The monopoly benchmark on two-sided markets

The literature on the effects of market concentration in platform industries or two-sided markets often compares the competitive outcome against a benchmark. This benchmark is either the “joint management” solution in which one decision maker runs all platforms or a “pure” monopoly with just one platform. Literature has not generally discussed, which benchmark is the appropriate one. We show that the appropriate benchmark, i.e. how many platforms the monopolist will operate, depends on whether agents multi- or singlehome, whether the externalities are positive or negative, and in some cases on the properties of the demand functions. Different situations require different benchmarks. Our results also help to anticipate the effects of proposed platform mergers, where the assessment might crucially depend on the number of platforms after a merger.two-sided markets; market concentration; monopoly

Technological Bleed-through：The Transformative Effects of Technology on Text

departmental bulletin pape

History as crisis : insights from a mimetic philosophy of history

A central aspect of René Girard’s Mimetic theory is the eruptive interpersonal violence facilitated by humanity’s propensity toward imitative desire turned rivalry. At the heart of this process is a crisis; a moment in which the imminent threat of an all-encompassing violence unconsciously leads humanity towards a compromise: apocalyptic communal violence or the scapegoat. Girard, in his final work Battling to the End, wishes for his theory to be applied within the philosophy of history. In this thesis, an attempt is made to trace the history of civilizational collapse and pursuant crises via the works of Oswald Spengler, who offers us a framework within which to apply Girard’s theories and, in so doing, analyse the main line of modern philosophical thought regarding the overarching meaning of history, while using mimetic theory as their counterpoint. The aim of this analysis is to identify how mimetic theory can inform us as to the mechanism of cultural and rise and decline to analyse whether Girard provides an alternative to the prevailing philosophical conclusions represented by Spengler’s work: fatalism or idealist utopianism. Through an analysis of the concept of crisis, this thesis will show that Girard’s, or rather, the Gospel’s uncovering of the mimetic mechanism in history and its attending crises has both exacerbated this existential problem while simultaneously providing us with a new historical scenario in which cultural-apocalyptic violence could be avoided

Make Him an Offer He Can\u27t Refuse -- Mezzanatto Waivers as Lynchpin of Prosecutorial Overreach

Plea bargaining is the dominant means of disposing of criminal charges in the United States, in both state and federal courts. This administrative mechanism has become a system that is grossly abusive of individual rights, leading to many well-known maladies of the criminal justice system, which include overcharging, overincarceration, convictions on charges that would likely fail at trial, and even conviction of “factually innocent” persons. Instrumental in the abuses of plea bargaining is the so-called Mezzanatto waiver, which takes its name from a 1995 Supreme Court decision that approved the practice of getting defendants to agree that anything they say in negotiations with prosecutors can be admitted against them if a trial ensues, despite Evidence Rule 410, which provides that such statements are inadmissible. These waivers, which are largely overlooked in the vast literature that criticizes plea bargaining, are in fact lynchpins in a system that is horrifying to contemplate. These waivers mean that the very act of negotiation almost guarantees conviction of something, imposing one-sided risks on defendants that can only benefit prosecutors. They amount to a kind of palpable unfairness that the system tolerates. They not only contribute to the maladies described above, but they produce rulings (if a trial goes forward) that admit unreliable statements. There are many reasons why these waivers should be disapproved, including policy arguments (they are unfair, produce bad results and unreliable statements) and arguments based on contract law, on Rule 410 itself, on a widely-recognized but seldom enforced “unitary” principle, and – finally – on the “Mezzanatto proviso” (a widely ignored term in the decision itself). This Article explores the origins and operation of Mezzanatto waivers, examines and expounds the reasons for disapproving them and taking a new direction, and offers a reply to standard arguments that prosecutors need them (they really do not and have other means to hold defendants to their bargains)