What Allotment and Subcontracting in Procurement Bidding

Allotment and subcontracting are the two alternative mechanisms enabling the participation of SMEs in procurement. We compare these two alternatives in the context of a procurement contract awarded by a first-price sealed-bid auction. When the winning large firm is constrained with respect to the degree of subcontracting, we show that only a reduction of the chosen SME's profit can reduce the expected cost of the contract. However, when the large firm is allowed to choose the subcontracting level, subcontracting can be a Pareto dominating mechanism, i.e. simultaneously increasing both firms' profits and reducing the expected total cost of the contract.allotment; subcontracting; procurement; bidding

Feeding and metabolism of the jellyfish Pelagia noctiluca (scyphomedusae, semaeostomae)

International audienc

Long-term fluctuations of Pelagia noctiluca (Cnidaria, Scyphomedusa) in the Western Mediterranean sea : prediction by climatic variables

International audienc

The Sales of Small firms : a multidimensional analysis

Working Paper du GATE 2001-02This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.Ce papier étudie une procédure particulière de vente de PME, l'open-bid, dans laquelle nous endogénéisons la structure en droits de vote des actifs financiers. Cette procédure de vente se rapproche d'une enchère ascendante. Le vendeur peut avoir deux objectifs divergents: maximiser son revenu et assurer la pérennité de son entreprise. Le premier objectif est atteint si le vendeur conserve une partie des parts de l'entreprise afin de tirer bénéfices des dividendes futurs réalisés par le repreneur. Le second objectif implique la vente de la totalité des parts de l'entreprise

The Sales of Small firms : a multidimensional analysis

This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.auctions; security voting structure; small firms