Fintech and Secured Transactions Systems of the Future

Syftet med den här studien var att undersöka hur pedagoger tänker kring sitt förhållningssätt i konflikter och vilka effekter de tror att förhållningssättet kan få i barngruppen. Studiens metod har varit kvalitativa intervjuer där sex pedagoger från olika förskolor har deltagit. Resultatet visade att deltagarna hela tiden reflekterar över sitt förhållningssätt till konflikter och varför konflikter uppstår. Något som alla deltagare belyste var att det är viktigt att barnen ges verktyg för att klara konflikter själva. Flera olika strategier kunde ses på hur konflikthantering går till men mycket handlar om bemötande, förklaringar och att alla i slutändan ska känna sig nöjda. Alla deltagande ansåg att konflikter är lärande men på olika plan. Bland annat handlar det om ett lärande utifrån den gemensamma respekt man bör ha mot varandra men även det sociala samspelet nämns. De slutsatser som kan dras är att konflikthantering i förskolan är en viktig del där pedagogens förhållningssätt påverkar konfliktens utgång. Att ge barnen verktyg för att klara konflikter själva ses som en bra start och en central del i konflikthantering hos deltagarna

Prosthesis coupling

A coupling for use in an apparatus for connecting a prosthesis to the bone of a stump of an amputated limb is described which permits a bio-compatible carbon sleeve forming a part of the prosthesis connector to float so as to prevent disturbing the skin seal around the carbon sleeve. The coupling includes a flexible member interposed between a socket that is inserted within an intermedullary cavity of the bone and the sleeve. A lock pin is carried by the prosthesis and has a stem portion which is adapted to be coaxially disposed and slideably within the tubular female socket for securing the prosthesis to the stump. The skin around the percutaneous carbon sleeve is able to move as a result of the flexing coupling so as to reduce stresses caused by changes in the stump shape and/or movement between the bone and the flesh portion of the stump

Beyond Intermediation: A New (FinTech) Model for Securities Holding Infrastructures

Publicly traded securities generally are held by investors in securities accounts with intermediaries such as stockbrokers and central securities depositories—intermediated securities. For many investors this is the only practical means of holding and dealing with securities. These intermediated holding systems (IHSs) impose a variety of risks and costs. Investors are exposed to intermediary risk (default or insolvency of an intermediary holding securities) as well as impediments to the exercise of rights such as voting and asserting claims against securities issuers. The nontransparency of IHSs imposes other social costs, such as obstacles to anti-money laundering enforcement. The emergence of FinTech and the potentially disruptive effects of distributed ledger technology (blockchain) now present realistic opportunities for reforms of securities holding infrastructures that would increase transparency and allow investors to hold securities directly on the books of their issuers. This article proposes a “New Platform System” (NPS) for the direct holding of securities that would connect issuers and investors and also connect both with trading and settlement systems (which would remain intact, at least for now). Unlike other recent transparency and direct holding proposals, the NPS would cover both equity and debt securities and would flexibly accommodate beneficial aspects of current IHSs, such as margin lending, securities lending, and rehypothecation. The article presents a broader menu of problems that the NPS could resolve. The NPS addresses the probable objections that the intermediaries who benefit from the status quo would make to any transparency or direct holding proposals. Disintermediation likely would require regulatory intervention by the SEC in the United States. By offering reforms that would minimize the disruption of current market practices, the NPS could encourage intervention and blunt opposition. It also could provide a “primordial soup” for future, more extensive reforms of trading and settlement systems

The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors for Settlement Payments and Securities Contracts: When Is Safe \u3ci\u3eToo\u3c/i\u3e Safe?

This Article addresses insolvency law-related issues in connection with certain financial-markets contracts, such as securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements (repos), swaps and other derivatives, and master netting agreements. The Bankruptcy Code provides special treatment—safe harbors—for these contracts (collectively, qualified financial contracts or QFCs). This special treatment is considerably more favorable for nondebtor parties to QFCs than the rules applicable to nondebtor parties to other contracts with a debtor. Yet even some strong critics of the safe harbors concede that some special treatment may be warranted. This Article offers a critique of the safe harbor for settlement payments, as interpreted by the courts, and the safe harbor for transfers in connection with securities contracts that is clearly written into the Bankruptcy Code. It provides an overview of the legislative history, describes the scope and operation of the statutory components of the safe harbors, briefly describes the various academic critiques, and offers my general views on revisions that should be made to the safe harbor provisions. It questions the quite expansive interpretation given by some courts to the safe harbor for settlement payments. It then explains how the safe harbor for transfers made in connection with security contracts could be used to protect from the avoidance powers payments and collateralizations of ordinary debt, transactions that have nothing to do with the QFC markets