The potential and pitfalls of unit asking in reducing scope insensitivity

This article revisits and further investigates the extent to which scope insensitivity in helping contexts can be reduced by the unit asking (UA) method. UA is an intervention that first asks people to help one unit and then asks for willingness to help multiple units. In 3 studies (N = 3,442), participants took on the role of policymakers to allocate help (motivation to help and willingness to pay) to local aid projects. They underwent either UA or a control condition (in which they stated their willingness to help only to the multiple units). Against expectations, the first 2 studies found a reversed UA effect for helping motivation, such that help decreased when participants were in the UA condition. However, the third study found a UA effect for helping motivation when participants made the sequential assessments within one project (when the individual unit belonged to the multiple units-group), rather than between projects (when the individual unit belonged to another group). Thus, our results suggest that the 2 assessments critical for the UA method should be done within the same project rather than between 2 projects to successfully reduce scope insensitivity. Further, the age of the unit (child or adult), the number of the unit(s), the composition of the group (homogeneous or heterogeneous), and the size of the group did not substantially reduce scope insensitivity with UA

Is happiness choosing to give or to take money? : An experimental study of prosocial spending, active and passive choices and nudging

Research within positive psychology has shown that spending money on other people (prosocial spending) makes you happier than spending it on yourself (proself spending). The present study tested and extended this idea. Also, how an active or a passive choice in spending affect happiness has been tested. Lastly, this study is the first one to test the effect of nudging on happiness by examining the role of choice, defaults in spending. Three measures of subjective well-being (SWB) was used before and after the manipulation. The web experiment consisted of 788 people recruited from a web-based research company that were randomized to five conditions. Participants played a game and won money, of which some could be donated to a charity organization - representing prosocial spending. The results show that prosocial spending makes people happier than proself spending and that active choices elicit significantly more negative affects than passive choices. A default effect was also found, in so that more people chose proself spending when this was the default. Lastly, the greatest effect on happiness is to change from a default, compared to following a default or doing an active choice without a default. The results are in line with findings in positive psychology as well as theories suggesting that people feel less satisfied and happy when making decisions

Hur Liv Värderas Olika och Vad Man Kan Göra åt Det : Rollen av Identifierbarhet, Antal och Ålder i Välgörenhetsgivande

Many people choose to donate money to help victims of humanitarian crises. However, people’s donation decisions often fail to reflect that all victims are equally valuable to help. Instead, some victims seem to be favored. This thesis aims to better understand valuations of lives by looking at how people respond to charity appeals that differ on three factors: level of identifiability (if there is an identified victim or not), numbers in need (if there is one, few, or many victims in need), and age (if the victim is a child or an adult). This thesis also tests two kinds of interventions in charitable giving aimed to make people value lives more equally regarding numbers in need and the identifiability of victims.    Paper I investigated how the identifiable victim effect (i.e., more willingness to help an identified victim than unidentified victims) influences people’s donation decisions if they are reminded of alternative uses of money (i.e., opportunity cost). In two studies, participants (N = 2397) saw a charity appeal that either included an identified victim or not, while either receiving an opportunity cost reminder or not. The results showed that for a one-time donation decision, people became less willing to donate when reminded of opportunity cost, but mainly for non-identified charity appeals.    Paper II investigated how the victim’s age relates to the identifiable victim effect. In three studies, participants (N = 1508) saw a charity appeal that either helped children or adults, and either included an identified victim or not. The results showed that people did not donate more if the charity appeal included an identified victim, regardless of whether the victim was a child or an adult, but that people were more motivated to help or more willing to donate to children than adults.    Paper III investigated two types of deliberation interventions for the singularity effect (i.e., increased willingness to help a single identified victim over a group of identified victims). In two studies, participants (N = 900) saw a charity appeal that either depicted one or eight identified children in need, and either got an intervention prompting them to rely on deliberate thinking, an intervention asking them to rate the importance of four decision-relevant attributes, or no intervention at all. The singularity effect was found in control conditions, but not in either of the intervention conditions. However, this was at the expense of decreasing the help to the single victim, without increasing help to the group of victims.   Paper IV investigated the unit asking intervention in relation to victim identifiability and the number of victims in need. In three studies, participants (N = 4206) either underwent the unit asking intervention, in which they indicated a hypothetical amount to one victim before answering how much to donate to a group of victims, or no intervention. In the first two studies, participants also saw a charity appeal that either included an identified victim – with varying levels of identifiability – or not. In the third study, participants saw an appeal that either included the picture of one or five children, and involved providing help to either 20 or 200 children. People in control conditions were unaffected by whether the charity appeal included an identified victim or not, and they did not donate more when more victims were in need. However, participants in the unit asking conditions donated more when more victims were in need and donated more regardless of the level of identifiability.  In conclusion, this thesis shows that people’s donation decisions are affected to different extents by the information in the charity appeal related to identifiability, numbers in need, and age – which can result in unequal valuations of lives. This thesis also shows that interventions, especially the unit asking method, can make valuations of lives more equal. Taken together, this thesis contributes to a broader understanding of how people make decisions regarding charity and how interventions can impact such decision-making processes.   Många människor donerar pengar för att hjälpa offer för humanitära kriser. Däremot tycks människors donationsbeslut sällan reflektera att alla offer är lika mycket värda att hjälpa. I stället tycks vissa offer värderas högre. Denna avhandling syftar till att få en bättre förståelse kring värdering av liv genom att undersöka hur människor svarar på välgörenhetsannonser som skiljer sig åt i tre aspekter: nivå av identifierbarhet (om det finns ett identifierat offer eller inte), antal i behov av hjälp (om det är ett, några få eller många offer i behov) och ålder (om offret är ett barn eller en vuxen). Avhandlingen undersöker även två typer av interventioner som ämnar att öka lika värderingar av liv gällande antal i behov och identifierbarhet av offer.    Papper I undersökte hur identifierbarhetseffekten (d.v.s. större villighet att hjälpa ett identifierat offer än oidentifierade offer) påverkar människors donationsbeslut om de påminns om andra sätt att använda pengarna på (d.v.s. alternativkostnad). I två studier fick deltagare (N = 2397) se en välgörenhetsannons som antingen inkluderade ett identifierat offer eller inte, medan de antingen fick en påminnelse om alternativkostnad eller inte. Resultatet visade att deltagare blev mindre villiga att donera vid engångsbeslut om de påmindes om alternativkostnad, men huvudsakligen i relation till välgörenhetsannonser utan ett identifierat offer.     Papper II undersökte hur identifierbarhetseffekten påverkas av offrets ålder. I tre studier fick deltagare (N = 1508) se en välgörenhetsannons som antingen hjälpte barn eller vuxna, och som antingen inkluderade ett identifierat offer eller inte. Resultatet visade att deltagare inte donerade mer om välgörenhetsannonsen inkluderade ett identifierat offer, oavsett om offret var ett barn eller en vuxen, men att deltagare var mer motiverade att hjälpa eller donera till barn än till vuxna.    Papper III undersökte två typer av interventioner som betonar eftertänksamhet för singularitetseffekten (d.v.s. större villighet att hjälpa ett identifierat offer än en grupp identifierade offer). I två studier fick deltagare (N = 900) se en välgörenhetsannons som antingen presenterade ett eller åtta identifierade barn i behov av hjälp, och fick antingen en intervention som uppmanade dem att vara eftertänksamma, en intervention som lät de skatta hur viktiga fyra beslutsrelevanta attribut var, eller ingen intervention alls. Singularitetseffekten hittades i kontrollbetingelserna, men inte i någon av interventionsbetingelserna. Däremot var detta på bekostnad av att hjälpen till det enskilda barnet minskade, utan att hjälpen till gruppen ökade.   Papper IV undersökte en unit asking intervention i relation till identifierbarhet och antal offer i behov. I tre studier fick deltagare (N = 4206) antingen genomgå en unit asking intervention, där de först fick uppge ett hypotetiskt donationsbelopp till ett offer innan de skulle uppge hur mycket de ville donera till en grupp offer, eller ingen intervention. I de första två studierna fick deltagare även se en välgörenhetsannons som antingen inkluderade ett identifierat offer – med varierande grad av identifierbarhet – eller inte. I den tredje studien fick deltagare se en välgörenhetsannons som antingen inkluderade en bild på ett eller fem barn, i en annons som hjälpte antingen 20 eller 200 barn. Deltagare i kontrollbetingelsen påverkades inte av om annonsen inkluderade ett identifierat offer eller inte, och de donerade inte mer när fler offer var i behov av hjälp. Deltagare i unit asking betingelserna donerade däremot mer när fler offer var i behov av hjälp och donerade mer oavsett nivå av identifierarbarhet. Sammantaget visar denna avhandling att människors donationsbeslut påverkas till olika grad av informationen som presenteras i välgörenhetsannonser relaterat till identifierbarhet, antal i behov och ålder – vilket kan resultera i att offer värderas olika. Avhandlingen visar också att interventioner, framför allt unit asking interventionen, kan minska tendensen att liv värderas olika i donationsbeslut. Denna avhandling bidrar därmed till en större förståelse för hur människor fattar beslut gällande välgörenhetsgivande och hur interventioner kan påverka sådana beslutsfattandeprocesser.  

To Give or to Take Money? The Effects of Choice on Prosocial Spending and Happiness

Previous studies show that spending money on other people makes people happier than spending it on whatever they want. This study tested and extended this by examining the role of active versus passive choice and default choices. 788 participants played and won money in a game, from which some of the earnings could be donated to charity. Participants were randomized to five conditions (control, passive/active decision, default to self/charity). Three measures of subjective well-being (SWB) was used. The results show that people who donated money were happier than people who kept money for themselves, and active choices elicited significantly more negative affect than passive choices. Also, more people chose to keep the money when this was the default. Last, the greatest effect on happiness was when participants chose to change from the default. The results are in line with previous findings in both positive psychology and decision making

Helping the child or the adult? Systematically testing the identifiable victim effect for child and adult victims

Is the identifiable victim effect (IVE; helping a single identified victim more than a statistical victim) stronger for child victims than adult victims? In this paper, we test the effect of identifying a victim and whether that victim is a child or adult on helping motivation and donation behaviors. In three studies (N = 1508) with different samples from different countries, we find no main effect of identifiability on any of our measures, and no support that the IVE mainly occurs for children. However, we find an age effect; child victims receive more help (studies 1a-1b) or evoke a greater motivation to help (study 2) than adult victims.Funding Agencies|Swedish Research Council (VR)Swedish Research Council [Vetenskapsradet 2014-1158]</p

To give or to take money? The effects of choice on prosocial spending and happiness

Previous studies show that spending money on others makes people happier than spending it on themselves. The present study tested and extended this idea by examining the role of active versus passive choice and default choices. Here, 788 participants played and won money in a game, from which some of the earnings could be donated to charity. Participants were randomized to five conditions (control, passive or active choice, default to self or charity). Three measures of subjective well-being (SWB) were used. The results show that people who donated money were happier than people who kept money for themselves, and that active choices elicited significantly more negative affects than passive choices. Also, more people chose to keep the money when this was the default. Last, the greatest effect on happiness was to change from the set default. The results are in line with previous findings in positive psychology and decision making.Funding Agencies|Swedish Research CouncilSwedish Research CouncilEuropean Commission</p

Thinking, good and bad? Deliberative thinking and the singularity effect in charitable giving : Deliberative thinking and the singularity effect in charitable giving

Can deliberation increase charitable giving when giving is impulsive (i.e., a one-time small gift in response to an immediate appeal)? We conduct two studies in Israel and Sweden to compare two forms of deliberation, unguided and guided, in their ability to decrease the singularity effect (i.e., giving more to one than many victims), often evident in impulsive giving. Under unguided deliberation, participants were instructed to simply think hard before making a donation decision whereas participants in the guided deliberation condition were asked to think how much different prespecified decision attributes should influence their decision. We find that both types of deliberation reduce the singularity effect, as people no longer value the single victim higher than the group of victims. Importantly, this is driven by donations being decreased under deliberation only to the single victim, but not the group of victims. Thus, deliberation affects donations negatively by overshadowing the affective response, especially in situations in which affect is greatest (i.e., to a single victim). Last, the results show that neither type of deliberation significantly reversed the singularity effect, as people did not help the group significantly more than the single victim. This means that deliberate thinking decreased the overall willingness to help, leading to a lower overall valuation of people in need.Funding Agencies: National Science Foundation (NSF)[1757315]</p

Opportunity Cost in Monetary Donation Decisions to Non-identified and Identified Victims

Do people consider alternative uses of money (i.e., opportunity cost) when asked to donate to a charitable cause? To answer this question, we examined the effect of providing versus not providing participants with an opportunity cost reminder when they are asked to donate money to causes with identified and non-identified victims. The results of two studies show that when making one-time donation decisions, people become less willing to donate to charity when reminded of opportunity cost, but mainly for non-identified victims. Moreover, framing the opportunity cost reminder as prosocial versus proself did not influence willingness to donate. Overall, our evidence suggests that opportunity cost reminders influence peoples donation behavior depending on whether charities identify supported victims or not