nuclear contamination has continued to hinder clean-up and reconstruction efforts in Fukushima prefecture, one of the three worst hit by the tsunami, and it is estimated that the plant itself could take up to 40 years to decommission. Moreover, subsequent investigations have revealed serious systemic issues in the regulation of nuclear power and in the mechanisms for provision of scientific advice to the public, policymakers, and to disaster response personnel, which has contributed to a considerable loss of public trust in both scientists and the Japanese government. Handling of the ‘triple disaster’, therefore, raises important questions for understanding the scale and extent of nuclear contamination after accidental release, but also about the need for realistic emergency planning and for consistency, accuracy and trust in the dissemination of useful information, not only during an unfolding disaster and immediate recovery period, but often for years, even decades, to come

Disaster Evacuation from Japan's 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

JAPAN’S 2011 DISASTER: RESPONSES TO NATURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES The triple disaster that hit the Tohoku region of Japan on 11 March 2011 triggered a massive human displacement: more than 400,000 people evacuated their homes as a gigantic tsunami induced by a magnitude 9.0 earthquake engulfed the coastal areas, and the following nuclear accident in Fukushima released a large amount of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. This study analyses the disaster response, with a particular focus on evacuation of the population, and social consequences of this complex crisis, based on intensive fieldwork carried out one year after the catastrophe. It reveals that the responses of the Japanese authorities and population were significantly different between a natural disaster and an industrial (man-made) accident. TWO EVACUATION PATTERNS: RISK PERCEPTION VERSUS VULNERABILITY Being prone to both earthquakes and tsunamis, Japan had been preparing itself against such risks for many years. A tsunami alert was immediately issued and the population knew how and where to evacuate. In contrast, the evacuation from the nuclear accident was organised in total chaos, as a severe accident or large-scale evacuation had never been envisaged—let alone exercised—before the disaster. The population was thus forced to flee with no information as to the gravity of the accident or radiation risk. In both cases, the risk perception prior to the catastrophe played a key role in determining the vulnerability of the population at the time of the crisis. SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES FROM THE DISASTER: DIVIDED COMMUNITIES AND FAMILIES While tsunami evacuees are struggling with a slow reconstruction process due to financial difficulties, nuclear evacuees are suffering from uncertainty as to their prospect of return. One year after the accident, the Japanese authorities began to encourage nuclear evacuees to return to the areas contaminated by radiation according to a newly established safety standard. This triggered a vivid controversy within the affected communities, creating a rift between those who trust the government’s notion of safety and those who do not. The nuclear disaster has thus become a major social disaster in Japan dividing and weakening the affected communities. www.iddr

Saving Lives and Preventing Injuries from Unjustified Protective Actions - Method for Developing a Comprehensive Public Protective Action Strategy for a Severe NPP Emergency

During the response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (FDNPP) emergency about 50 patients died during or shortly after an evacuation when they were not provided with the needed medical support. In addition, during the FDNPP emergency it has been shown that there were increases in mortality rates among the elderly due to long term dislocation as a result of evacuation and relocation orders and an inability to stay in areas advised to shelter for extended periods. These deaths occurred even though the possible radiation exposure to the public was too low to result in radiation induced deaths, injuries or a meaningful increase in the cancer rate, even if no protective actions had been taken. These problems are not unique to the FDNPP emergency and would be expected if the recommendations of many organizations were followed. Neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nor the U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adequately take into consideration in their recommendations and analysis the non-radiological health impact, such as deaths and injuries, that could result from protective actions. Furthermore, ICRP, NRC, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) call for taking protective actions at doses lower than those resulting in meaningful adverse radiation induced health effects and do not state the doses at which such effects would be seen. Consequently, it would be impossible for decision makers and the public to balance all the hazards both from radiation exposure and protective actions when deciding whether a protective action is justified. What is needed, as is presented in this paper, is a method for developing a comprehensive protective action strategy that allows the public, decision makers and others who must work together to balance the radiological with the non-radiological health hazards posed by protective actions, and to counter the exaggerated fear of radiation exposure that could lead to taking unjustified protective actions and adverse psychological, sociological and other effects

Science by, with and for citizens: rethinking ‘citizen science’ after the 2011 Fukushima disaster

AbstractThis study illustrates how citizen-driven radiation monitoring has emerged in post-Fukushima Japan, where citizens generate their own radiation data and measurement devices to provide public with actionable data about their environments. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in and around Fukushima Prefecture, it highlights the multifaceted character of these bottom-up, citizen-led efforts, contrasting these initiatives with the emergence of “citizen participatory” science policy discourses in Japan. Recognizing the contested nature of citizenship in Japan and in the nuclear arena, the article considers how terms and definitions shape the participation of citizens and other stakeholders (local communities, public authorities, regulators, and professional scientists) in science and technology in culturally and historically specific ways. It builds on these observations to open up new spaces of expertise, which engage all stakeholders through social-scientific intervention.</jats:p