General-elimination stability

General-elimination harmony articulates Gentzen's idea that the elimination-rules are justified if they infer from an assertion no more than can already be inferred from the grounds for making it. Dummett described the rules as not only harmonious but stable if the E-rules allow one to infer no more and no less than the I-rules justify. Pfenning and Davies call the rules locally complete if the E-rules are strong enough to allow one to infer the original judgement. A method is given of generating harmonious general-elimination rules from a collection of I-rules. We show that the general-elimination rules satisfy Pfenning and Davies' test for local completeness, but question whether that is enough to show that they are stable. Alternative conditions for stability are considered, including equivalence between the introduction- and elimination-meanings of a connective, and recovery of the grounds for assertion, finally generalizing the notion of local completeness to capture Dummett's notion of stability satisfactorily. We show that the general-elimination rules meet the last of these conditions, and so are indeed not only harmonious but also stable.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Melanin Pigmentation and Inflammation in Human Gingiva

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/141745/1/jper0701.pd

Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?

The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others

J. L. Austin and literal meaning

Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning

Radical anti-realism and substructural logics

We first provide the outline of an argument in favour of a radical form of anti-realism premised on the need to comply with two principles, implicitness and immanence, when trying to frame assertability-conditions. It follows from the first principle that one ought to avoid explicit bounding of the length of computations, as is the case for some strict finitists, and look for structural weakening instead. In order to comply with the principle of immanence, one ought to take into account the difference between being able to recognize a proof when presented with one and being able to produce one and thus avoid the idealization of our cognitive capacities that arise within Hilbert-style calculi. We then explore the possibility of weakening structural rules in order to comply with radical anti-realist strictures

A coalgebraic view of bar recursion and bar induction

We reformulate the bar recursion and induction principles in terms of recursive and wellfounded coalgebras. Bar induction was originally proposed by Brouwer as an axiom to recover certain classically valid theorems in a constructive setting. It is a form of induction on non- wellfounded trees satisfying certain properties. Bar recursion, introduced later by Spector, is the corresponding function defnition principle. We give a generalization of these principles, by introducing the notion of barred coalgebra: a process with a branching behaviour given by a functor, such that all possible computations terminate. Coalgebraic bar recursion is the statement that every barred coalgebra is recursive; a recursive coalgebra is one that allows defnition of functions by a coalgebra-to-algebra morphism. It is a framework to characterize valid forms of recursion for terminating functional programs. One application of the principle is the tabulation of continuous functions: Ghani, Hancock and Pattinson defned a type of wellfounded trees that represent continuous functions on streams. Bar recursion allows us to prove that every stably continuous function can be tabulated to such a tree where by stability we mean that the modulus of continuity is also continuous. Coalgebraic bar induction states that every barred coalgebra is well-founded; a wellfounded coalgebra is one that admits proof by induction

Normative Alethic Pluralism

Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what I call Normative Alethic Pluralism (NAP)—according to which (i) there is more than one correct judgement-truth norm and (ii) the normative relationships between truth and judgement vary in relation to the subject matter of the judgement. By means of a comparative analysis of disagreement in three areas of the evaluative domain—refined aesthetics, basic taste and morality—I show that there is an important variability in the normative significance of disagreement—I call this the variability conjecture. By presenting a variation of Lynch’s scope problem for alethic monism, I argue that a monistic approach to the normative function of truth is unable to vindicate the conjecture. I then argue that normative alethic pluralism provides us with a promising model to account for it

Monsters in Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives

Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character-such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 200