On the Influence of Reward on Action-Effect Binding

Ideomotor theory states that the formation of anticipatory representations about the perceptual consequences of an action [i.e., action-effect (A-E) binding] provides the functional basis of voluntary action control. A host of studies have demonstrated that A-E binding occurs fast and effortlessly, yet little is known about cognitive and affective factors that influence this learning process. In the present study, we sought to test whether the motivational value of an action modulates the acquisition of A-E associations. To this end, we linked specific actions with monetary incentives during the acquisition of novel A-E mappings. In a subsequent test phase, the degree of binding was assessed by presenting the former effect stimuli as task-irrelevant response primes in a forced-choice response task, absent reward. Binding, as indexed by response priming through the former action-effects, was only found for reward-related A-E mappings. Moreover, the degree to which reward associations modulated the binding strength was predicted by individuals’ trait sensitivity to reward. These observations indicate that the association of actions and their immediate outcomes depends on the motivational value of the action during learning, as well as on the motivational disposition of the individual. On a larger scale, these findings also highlight the link between ideomotor theories and reinforcement-learning theories, providing an interesting perspective for future research on anticipatory regulation of behavior

Goal-seeking compresses neural codes for space in the human hippocampus and orbitofrontal cortex

Humans can navigate flexibly to meet their goals. Here, we asked how the neural representation of allocentric space is distorted by goal-directed behavior. Participants navigated an agent to two successive goal locations in a grid world environment comprising four interlinked rooms, with a contextual cue indicating the conditional dependence of one goal location on another. Examining the neural geometry by which room and context were encoded in fMRI signals, we found that map-like representations of the environment emerged in both hippocampus and neocortex. Cognitive maps in hippocampus and orbitofrontal cortices were compressed so that locations cued as goals were coded together in neural state space, and these distortions predicted successful learning. This effect was captured by a computational model in which current and prospective locations are jointly encoded in a place code, providing a theory of how goals warp the neural representation of space in macroscopic neural signals

Priming determinist beliefs diminishes implicit (but not explicit) components of self-agency

Weakening belief in the concept of free will yields pronounced effects upon social behavior, typically promoting selfish and aggressive over pro-social and helping tendencies. Belief manipulations have furthermore been shown to modulate basic and unconscious processes involved in motor control and self-regulation. Yet, to date, it remains unclear how high-level beliefs can impact such a wide range of behaviors. Here, we tested the hypothesis that priming disbelief in free will diminishes the sense of agency, i.e., the intrinsic sensation of being in control of one’s own actions. To this end, we measured participants’ implicit and explicit self-agency under both anti-free will and control conditions. Priming disbelief in free will reduced implicit but not explicit components of agency. These findings suggest that free will beliefs have a causal impact on the pre-reflective feeling of being in control of one’s actions, and solidify previous proposals that implicit and explicit agency components tap into distinct facets of action awareness

More than associations: an ideomotor perspective on mirror neurons

In this commentary, we propose an extension of the associative approach of mirror neurons, namely, ideomotor theory. Ideomotor theory assumes that actions are controlled by anticipatory representations of their sensory consequences. As we outline below, this extension is necessary to clarify a number of empirical observations that are difficult to explain from a purely associative perspective

Transcranial magnetic stimulation dissociates prefrontal and parietal contributions to task preparation

Cognitive control is thought to rely upon a set of distributed brain regions within frontoparietal cortex, but the functional contributions of these regions remain elusive. Here, we investigated the disruptive effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the human prefrontal and parietal cortices in task preparation at different abstraction levels. While participants completed a task-switching paradigm that assessed the reconfiguration of task goals and response sets independently, TMS was applied over the left inferior frontal junction (IFJ) and over the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) during task preparation. In Experiment 1, TMS over the IFJ caused interference with the updating of task goals, while leaving the updating of response sets unaffected. In Experiment 2, TMS over the IPS created the opposite pattern of results, perturbing only the ability to update response sets, but not task goals. Experiment 3 furthermore revealed that TMS over the IPS interfered with task goal updating when the pulses are delivered at a later point in time during preparation. This dissociation of abstract and action-related components not only reveals distinct cognitive control processes during task preparation, but also sheds new light on how prefrontal and parietal areas might work in concert to support flexible and goal-oriented control of behavior

Do tasks matter in task switching? Dissociating domain-general from context-specific brain activity

Throughout the past decade, the task-switching paradigm has been used extensively as a tool to delineate the neural mechanisms underlying flexible and goal-directed action control. Yet, given a large number of experimental procedures, the task-switching literature has yielded considerable inconsistencies calling for a systematic evaluation of the impact of methodological parameters. In the present study, we examine a fundamental and implicit assumption that has guided previous research on task switching. Does switch-related brain activation (i.e., the contrast between preparatory activity on switch versus repetition trials) reflect abstract cognitive control processes that are independent of specific task demands, and thus equivalent across different types of tasks? To answer this question, we compared the data of two fMRI studies that examined updating of task goals and/or stimulus–response mappings under almost identical protocols, but using entirely different tasks. In line with an abstract control process view, our results show that the vast majority of switch-related brain activity is insensitive to the context in which it occurs. The only region that exhibited a reliable contextual modulation was the anterior cingulate cortex, indicating that its contribution to preparatory adjustments might be linked to specific task demands. Keywords: task switching, cognitive control, task context, replicatio