Structural Linkages, Expectancy Climate and School Effectiveness

This research was published by the KU Center for Research on Learning, formerly known as the University of Kansas Institute for Research in Learning Disabilities.The purpose of the investigation was to determine the effects of structural linkages and expectancy climate on four indicators of school effectiveness and to assess the stability and patterns of relationships during a school year. Samples of teachers and students from 89 elementary and secondary schools participated in the study. The structural linkage variables were consistent predictors of the criterion variables, especially later in the school year

Are we Learning the Right Lessons from Africa

In a speech delivered at Kigali Airport in late March 1998, Presi­ dent William Clinton eloquently reminded us all of the terrible atrocities that had occurred in Rwanda in 1994. There were, as the president made clear, many profoundly disturbing aspects of the genocide in Rwanda. In perhaps the most vicious cycle of violence since World War II, at least a million ethnic Tutsi people and others had been brutally murdered, and more maimed, by rampaging Hutu mobs. The violence had started in early April 1994 and only ended in July 1994, when the government was toppled by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a coalition of indigenous factions and Tutsi exile groups that had been based in Uganda

Observations on the Role of the Military in Disaster Relief

The armed fordes have payed important roles in disaster relief for more than a century. In fact the military has been so heavily involved in responding to domestic disasters, and for so long, that two questions naturally arise. The first is why there continues to be any controversy about military involvement in disaster relief. The second question is whether, in this dawning era of government reinvention, the federal disaster relief program should be administered by the military rather than by a civilian agency, as it is today

Reducing the Risks of Depending upon Foreign Industries

A common view among national security strategists is that the United States is courting trouble by importing too many defense-related components and technologies from Europe and Asia

“Being There” Matters—But Where?

The driving factor in determining the requirements for routine, noncrisis forward presence ought to be reasoned, objective judgments about the relative importance of the various regions of the world to the United States. One approach is to define specific criteria—and for the time being, the most sensible criteria are economic

National Interests—Grand Purposes or Catchphrases?

For thoroughly practical reasons, it would be wise to engage the public and Congress in a meaningful dialogue about what the national interests actually are. Projects that require protracted effort are simply not possible when national interests are so generally defined that they mean all things to all people

Effects of Structural Coupling and Expectancy Climate on the Effectiveness of Learning Strategies Interventions: A Pilot Study to Establish Reliability and Validity Estimates

This research was published by the KU Center for Research on Learning, formerly known as the University of Kansas Institute for Research in Learning Disabilities.Successful implementation of the learning strategies model proposed by Alley and Deshler (1979) depends on high levels of interactive planning and effort by learning disabilities teachers, regular classroom teachers and administrators. In this context, structural coupling and expectancy climate become important intervening variables by defining mechanisms and norms that influence how individuals interact and the level of effort expended. The purpose of this pilot study was to establish structural coupling and expectancy climate levels with interview and assessment instruments. Over 155 educators drawn from several schools participated in the study. Results of the study showed that these assessment instruments demonstrated high reliability and adequate validity levels

Still Worth Fighting Over? A Joint Response

Readers may recall that in the Autumn 2002 issue of the Naval War College Review, Professor James F. Miskel, of the National Security Decision Making Department, argued that the U.S. government often defines national interests in such general terms that its specific goals are not clearly communicated to the American public and to other governments.1 In the Spring 2003 issue, Professor P. H. Liotta, also of the National Security Decision Making Department, responded with a counter- essay arguing that while distinguishing core strategic interests—those for which Americans would be willing to die—from significant interests is almost never easy, it is also essential