UMA ESTRATÉGIA DE TRANSIÇÃO PARA UMA NOVA POLÍTICA ECONÔMICA

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Mass protests: Brazilian spring or Brazilian malaise?

Vast demonstrations erupted in Brazil in early June 2013, seemingly from nowhere, demanding free transport, improvements in public services, the reform of a dysfunctional and corrupt political system, and much more. The federal government, led since 2003 by the left-wing Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), was stunned. The right-wing opposition vanished in the mêlée, while the TV showed, night after night, masses of young people pouring into the streets, most of them marching for the first time. For a few days, it seemed that a revolutionary situation might emerge, leaderless, perhaps, but fully formed in the womb of the masses. Then strange things began to happen. The movement took a slightly sinister turn. At the margins of large concentrations, small groups of people regularly went on the rampage. The police sometimes attacked the demonstrations, and sometimes disappeared from view. Bands of muscular men with cropped hair, wrapped in the national flag, beat up people with a red T-shirt or waving a red flag. There were calls for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousssef, and for a military coup. Finally, unknown persons launched, on Facebook and Youtube, a call for a general strike on 1 July, but they did not think it useful to issue specific demands. This essay offers a political economy interpretation of the context, origins, implications and challenges posed by the ‘Events of June’ to the Brazilian left, in the light of the achievements and limitations of the federal administrations led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-present). The argument is developed in six substantive sections. The first three review the Lula and Dilma administrations. The fourth describes the Events of June, and the fifth examines the lessons for the left. The sixth section draws the relevant conclusions

Da economia política à política econômica: o novo-desenvolvimentismo e o governo Lula

From political economy to economic policy: The neo-developmentalism and the Lula administration. This article critically reviews the design of neo-developmentalist economic policies in Brazil, in the first half of the last decade, and their relationship with the economic policies of the Lula administration after 2006. Paradoxically, the neo-developmentalist policies were implemented jointly with the main (neoliberal) macroeconomic policies which had been introduced earlier. The article reviews the relevant literature, and examines the contradictory nature of this 'inflection' of economic policy. So far, this combination of policies has achieved an unquestionable - though provisional - success, despite the persistence of the structural macroeconomic problems due to the continuity of the neoliberal policies

Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory?

The Brazilian Workers' Party () won a resounding victory in the presidential elections in October . Its candidate, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) received m votes (.%) in the first round, and m (.%) in the second round of the elections. His nearest rival, José Serra, a former minister in F.H. Cardoso's administration (-), was beaten by m votes in both rounds. 2 The new president, a former lathe operator and trade union leader, commands nearly universal appreciation. He has been fêted by the international left as well as the government, the and the World Bank, and he is probably the only person ever to be cheered both in the Davos World Economic Forum and the Porto Alegre World Social Forum. This can be explained by Lula's impeccable leftist credentials and personal integrity, and by his adoption of a thoroughly neoliberal economic programme. This article examines the reasons for continuity and the scope for change during the new administration. Neo-liberalism in the s Since the late s, successive Brazilian administrations have followed the standard neo-liberal-globalist policy menu. These policies included financial, trade and capital account liberalisation, large-scale privatisations, economic deregulation and monetary stabilisation though the Real plan. 3 Brazilian neo-liberalism is peculiar only because of its relative lateness and gradualism. This was partly due to Brazil's protracted transition to democracy, stretching between the mid-s and the late s, and partly due to the political T his article explains the context of Lula's election for the Brazilian presidency, and the scope for progressive economic and social change in the country. We argue that although the ruling coalition is on the political left, the new administration is not, and it will face grave difficulties to achieve traditional left objectives, including universal citizenship and greater equality of income and wealth

UMA ESTRATÉGIA DE TRANSIÇÃO PARA UMA NOVA POLÍTICA ECONÔMICA

Não há resum

Mass Protests: Brazilian Spring or Brazilian Malaise?

Vast demonstrations erupted in Brazil in early June 2013, seemingly from nowhere, demanding free transport, improvements in public services, the reform of a dysfunctional and corrupt political system, and much more. The federal government, led since 2003 by the left-wing Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), was stunned. The right-wing opposition vanished in the mêlée, while the TV showed, night after night, masses of young people pouring into the streets, most of them marching for the first time. For a few days, it seemed that a revolutionary situation might emerge, leaderless, perhaps, but fully formed in the womb of the masses. Then strange things began to happen. The movement took a slightly sinister turn. At the margins of large concentrations, small groups of people regularly went on the rampage. The police sometimes attacked the demonstrations, and sometimes disappeared from view. Bands of muscular men with cropped hair, wrapped in the national flag, beat up people with a red T-shirt or waving a red flag. There were calls for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousssef, and for a military coup. Finally, unknown persons launched, on Facebook and Youtube, a call for a general strike on 1 July, but they did not think it useful to issue specific demands. This essay offers a political economy interpretation of the context, origins, implications and challenges posed by the ‘Events of June’ to the Brazilian left, in the light of the achievements and limitations of the federal administrations led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-present). The argument is developed in six substantive sections. The first three review the Lula and Dilma administrations. The fourth describes the Events of June, and the fifth examines the lessons for the left. The sixth section draws the relevant conclusions