An International Political Economy Approach to the Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP from the Enlargement and the Mediterranean Perspectives

Scholars have widely used the enlargement process as a foil for assessing both the nature and the potential influence of the ENP. In this paper, I attempt to show that the ENP-enlargement comparison is flawed by the fact that the two policies pursue different finalitŽ Ð association and integration respectively. The paper then privileges the comparison with the Euro-Mediterranean policy. Drawing on the ENP-EMP comparison, the paper argues that the ENP marks the shift away from policy-change to policy-level. Two implications are drawn from this finding. The first is substantive in that it points to a pragmatic international role for the EU. The second is methodological in that I argue that adopting an IPE approach to the study of the ENP bears important analytic advantages.ENP; EMP; enlargement; differentiation; policy-level

The institutional roots of incremental ideational change. The IMF and capital controls after the global financial crisis

Although much scholarly attention has been devoted to examining the punctuated dynamics of ideational change, other dynamics exist. Ideational change may well occur incrementally in ordinary times or, as this study shows, can also materialize after a major shock, such as a financial and economic crisis. By examining the IMF\u2019s new approach to capital controls in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the paper demonstrates that the non-punctuated, non-paradigmatic nature of ideational change can be explained in light of the enabling (and not solely constraining) features of the institutional context in which actors operate. In contrast to cases where institutions prevent change until the point where the pressures for change become irresistible and lead to an explosion, here institutions act as safety valves that allow for the relief of pressures and therefore prevent the blast

When Some Are More Equal than Others: National Parliaments and Intergovernmental Bailout Negotiations in the Eurozone

This article argues that the integration of financial assistance capacity in the eurozone, which was meant to remedy institutional shortcomings and mitigate the distributional implications of financial support in the European Monetary Union (EMU), has instead contributed to a deepening of the existing political cleavages and the creation of new ones. This dysfunctional effect reflects the empowerment of some national parliaments in decisions on financial assistance. These arguments are tested against the empirical examination of the negotiations of the three adjustment programmes for Greece. Specifically, the article shows that negotiations moved towards the radicalization of creditors\u2019 positions and increased divisions between creditors in conjunction with the development of financial assistance capacity. While advancing its theses, the article strikes a note of caution regarding the argument that the empowerment of national parliaments in EU policymaking is one of the most powerful antidotes to its legitimacy deficit and thus a safeguard for the integration project

Negotiating Greece. Layering, insulation, and the design of adjustment programs in the Eurozone

The paper sets out to explain why the European Central Bank and the European Commission relaxed their opposition to debt restructuring and fiscal accommodation for Greece in the shift from the first to second adjustment program. Using the findings of the empirical analysis, the paper shows that EU institutions\u2019 repositioning cannot easily be ascribed to the mechanisms that are typically at play in international negotiations, namely exogenous pressures and internalization of new beliefs through persuasion. Instead, the paper argues that a more nuanced and complete explanation of the relaxation of opposition to the change in the program strategy requires taking into account the institutional and temporal dimensions of the Troika negotiations. Specifically, the paper shows that the evolution of European actors\u2019 preferences was shaped by the layering of new crisis management rules into the machinery of the monetary union. Layering allowed political actors in favor of the status quo achieving their preferences under changed external circumstances

Political conflicts in the ECB: how national battles play out behind closed doors

The European Central Bank has traditionally presented itself as pursuing a ‘consensual’ approach in which members of the Governing Council work together to reach decisions. Yet as Manuela Moschella explains, this does not mean the institution has been free from conflict behind closed doors. Drawing on a new study, she illustrates some of the key factors that drive disagreements within the ECB

Currency Wars in the Advanced World. Resisting Appreciation at a Time of Change in Central Banking Monetary Consensus

The purpose of this paper is to consider certain consequences of large post- crisis capital flows in advanced economies. Specifically, I offer an examination of the Swiss response to large capital inflows during the early stages of the global financial crisis. Why did the Swiss National Bank (SNB) intervene in the foreign exchange market and introduce an exchange rate floor? Why did the SNB gamble with its highly valued anti-inflationary reputation in attempting to stem the appreciation of the Swiss franc? To answer these questions, this paper suggests a broader and more complete explanation than one that focuses solely on the configuration of domestic interests. Specifically, the paper argues that a thorough explanation of the SNB\u2019s response requires accounting for the changing monetary paradigm of the central banking community. This emerging monetary paradigm influenced the SNB\u2019s policy decisions by making the SNB particularly sensitive to financial stability risks and by providing it with the policy space to experiment with (macroprudential) tools to manage these risks

The symbolic politics of delegation: macroprudential policy and independent regulatory authorities

This paper investigates the motivations that led policy-makers to delegate macroprudential authorities to newly created independent systemic regulatory authorities (SRAs). Three case studies are examined: the US Financial Stability Oversight Council, the European Systemic Risk Board and the UK\u2019s Financial Policy Committee. Policy-makers\u2019 motivations are captured by examining the specific institutional features of the newly created SRAs and by tracing the legislative debates that surrounded their creation. The findings of this empirical analysis call into question several of the conventional claims that are used to justify delegation to technocratic agencies from the functionalist and ideational scholarship. Given the limitations of the explanations based on efficiency considerations and socialisation of welfare losses, this paper suggests that the delegation of powers to SRAs was ultimately motivated by what is referred to as the \u2018logic of symbolic politics.\u2019 It is argued that the main motivation that emerges from the legislative debates for delegating this important task is that the SRAs provided a quick institutional \u2018fix\u2019 to signal to the public that in the wake of the international crisis of 2007\u2013 2009, policy-makers were redressing regulatory mistakes made prior to and during the crisis that had caused a severe deterioration of public\u2019s wealth