King of the Hill Positional Dynamics in Contests

In a contest with positional dynamics between an incumbent and a challenger i) inequality of power may magnify conflicts, ii) more severe conflicts can go together with lower turnover of incumbents, and iii) power can be self defeating as cost advantages can reduce pay-offs. These three propositions of our paper are contrary to the implications of static conflict models. They follow from incorporating positional dynamics into the standard static approach. Such positional dynamics are relevant for competition in battlefields, politics, and market places.Contests;political stability;war;incumbency advantage

Destructive Creativity

Destructive creativity implies that parasites become more efficient in rent extraction. We focus on destructive creativity in situations where parasites live on rents extracted from the producers. A higher parasitic strength implies that the waste associated with rent seeking increases, and in the long run erodes business productivity, implying that the sustainability of predation is threatened by improved efficiency.

Plunder & Protection Inc

When the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protection against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire group of violent entrepreneurs. Hence, in weak states a situation may arise where a large number of violent entrepreneurs can operate side by side as plunderers and protectors squeezing the producers from both sides. The problem reached new levels at the end of the cold war. As military forces were demobilized without civilian jobs to go to, many countries got an oversupply of qualified violent people for crime, warfare and private protection. In this .market for extortion. the entry of new violent entrepreneurs enhances the proÞtability of them all. The supply of violence creates its own demand; an externality of violence that is detrimental to the development in poor countries

King of the Hill Positional Dynamics in Contests

In a contest with positional dynamics between an incumbent and a challenger i) inequality of power may magnify conflicts, ii) more severe conflicts can go together with lower turnover of incumbents, and iii) power can be self defeating as cost advantages can reduce pay-offs. These three propositions of our paper are contrary to the implications of static conflict models. They follow from incorporating positional dynamics into the standard static approach. Such positional dynamics are relevant for competition in battlefields, politics, and market places

Rising Inequality in the Egalitarian Nordics

acceptedVersio

Marked, makt og motmakt – i Adam Smiths, Henry Hunts og Henry Georges tid

De engelske kornlovene 1815–1846 ble initiert for å beskytte grunneiernes kommersielle inntekter; matkrisen i Frankrike i 1770 for å øke overskuddet på kongens jord; hungersnøden i Bengal i 1770 for å øke East India Companys profitt. Eksemplene indikerer hvordan fattigdom og sult i perioden 1750–1850 kunne skyldes kommersielt maktmisbruk som skadet allmennheten, samtidig som grunneiere og næringslivsinteresser tjente på det. Essayet understreker hvordan progressive økonomer på den tiden foreslo å bruke frihandel for å temme det kommersielle maktmisbruket. Venstresiden agiterte for marked heller enn monopol. Høyresiden agiterte for privilegier heller enn konkurranse

Institutions and the resource curse

Countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners. We claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions. More natural resources push aggregate income down, when institutions are grabber friendly, while more resources raise income, when in- stitutions are producer friendly. We test this theory building on Sachs and Warner's influential works on the resource curse. Our main hypothesis: that institutions are decisive for the resource curse, is confirmed. Our results are in sharp contrast to the claim by Sachs and Warner that institutions do not play a role

Nordic Economic Policy Review : Globalization, labour market institutions and wage structure

The Nordic Economic Policy Review – NEPR – is published by the Nordic Council of Ministers and addresses policy issues in a way that is useful for in-formed non-specialists as well as for professional economists. All articles are commissioned from leading professional economists and are subject to peer review prior to publication. The review appears twice a year. It is published electronically on the website of the Nordic Council of Ministers: www.norden.org/en. On that website, you can also order paper copies of the Review (enter the name of the Review in the search field, and you will find all the information you need). Managing Editor: Professor Torben M. Andersen, Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Denmark. Special Editors for this volume: Research Professor Erling Barth, Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway and Professor Kalle O. Moene, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Norway