Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks and Firm Reputation

 We develop a reputation model to study the concurrent use of trademarks and certification for food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). The model extends Shapiro’s (1983) approach to modeling reputation to a situation in which two technologies for the production of quality are available, one of which is available only in the GI region and has a cost advantage for the production of higher quality levels. In this setting, trademarks capture firm-specific reputations whereas GI certification captures a notion of collective reputation. The model shows that GI certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality when it is linked to some inherent attributes of a particular production area. We discuss some welfare implications of introducing GI certification and show that an EU-style sui generis GI certification is preferable to the US-style approach based on certification marks. asymmetric information; certification; geographical indications; reputation; quality; trademarks.

U.S. Universitiesï¾’ Net Returns from Patenting and Licensing: A Quantile Regression Analysis

In line with the rights and incentives provided by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, U.S. universities have increased their involvement in patenting and licensing activities through their own technology transfer offices. Only a few U.S. universities are obtaining large returns, however, whereas others are continuing with these activities despite negligible or negative returns. We assess the U.S. universitiesï¾’ potential to generate returns from licensing activities by modeling and estimating quantiles of the distribution of net licensing returns conditional on some of their structural characteristics. We find limited prospects for public universities without a medical school everywhere in their distribution. Other groups of universities (private, and public with a medical school) can expect significant but still fairly modest returns only beyond the 0.9th quantile. These findings call into question the appropriateness of the revenue-generating motive for the aggressive rate of patenting and licensing by U.S. universities.

Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks and Firm Reputation

We study firm reputation as a mechanism to assure product quality in perfectly competitive markets in a context in which both certification and trademarks are available. Shapiro’s (1983) model of reputation is extended to reflect both collective and firm-specific reputations, and this framework is used to study certification and trademarks for food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). Our model yields two primary results. First, in markets with asymmetric information and moral hazard problems, credible certification schemes reduce the cost of establishing reputation and lead to welfare gains compared to a situation in which only private trademarks are available. Hence, certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality. Second, the actual design of the certification scheme plays an important role in mitigating informational problems. From a policy perspective, our results have implications for the current debate and negotiations on GIs at the World Trade Organization and the ongoing product quality policy reform within the European Union. With regard to the instrument of choice to provide intellectual property protection for GIs, our model favors a sui generis scheme based on appellations over certification marks. Finally, our model supports the validity of the traditional specialities guaranteed scheme of the European Union as an instrument for the provision of high-quality products that are not linked to a geographic area.Asymmetric Information, Certification, Geographical Indications, Quality, Reputation, Environmental Economics and Policy, D23, D82, L14, L15, Q1,

Patents, Research Exemption, and the Incentive for Sequential Innovation

We develop a dynamic duopoly model of R&D competition to improve the quality of a final good. The innovation process is sequential and cumulative, and takes place alongside production in an infinite-horizon setting. In this context we study the R&D incentive impacts resulting from a ﾓresearch exemptionﾔ or ﾓexperimental useﾔ provision. We specify and solve the innovation and production model under two distinct intellectual property right (IPR) regimes, essentially a patent system with and without a research exemption. The model applies closely to the question of the optimal mode of IPR protection for plants, where traditional plant breederﾒs rights allow for a well-defined research exemption, whereas standard utility patents do not. We characterize the properties of the relevant Markov perfect equilibria and investigate the profit and welfare effects of the research exemption. We find that firms, ex ante, always prefer full patent protection. The welfare ranking of the two IPR regimes, on the other hand, depends on the relative magnitudes of the costs of initial innovation and improvements. In particular, a research exemption is most likely to provide inadequate R&D incentives when there is a large cost to establish the initial research program.

A LINEAR INVERSE DEMAND SYSTEM

We present an inverse demand that can be estimated in a linear form. The model is derived from a specification of the distance function which is parametrically similar to the cost function underlying the Almost Ideal Demand System. Simulation results suggest that this linear inverse demand system has good approximation properties.Demand and Price Analysis,

Competition Issues in the Seed Industry and the Role of Intellectual Property

Research and Development (R&D) and innovation are crucial features of the seed industry. To support large R&D investments by the private sector, strong intellectual property rights, such as patents, are necessary. The exclusivity granted by patents naturally creates market power positions and raises difficult and unresolved competition issues in an antitrust context.�

Pharmaceutical and Industrial Traits in Genetically Modified Crops: Co-Existence with Conventional Agriculture

This paper discusses the implications of using genetically modified crops to biomanufacture pharmaceuticals and industrial compounds from the perspective of their co-existence with conventional agriculture. Such plant-made pharmaceuticals and plant-made industrial products rely on exciting scientific and technological breakthroughs and promise new opportunities for the agricultural sector, but they also entail novel risks. The management of the externalities and of the possible unintended economic effects that arise in this context is critical and poses difficult questions for regulators.

Incentives and Outcomes in a Strategic Setting: The 3-Points-For-A-Win System in Soccer

We exploit a major structural change that has occurred in world soccer to study the impact of incentives on outcomes in a strategic setting. A game-theoretic model is developed that captures some essential strategic elements of soccer vis-à-vis the number of points awarded to a win. The observable implications of the model are tested using a large dataset that spans 30 years and 35 countries. The empirical results support the theoretical model and show that the 3-point system has led to a statistically significant increase in the expected number of goals and a decrease in the fractions of drawn matches.Association football; Nash equilibrium; panel data; strategic incentives; supermodularity; tournaments

Improving L2L^2 estimates to Harnack inequalities

We consider operators of the form ${\mathcal L}=-L-V$, where $L$ is an elliptic operator and $V$ is a singular potential, defined on a smooth bounded domain $\Omega\subset \R^n$ with Dirichlet boundary conditions. We allow the boundary of $\Omega$ to be made of various pieces of different codimension. We assume that ${\mathcal L}$ has a generalized first eigenfunction of which we know two sided estimates. Under these assumptions we prove optimal Sobolev inequalities for the operator ${\mathcal L}$, we show that it generates an intrinsic ultracontractive semigroup and finally we derive a parabolic Harnack inequality up to the boundary as well as sharp heat kernel estimates

Competition Issues in the Seed Industry and the Role of Intellectual Property

Crop Production/Industries, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, L1, L4, O3, Q1,