A gibbad-satterthwaite theorem for public good economies

We study the properties of mechanisms for deciding upon the provision of public goods when the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or technological constraints), and individuals' preferences are represented by continuous, increasing and concave utility functions, and we establish a result analog to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: strategy-proof mechanisms are dictatorial. Further, efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms are strongly dictatorial (i.e., maximize the dictator's welfare on the entire feasible set.

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial -- i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial -- i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems.Allocation mechanisms, Public goods, Strategy-proofness, Dictatorship, Efficiency

A Gibbad-Satterthwaite Theorem for Public Good Economies

We study the properties of mechanisms for deciding upon the provision of public goods when the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or technological constraints), and individuals' preferences are represented by continuous, increasing and concave utility functions, and we establish a result analog to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: strategy-proof mechanisms are dictatorial. Further, efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms are strongly dictatorial (i.e., maximize the dictator's welfare on the entire feasible set.)

E-Democracy and Knowledge. A Multicriteria Framework for the New Democratic Era

This paper analyses a new framework for decision-making in e-democracies that exploits the power of Internet based public knowledge, which is called briefly e-cognocracy. This is not a procedure to improve technical aspects using the Internet (e.g. e-voting); it is rather a procedure to add a new quality to the democratic system by using the network. This proposed system of e-cognocracy would allow those who are interested to solve highly complex problems by participatory decision-making. Furthermore, we suggest the multicriteria framework for the modelling and resolution of such complex problems. Similarly, using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) approach, we propose decisional (analytic and informatic) tools for searching the knowledge - relevant for the decision-making process. This knowledge of patterns of behaviour, trends, opportunities, decisions and stylised facts will be the starting point of a consensus-reaching process, which is aimed to effectively solve problems of high complexity of the Internet society.E-democracy, Knowledge society, E-cognocracy, Multicriteria, AHP criterion, Consensus

Good practices in school to educate critical citizens: the youth parliament programme from the perspective of secondary school teachers in training

ERPA International Congresses on Education 2018This paper refers to the European project Erasmus + ELEF (European Learning Environment Formats for Citizenship and Democracy, Reference number 580426). The aim of this project is to develop, implement, evaluate and replicate democratic and innovative learning environments (good practices) in both educational institutions and informal and community learning environments. In this context, over the course of a year, a number of experiences considered relevant have been selected, which constitute the sample of this research on good practices. This contribution presents the educational programme “Youth Parliament”. This is a project with a long history and whose main objective is to train responsible citizens, with the collaboration of various educational agents. The evaluation carried out by the Secondary Education teachers in training on the potentialities and limitations of the programme is shown, based on the experiences carried out in the participating educational centres during the academic year 2016-2017

Consumo público e inflación dual

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los efectos de la política fiscal sobre producción, empleo y precios relativos en una economía formada por dos sectores productivos: uno de bienes comerciables (competitivo) y otro de bienes no comerciables (monopolio). El análisis de los efectos de la política fiscal se efectúa bajo dos escenarios diferentes. En uno de ellos, el sector monopolista no considera el nivel de gasto público en la determinación del precio, mientras que en el otro sí lo considera