Does practice shape the brain?

No abstract available

Syntactic structure and artificial grammar learning : The learnability of embedded hierarchical structures

Embedded hierarchical structures, such as ‘‘the rat the cat ate was brown’’, constitute a core generative property of a natural language theory. Several recent studies have reported learning of hierarchical embeddings in artificial grammar learning (AGL) tasks, and described the functional specificity of Broca’s area for processing such structures. In two experiments, we investigated whether alternative strategies can explain the learning success in these studies. We trained participants on hierarchical sequences, and found no evidence for the learning of hierarchical embeddings in test situations identical to those from other studies in the literature. Instead, participants appeared to solve the task by exploiting surface distinctions between legal and illegal sequences, and applying strategies such as counting or repetition detection. We suggest alternative interpretations for the observed activation of Broca’s area, in terms of the application of calculation rules or of a differential role of working memory. We claim that the learnability of hierarchical embeddings in AGL tasks remains to be demonstrated

Development and production of a flame retardant, general purpose, pressure sensitive adhesive tape

The specification results for the finished tape properties were as follows: (1) adhesive strength (180 deg peel) on aluminum from 107 to 143 grams per centimeter (0.6 to 0.8 pounds per inch); (2) adhesive strength (180 deg peel) on stainless steel from 71 to 107 grams per centimeter (0.4 to 0.6 pounds per inch); (3) unwind resistance of 536 to 714 grams per centimeter (3 to 4 pounds per inch); (4) tensile strength minimum of 7143 grams per centimeter (40 pounds per inch); (5) elongation from 5 to 10% at break; (6) tear strength, Elmendorf from 200 to 350 grams (0.44 to 0.77 pounds); and (7) tear strength, tongue from 363 to 408 grams (0.8 to 0.9) pounds)

Distribution and marketing of Western Australia rock lobster.

This report describes the marketing and distribution of Western Australian rock lobster products in the major consuming countries namely, USA, Japan and Taiwan. It is based on a study which was commissioned by the Fisheries Department of Western Australia who sought, for the benefit of industry generally, an understanding of the world lobster markets

A study into the feasibility of establishing a system for the buy-back of salmon fishing authorisations and related endorsements.

A buy-back system for the buy-back of under performing salmon authorisations is suggested as the most cost effective method of reducing the number of salmon fishing units. It could be of benefit to commercial salmon fishermen and could be achieved at relatively modest cost. The alternative of implementing a buy-back system of interest to all salmon authorisation holders could be extraordinary expensive as salmon fishermen place a high value on lifestyle

Comment on Professor Van Alstyne\u27s Paper

My major difficulty with Professor Van Alstyne\u27s paper is its incomplete character. In the end, he makes only two points: first, judges are authorized to apply this Constitution, not to do justice; and second, judges should not lie about what they are doing. The danger is that after a while the first point sounds somewhat empty, while the actual content of the second point seems entirely parasitic on the first

Constructive Trust and Equitable Lien: Status of the Conscious and the Innocent Wrongdoer in Equity

The field of restitution, broadly considered, involves all those situations in which a person who holds property (or has consumed it) must deliver it (or its value) to the claimant in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of the holder. In this sense the ancient common law writs for the recovery of chattels or their value (detinue, replevin, and trover) and land (ejectment) are perceived to be restitutionary in character. A more modem development in the law courts, the allowance of quasi-contractual relief upon the common counts in general assumpsit, rests upon the same basis. In a leading English case, Lord Mansfield states the true basis of the latter obligation. If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice to refund, the law implies a debt, and gives this action founded in the equity of the plaintiff\u27s case, as it were upon a contract (\u27quasi ex contractu\u27) as the Roman law expresses it … This kind of equitable action, to recover back money, is very beneficial, and therefore much encouraged. It lies only for money which, ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought to refund. Contract sounded in promise but quasi-contract had its roots in the notion of unjust enrichment

Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us

Since its publication in 1953, Henry Hart’s famous article, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic , subsequently referred to as simply “The Dialogue,” has served as the leading scholarly treatment of congressional control over the federal courts. Now in its seventh decade, much has changed since Hart first wrote. This Article examines what lessons The Dialogue still holds for its readers circa 2020

Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What \u3cem\u3eThe Dialogue\u3c/em\u3e (Still) Has to Teach Us

Since its publication in 1953, Henry Hart’s famous article, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, subsequently referred to as simply “The Dialogue,” has served as the leading scholarly treatment of congressional control over the federal courts. Now in its seventh decade, much has changed since Hart first wrote. This Article examines what lessons The Dialogue still holds for its readers circa 2020

Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When

When the newly appointed Justices of the Supreme Court assembled in the Royal Exchange Building in New York for their first session on February 2, 1790, the most farsighted individual could not have foreseen what the future held for this tribunal. Now less than a generation short of its 200th anniversary, the Court is universally acknowledged to be the final and authoritative expositor of the Constitution. Yet after almost two centuries, questions concerning this power of the Court to interpret the Constitution remain. The first set of questions centers on the substantive standards for constitutional adjudication. The second, with which this article deals, focuses on the conditions under which constitutional determinations should be made: who may obtain constitutional declarations and when. Although often viewed as merely technical, legalistic wrangling which unnecessarily impedes the Court in its task of constitutional exegesis, these who and when questions embody fundamental assumptions as to the Court\u27s appropriate role in our constitutional scheme. The constitutional text is itself spare and unhelpful on these critical questions, providing only that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to certain enumerated cases and controversies, including those arising under the Constitution. Except for the creation of the Court and limited specifications as to its original jurisdiction; the remainder was left to Congress, which was expressly authorized to establish such inferior federal courts as it saw fit and to regulate the Supreme Court\u27s appellate jurisdiction. At its first session Congress quickly enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized, inter alia, Supreme Court review of certain constitutional determinations by the state courts. While the Act also established lower federal courts – a step which proved to have lasting significance – it gave those courts no direct arising under jurisdiction, and accordingly, until the great expansion of federal jurisdiction following the Civil War, their constitutional adjudications resulted only as by-products of the exercise of other jurisdiction. Neither the Constitution nor the Act set out the `circumstances under which constitutional pronouncements were proper. Article III\u27s limitation of the judicial power to cases and controversies has little necessary meaning; like most provisions of the Constitution, these words bear several interpretations. And while the Act established the federal judicial system, it said little about the occasions on which it was proper for any court to decide constitutional questions. Rather, like the substantive constitutional standards, the nature and form of judicial review were slowly shaped over time