On-line Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria with Synchronous Parallel Genetic Algorithms

Cataloged from PDF version of article.This paper develops a method to compute the Stackelberg equilibria in sequential games. We construct a normal form game which is interactively played by an artificially intelligent leader, GAL, and a follower, GA(F). The leader is a genetic algorithm breeding a population of potential actions to better anticipate the follower's reaction. The follower is also a genetic algorithm training on-line a suitable neural network to evolve a population of rules to respond to any move in the leader's action space. When GAs repeatedly play this game updating each other synchronously, populations converge to the Stackelberg equilibrium of the sequential game. We provide numerical examples attesting to the efficiency of the algorithm. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved

Learning the optimum as a Nash equilibrium

Cataloged from PDF version of article.This paper shows the computational benefits of a game theoretic approach to optimization of high dimensional control problems. A dynamic noncooperative game framework is adopted to partition the control space and to search the optimum as the equilibrium of a k-person dynamic game played by k-parallel genetic algorithms. When there are multiple inputs, we delegate control authority over a set of control variables exclusively to one player so that k artificially intelligent players explore and communicate to learn the global optimum as the Nash equilibrium. In the case of a single input, each player's decision authority becomes active on exclusive sets of dates-so that k GAs construct the optimal control trajectory as the equilibrium of evolving best-to-date responses. Sample problems are provided to demonstrate the gains in computational speed and accuracy. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved

A genetic game of trade, growth and externalities

Cataloged from PDF version of article.A genetic algorithm is introduced to search for optimal policies in the presence of knowledge spillovers and local pollution in a dynamic North/South trade game. Noncooperative trade compounds inefficiencies stemming from externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet not credible. Short of a joint maximization of the global welfare, transfer of knowledge remains as a viable route to improve world welfare. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved

Italian guidelines for primary headaches: 2012 revised version

The first edition of the Italian diagnostic and therapeutic guidelines for primary headaches in adults was published in J Headache Pain 2(Suppl. 1):105–190 (2001). Ten years later, the guideline committee of the Italian Society for the Study of Headaches (SISC) decided it was time to update therapeutic guidelines. A literature search was carried out on Medline database, and all articles on primary headache treatments in English, German, French and Italian published from February 2001 to December 2011 were taken into account. Only randomized controlled trials (RCT) and meta-analyses were analysed for each drug. If RCT were lacking, open studies and case series were also examined. According to the previous edition, four levels of recommendation were defined on the basis of levels of evidence, scientific strength of evidence and clinical effectiveness. Recommendations for symptomatic and prophylactic treatment of migraine and cluster headache were therefore revised with respect to previous 2001 guidelines and a section was dedicated to non-pharmacological treatment. This article reports a summary of the revised version published in extenso in an Italian version