21 research outputs found
The role of valuation and bargaining in optimising transboundary watercourse treaty regimes
In the face of water scarcity, growing water demands, population increase, ecosystem degradation, climate change, and so on transboundary watercourse states inevitably have to make difficult decisions on how finite quantities of water are distributed. Such waters, and their associated ecosystem services, offer multiple benefits. Valuation and bargaining can play a key role in the sharing of these ecosystems services and their associated benefits across sovereign borders. Ecosystem services in transboundary watercourses essentially constitute a portfolio of assets. Whilst challenging, their commodification, which creates property rights, supports trading. Such trading offers a means by which to resolve conflicts over competing uses and allows states to optimise their ‘portfolios’. However, despite this potential, adoption of appropriate treaty frameworks that might facilitate a market-based approach to the discovery and allocation of water-related ecosystem services at the transboundary level remains both a challenge, and a topic worthy of further study. Drawing upon concepts in law and economics, this paper therefore seeks to advance the study of how treaty frameworks might be developed in a way that supports such a market-based approach to ecosystem services and transboundary waters
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Transboundary water interaction III: contest and compliance
This paper serves international water conflict resolution efforts by examining the ways that states contest hegemonic transboundary water arrangements. The conceptual framework of dynamic transboundary water interaction that it presents integrates theories about change and counter-hegemony to ascertain coercive, leverage, and liberating mechanisms through which contest and transformation of an arrangement occur. While the mechanisms can be active through sociopolitical processes either of compliance or of contest of the arrangement, most transboundary water interaction is found to contain elements of both. The role of power asymmetry is interpreted through classification of intervention strategies that seek to either influence or challenge the arrangements. Coexisting contest and compliance serve to explain in part the stasis on the Jordan and Ganges rivers (where the non-hegemons have in effect consented to the arrangement), as well as the changes on the Tigris and Mekong rivers, and even more rapid changes on the Amu Darya and Nile rivers (where the non-hegemons have confronted power asymmetry through influence and challenge). The framework also stresses how transboundary water events that may appear isolated are more accurately read within the many sociopolitical processes and arrangements they are shaped by. By clarifying the typically murky dynamics of interstate relations over transboundary waters, furthermore, the framework exposes a new suite of entry points for hydro-diplomatic initiatives
WATER-Model: An Optimal Allocation of Water Resources in Turkey, Syria and Iraq
Political instability of several countries in the Middle East is overshadowing one of the biggest challenges of the upcoming century: Water - a natural resource that is easily taken for granted, but whose scarcity might lead to serious conflicts. This paper investigates an optimal Water Allocation of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivershed by introducing the WATER-Model. A series of scenarios are analyzed to examine the effects of different levels of cooperation for an optimal water allocation. Special emphasize is put on the effects of filling new Turkish reservoirs which can cause additional welfare losses if these actions are not done on a basin-wide coordinated basis. Modeling results show that Turkey is most efficient in its water usage. However, using the water for irrigation purposes in Turkey, instead of the Iraqi or Syrian domestic and industrial sector, decreases the overall welfare. Especially the Euphrates basin might thus encounter losses of up to 33% due to such strategic behaviour. The predicted water demand growth in the region is going to increase this water scarcity further. Minimum flow treaties between riparian countries, however, can help to increase the overall welfare and should therefore be fostered
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Why are there so few basin-wide treaties? Economics and politics of coalition formation in multilateral international river basins
Examinations of international water treaties suggest that riparian states are not heeding the advice to adopt IWRM. Theories suggest that the larger the number of negotiating states, the lower the cost (per state) of the joint operation of treaties, but the higher the transaction costs of negotiating and maintaining them. We model the trade-off between benefits and costs associated with the number of treaty signatories and apply it to a global treaty data-set. Findings confirm that the transaction costs of negotiation and the economies of scale are important in determining the paucity of basin-wide agreements, the treaties’ content and their extent