Future planning in preschool children

The capacity to plan ahead and provide the means for future ends is an important part of human practical reasoning. When this capacity develops in ontogeny is the matter of an ongoing debate. In this study, 4- and 5-year-olds performed a future planning task in which they had to create the means (a picture of a particular object, e.g., a banana) that was necessary to address a future end (of completing a game in which such a picture was missing). Children of both ages drew more targets than children in a control condition in which there was no future end to be pursued. Along with prior findings, the results suggest a major progression in children’s future thinking between 3 and 5 years. Our findings expand on prior knowledge by showing that young children cannot only identify the probate means to future ends but determine such ends and create the means to achieve them, thus offering compelling evidence for future planning

Counterfactual curiosity in preschool children

We investigated whether young children are curious about what could have been (“counterfactual curiosity”). In two experiments, children aged 4 and 5 years (N = 32 in Experiment 1, N = 24 in Experiment 2) played a matching game in which they turned over cards in the hope that they matched a picture. After choosing a card, children could use “x-ray glasses” to uncover unchosen cards. In Experiment 1, most children spontaneously used the glasses to peek at past alternatives, even when the outcome could no longer be altered. In Experiment 2, children concentrated their information search on alternatives that were within their control. In both experiments, children showed greater interest in counterfactual outcomes when the card they chose turned out not to match the picture. The findings suggest that young children are curious not only about what is but also about what could have been. Curiosity about alternative outcomes seems to precede counterfactual reasoning

Freezing Medium Containing 5% DMSO Enhances the Cell Viability and Recovery Rate After Cryopreservation of Regulatory T Cell Products ex vivo and in vivo

Cell therapies have significant therapeutic potential in diverse fields including regenerative medicine, transplantation tolerance, and autoimmunity. Within these fields, regulatory T cells (Treg) have been deployed to ameliorate aberrant immune responses with great success. However, translation of the cryopreservation strategies employed for other cell therapy products, such as effector T cell therapies, to Treg therapies has been challenging. The lack of an optimized cryopreservation strategy for Treg products presents a substantial obstacle to their broader application, particularly as administration of fresh cells limits the window available for sterility and functional assessment. In this study, we aimed to develop an optimized cryopreservation strategy for our CD4+CD25+Foxp3+ Treg clinical product. We investigate the effect of synthetic or organic cryoprotectants including different concentrations of DMSO on Treg recovery, viability, phenotype, cytokine production, suppressive capacity, and in vivo survival following GMP-compliant manufacture. We additionally assess the effect of adding the extracellular cryoprotectant polyethylene glycol (PEG), or priming cellular expression of heat shock proteins as strategies to improve viability. We find that cryopreservation in serum-free freezing medium supplemented with 10% human serum albumin and 5% DMSO facilitates improved Treg recovery and functionality and supports a reduced DMSO concentration in Treg cryopreservation protocols. This strategy may be easily incorporated into clinical manufacture protocols for future studies

Cultural evolution: A review of theoretical challenges

The rapid growth of cultural evolutionary science, its expansion into numerous fields, its use of diverse methods, and several conceptual problems have outpaced corollary developments in theory and philosophy of science. This has led to concern, exemplified in results from a recent survey conducted with members of the Cultural Evolution Society, that the field lacks ‘knowledge synthesis’, is poorly supported by ‘theory’, has an ambiguous relation to biological evolution and uses key terms (e.g. ‘culture’, ‘social learning’, ‘cumulative culture’) in ways that hamper operationalization in models, experiments and field studies. Although numerous review papers in the field represent and categorize its empirical findings, the field's theoretical challenges receive less critical attention even though challenges of a theoretical or conceptual nature underlie most of the problems identified by Cultural Evolution Society members. Guided by the heterogeneous ‘grand challenges’ emergent in this survey, this paper restates those challenges and adopts an organizational style requisite to discussion of them. The paper's goal is to contribute to increasing conceptual clarity and theoretical discernment around the most pressing challenges facing the field of cultural evolutionary science. It will be of most interest to cultural evolutionary scientists, theoreticians, philosophers of science and interdisciplinary researchers

Tension in the Natural History of Human Thinking

Michael Tomasello has greatly expanded our knowledge of human cognition and how it differs from that of other animals. In this commentary to his recent book A Natural History of Human Thinking, I first critique some of the presuppositions and arguments of his evolutionary story about how homo sapiens’ cognition emerged. For example, I question the strategy of relying on the modern chimpanzee as a model for our last shared ancestor, and I doubt the idea that what changed first over evolutionary time was hominin behavior, which then in turn brought about changes in cognition. In the second half of the commentary I aim to show that the author oscillates between an additive and a transformative account of human shared intentionality. I argue that shared intentionality shapes cognition in its entirety and therefore precludes the possibility that humans have the same, individual intentionality (as shown in, e.g. their instrumental reasoning) as other apes

Tension in the Natural History of Human Thinking

Michael Tomasello has greatly expanded our knowledge of human cognition and how it differs from that of other animals. In this commentary to his recent book A Natural History of Human Thinking, I first critique some of the presuppositions and arguments of his evolutionary story about how homo sapiens’ cognition emerged. For example, I question the strategy of relying on the modern chimpanzee as a model for our last shared ancestor, and I doubt the idea that what changed first over evolutionary time was hominin behavior, which then in turn brought about changes in cognition. In the second half of the commentary I aim to show that the author oscillates between an additive and a transformative account of human shared intentionality. I argue that shared intentionality shapes cognition in its entirety and therefore precludes the possibility that humans have the same, individual intentionality (as shown in, e.g. their instrumental reasoning) as other apes