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Are We Learning the Right Lessons from Africa's Humanitarian Crises?

James Miskel

IN A SPEECH DELIVERED AT Kigali Airport in late March 1998, President William Clinton eloquently reminded us all of the terrible atrocities that had occurred in Rwanda in 1994. There were, as the president made clear, many profoundly disturbing aspects of the genocide in Rwanda. In perhaps the most vicious cycle of violence since World War II, "at least a million" ethnic Tutsi people and others had been brutally murdered, and more maimed, by rampaging Hutu mobs. The violence had started in early April 1994 and only ended in July 1994, when the government was toppled by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a coalition of indigenous factions and Tutsi exile groups that had been based in Uganda.

The years since the Rwanda crisis have given the president and his advisers both the time and emotional detachment to assess clinically the many "after

Dr. Miskel is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College. Readers may recall that in the spring of 1997, Dr. Miskel and Commander Richard Norton, USN, published an article in the *Naval War College Review* entitled "Spotting Trouble: Identifying Faltering and Failing States." That article argued that the United States should develop a methodology for estimating when states like Rwanda and Somalia are approaching failure, in effect an early warning system for failing states. The methodology revolved around the collection of trend data on social (literacy, poverty, morbidity), economic (inflation, infrastructure), and governmental (border control, maintenance of law and order) conditions. Among the uses that Professor Miskel and Commander Norton foresaw for such a methodology was the early identification of both emergency and nonemergency situations in which traditional forms of foreign aid would be futile or where military intervention might be unproductive. Indeed, the lead time that such a methodology would provide could be used, as the authors stated, to "debate usefully whether the military should be involved at all." In this article, Dr. Miskel evaluates a related early warning system—a United Nations system focused on the preliminary stages of widespread, communal violence—as well as the practical aspects of the military actions that might be taken during any early humanitarian interventions.

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action" analyses of Rwanda that have been undertaken by U.S. government agencies, United Nations agencies, and private humanitarian organizations, as well as studies by American and European scholars. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that President Clinton's Kigali speech reflects the lessons that the United States government has learned after careful deliberation, as well as the assumptions it has made, perhaps implicitly, about the nature of crises like the one in Rwanda. These lessons and assumptions are important, because they will influence U.S. policy toward the Rwandas of tomorrow. This article appraises these lessons and assumptions in the context of Rwanda and other humanitarian crises in order to evaluate their suitability as policy guidelines. In several respects, the lessons and assumptions appear to provide flawed guidance for, and create unrealistic expectations of, U.S. policy.

A particularly disturbing aspect of the Rwanda crisis—but one that was not emphasized by the president during his tour of Africa in the spring of 1998—is that Hutu-Tutsi violence did not end when the civil war did in the summer of 1994. In every month of 1998 through October, serious instances of Hutu-Tutsi violence in Rwanda were reported by the United Nations.[1] In some of these incidents hundreds of people were killed;[2] in others, groups of children were kidnapped or beaten to death by Hutu terrorists.[3] In neighboring Burundi—which is 85 percent Tutsi—three hundred died in January 1998, when the capital city airport at Bujumbura was attacked by Hutu guerrillas.[4] In May 1998 Hutu rebels reportedly cut off the ears of recalcitrant Burundian villagers, and in July and August tens of thousands were driven from their homes by fighting between the rebels and the Burundi army.[5] For its part, the main Hutu organization in Burundi claims that eighty thousand Hutu have been killed since July 1996 and that most of the violence is attributable to the Burundi government.[6] Hutu-Tutsi violence has also figured in the civil war in the former state of Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. In August 1998, when Tutsi residents of eastern Congo launched an armed rebellion, the central government in Kinshasa announced that it would not be able to protect civilian Tutsi residents from ethnic reprisals.[7]

Lessons from Rwanda

According to President Clinton and President Pasteur Bizimungu, the current president of Rwanda, the 1994 atrocities were not a spontaneous and thus unforeseeable paroxysm of mysterious tribal rivalries. Rather, the massacres were planned by Hutu extremists in the government and in other leadership positions in Rwandan society. The extremists evidently did what Hitler and Stalin had done earlier in the century—embitter the general public against a minority group, in this case the Tutsi, by blaming them for some or all of their country's economic and social woes. Also, as President Clinton acknowledged,

the United States, other Western governments, and the United Nations did not respond as quickly as they should have to the crisis in Rwanda. Indeed, he stated that leaders in the West did not fully appreciate the genocidal nature of the violence in Rwanda until very late in the crisis and thus did not intervene until after the violence had peaked.

The key policy lesson here would seem to be that a system should be developed to provide world leaders with better early warning. Many studies of the Rwanda crisis by scholars and humanitarian agencies reach the same conclusion.[8] Indeed, the United Nations has begun developing a humanitarian early warning system. The president announced in his 25 March 1998 speech that the United States will be working with the United Nations to "improve . . . our system for identifying and spotlighting nations in danger of genocidal violence, so that we can assure worldwide awareness of impending threats."[9]

However—as Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations conceded in May 1998—decision makers in Washington, Paris, London, and at the UN *actually did have* access to ample information during the earliest stages of the 1994 Rwanda crisis.[10] Information about the brewing crisis was collected and distributed by many governmental and private-sector organizations. The embassies of the United States and other nations operated in the Rwandan capital throughout the preliminary phases of the crisis. Moreover, North American, European, Asian, and other African embassies in the states bordering Rwanda (Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire, now Congo) functioned throughout the crisis. Although their reports are not publicly available, it is frankly inconceivable that these embassies would have failed to mention the escalating slaughter in Rwanda in those reports, particularly since there were concerns at the time that the violence would spread across national borders. Indeed, if the American and European embassies in Kigali and in neighboring capitals did not apprise their respective ministries of developments in Rwanda, this would raise very serious questions about the overall value and competence of the embassy system and, of course, about any early warning system that would in any way depend upon embassies for information or analysis.

Numerous United Nations agencies and private humanitarian organizations also maintained operations in the region before, during, and after the 1994 crisis, and their reports were replete with compelling information about its extent and severity.[11] The UN even had a military mission in the country (the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, or UNAMIR) reporting on the early stages of the crisis. (It was, perversely, reduced in size after it reported that the violence was escalating.)[12] Indeed, UNAMIR was the originator of the infamous "genocide fax" of January 1994, which provided the UN's Department of Peace-Keeping Operations with detailed information about the plans being made by extremists for anti-Tutsi violence.[13] There was, as well, enough contemporary media coverage in the United States and Europe to have encouraged policy makers and

legislators to commission special inquiries into events in Rwanda, or at the very least to consult the data available from embassies, UN agencies, and private humanitarian organizations.[14]

The inescapable conclusion is that if the international community deliberately looked away while hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were being slaughtered, it was not because it lacked knowledge of the crisis. Substantial early warning was available then; it continues to be available today, virtually throughout the world, from existing systems. Therefore, investing time and energy in a new humanitarian early warning system at the United Nations would be like stitching a wound that has already healed. The gesture ultimately amounts to a polite fiction: it may satisfy the urge to do something and provide a fig leaf for past inaction, but it does nothing good for the patient.

In his March 1998 remarks, President Clinton asserted that uninterrupted agitation by extremists had provoked the Hutu citizenry into anti-Tutsi frenzy and that Hutu extremists had made extensive, tangible preparations for the violence.[15] Observers generally agree that extremists did in fact pave the way, by whipping mobs into an anti-Tutsi frenzy through inflammatory radio broadcasts and street corner agitprop, distributing hit lists of Tutsi and their moderate Hutu sympathizers, and providing machetes and other small arms to their supporters.[16]

Again, a policy lesson seems clear: intervening to disrupt the preparations of extremists can avert or, at the very least mitigate, an outbreak of violence. Not only that, but disrupting Rwanda-like preparations seems to be well within the capacity of law enforcement agencies no larger than many metropolitan police forces in the United States and Europe, to say nothing of a multinational military force. (UNAMIR's genocide fax estimated that a force of five thousand armed troops would be required to rein in the developing violence.)

The problem is that focusing on the preparations of Rwandan extremists is like examining Nazi atrocities without considering their context—anti-Semitism, German nationalism, popular resentment over the World War I settlement, and the economic turmoil of the Great Depression. The context in this case is that Rwanda is one of the world's poorest, most densely populated countries and has a long history of civil war and hitter ethnic tension. Some of that history—perhaps most of it—is the result of the colonial powers having played off the Hutu and Tutsi against each other for decades. Surely those conditions helped to create a medium for violence, and just as surely, such conditions will be little affected by foreign intervention to confiscate machetes, destroy hit lists, and shut down "hate radio" stations.

Moreover, by virtue of its small size, Rwanda may not even be an appropriate model for estimating the ability of an intervention force to disrupt preparations for violence. Rwanda is only about the size of the state of Maryland; most other African countries where humanitarian intervention has been undertaken

or considered are substantially larger. The Democratic Republic of Congo, where intervention was considered in 1997, has more than eighty times Rwanda's square mileage. Somalia is more than twenty times as large. Even small "failing states" like Liberia and Sierra Leone are, respectively, four times and two and a half times the size of Rwanda. Suppressing extremist movements in such expansive territories may prove physically daunting for an early-intervention force unless that force is extremely large, in which case the effort of fielding it might preclude its arriving early.

Early Warning

Two more recent crises in the region raise questions about the extent to which the United Nations, the United States, and other major powers will act upon early warning. One would have expected—given international sensitivity over the delayed reaction to the Rwandan genocide—a predisposition toward timely action in 1995–96, when Zaire and Burundi began to experience serious Hutu-Tutsi violence. That this was not the case suggests that despite President Clinton's apparent support, international action on early warning is not likely and indeed may become progressively even less likely as the sense of guilt associated with Rwanda fades.

In November 1996, after many months of early warning, the United Nations and several key Western states did agree to intervene in Zaire to alleviate the suffering centered around refugee camps near the border with Rwanda. Ironically, as soon as the decision was made, the refugees voluntarily repatriated themselves en masse to Rwanda to avoid the violence in the camps, thus obviating the need for the intervention. One could argue that the repatriation confirmed the wisdom of not having intervened during the earlier stages of the crisis. There is, however, no convincing evidence that there ever was a deliberate assessment that the refugees would return to Rwanda of their own accord. To the contrary, had the international community seriously believed that the refugees would return to Rwanda spontaneously, the United Nations, Canada and the United States would obviously not have made the decision they did in November 1996 to intervene.

In fact, the camps that were built in eastern Zaire in the summer of 1994 to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the civil war in Rwanda were themselves the focus of humanitarian concern almost from the time they were set up. In 1995 and early 1996 there were numerous reports of horrific conditions in the camps, their use as bases for Hutu guerrilla incursions into Rwanda, the holding of refugees as hostages by extremist leaders, tensions between the refugees and the local Zairian population, anarchic violence toward aid workers, and the involvement of refugee groups in a nascent civil war in Zaire.[17] This early warning information was filed by at least six different

United Nation agencies and ten highly respected private humanitarian organizations.[18]

That the early warning information on Zaire was compelling and actionable is demonstrated by the efforts of several regional states, two international organizations, and a nongovernmental organization to orchestrate a response to the developing crisis. For example, there was a July 1996 regional summit meeting, at which Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia, and the Organization of African Unity discussed the situation in Zaire and in other parts of the region. Two separate tripartite commissions were set up in 1995 to help regional states coordinate with each other and share information with the United Nations. One involved the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the governments of Tanzania and Rwanda; the other involved the UNHCR and the governments of Tanzania and Burundi. Both commissions were concerned with the regional refugee crisis and its destabilizing influence on the region.[19] The Organization for African Unity and the UNHCR held conferences on the refugee situation with the involved nations (including Zaire) in February 1995, May 1995, and again in February 1996.[20] In November 1995 and March 1996, regional summit meetings were held in Cairo and Tunis, respectively. The summits were sponsored by the Carter Foundation (an American nongovernmental organization) and were attended by the nations most directly involved in the crisis.[21] Also, in July 1996 there was a bilateral summit meeting between Zaire and Rwanda to discuss the situation in the refugee camps inside Zaire and also transborder security issues.[22] Despite these international conferences and commissions, it was not until November 1996—long after the early warnings had grown stale—that the United Nations and its leading members agreed to intervene.

The Burundi case is less dramatic, but it confirms the point that systems already exist to provide early warning. In early 1996, acting on what amounted to warnings from private humanitarian organizations, the media, and the Organization for African Unity, the United Nations Security Council directed the Secretary-General to evaluate whether "hate radio" broadcasts were contributing to Hutu-Tutsi violence in Burundi.[23] The UN advisers sent to Burundi recommended that the United Nations establish another radio station to deescalate the crisis by broadcasting noninflammatory information. Ultimately, the Secretary-General chose not to establish the rival radio station, out of concern that it would become a target for attacks by extremists. Difficulties posed by the language requirements for broadcasts into Burundi were also cited as a factor.[24]

Indeed, the Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi humanitarian crises illustrate two paradoxes inherent in the concept of early warning systems. One is that the states with the greatest incentive for taking early action in humanitarian emergencies are those that least require a formal, international early warning system. These are the states whose national interests are directly affected by the

emergency—that is, neighboring states or more distant ones having major investments in, or security commitments to, the affected state. These states already monitor and evaluate such developments as communal violence that may jeopardize their interests or destabilize their borders. For example, as demonstrated by its participation in regional conferences and commissions, Tanzania already possessed a deep understanding of the Zaire crisis and would not have benefited significantly from information generated by a UN early warning system based in Geneva or New York.[25] Regrettably, however, neighboring states are often incapable of acting effectively upon early warning, for economic or political reasons. Angola, Tanzania, the Central African Republic, and Uganda each had obvious interests in the interrelated crises in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire, but their own economies were too fragile to support the kinds of action that might have been necessary to prevent the crises from worsening. Tanzania, the Central African Republic, and Uganda are among the lowest-income nations in the world, with per capita annual incomes of $410 or less, and declining or static rates of economic growth.[26] Often what these neighboring states do have is less helpful—a history of disputed borders, ethnic-political entanglements, and economic rivalries. Histories of this sort not only make suffering nations reluctant to invite their neighbors to intervene but make it difficult for neighboring states to cooperate with each other in humanitarian intervention.

The second paradox is that the states that might derive informational value from an early warning system are those normally the least likely to act on early warning, because they have no important security or economic interests at stake. For example, Washington might conceivably obtain useful information from a UN early warning system, but because it has important interests in very few impoverished nations, the United States generally will be reluctant to act on that information. Either the voting public would have to demand it, or national leaders would have to be personally affected by the moral issues at stake and then manage to convince the voters or their representatives that intervention is necessary. By the time public and legislative support is mobilized, the early stages of humanitarian crises can be expected to have long passed. This was the case in the 1996 Zaire crisis and the 1994 Rwanda crisis. One could argue that it was also the case in Bosnia during the early 1990s and in Kosovo more recently.

Early Intervention Actions

As noted above, one of the lessons that the United States government seems to have learned from Rwanda is that the key to effective early intervention is to disrupt the preparations being made by extremists for violence. In Rwanda this would have consisted of helping the government stop ethnic agitprop (particularly "hate radio" broadcasting), confiscate weapons, and detain or deport extremist leaders.

Intervention, early or late, by outside forces even against seemingly small groups of extremists or their leaders, however, could amount to picking sides in a nascent civil war. This often has adverse consequences. For instance, in Somalia, the UN decided to take action against one of the warring clans that was interfering with the distribution of humanitarian supplies. The result was the death of two dozen Pakistani peacekeeping troops in an ambush and then of eighteen U.S. soldiers, and the loss of public and congressional support. Moreover, little damage was done to the targeted clan or its leadership.

The U.S.-French-Italian intervention in Lebanon in the early 1980s had even more tragic and barren consequences. Because the peacekeeping forces were perceived as siding with the minority-dominated Lebanese government, the American embassy, then both the Marine Corps barracks at the Beirut airport and the French forces headquarters, were attacked by terrorist truck bombs.

Moreover, to be really effective, an early intervention would likely have to apprehend the extremist leadership; otherwise, the violence might only be postponed until the extremists had time to reorganize themselves. Getting extremist leaders out of circulation and bringing them to justice has often proven to be a complex and time-consuming task. United Nations forces tried and failed to capture the most troublesome Somali clan leaders in the early 1990s. Cambodia's Pol Pot died of natural causes in 1998, almost twenty years after his involvement in some of this century's most heinous atrocities. In Bosnia, alleged war criminals have eluded capture for years and have continued to foment tension.

It is true that many Rwandan extremists have been captured and brought to trial. In fact, some have been publicly executed, starting in April 1998.[27] The Rwandan experience is, however, an exception that proves the rule about the difficulty of neutralizing extremist groups. It is, moreover, in practical terms a case of victor's justice. The Rwandan war criminals were captured and brought to trial because their forces had been defeated on the battlefield and the victors had assumed full control of the reins of government. In addition, some of the war criminals had fled to refugee camps in other countries and were over a period of years repatriated to Rwanda under sustained pressure from the United Nations agencies, the Zairian authorities, and nongovernmental aid organizations. Plainly, assuming full control of the agencies of government and policing refugee camps in other countries amounts to a "stay late," not an "arrive early," intervention.

Roughly the same points apply to weapons confiscation. During the 1992–93 intervention in Somalia, U.S. and UN peacekeepers adopted a policy of confiscating two classes of weapons. The first comprised fairly large weapons, like rocket-propelled-grenade launchers, which did not figure prominently in the Rwandan violence. The second involved small arms, like pistols and rifles, analogous to the side arms and machetes used in Rwanda. Trying to reduce the

supply of both kinds of weapons could have had the same effect as picking sides in a civil war, as the reductions could have tilted the local balance of power by reducing, for instance, the advantage of the most heavily armed group, or by increasing the disadvantage of poorly armed factions. Moreover, efforts to reduce the supply of small arms in Somalia proved to be administratively cumbersome, time consuming, and ultimately futile.[28]

In arguing that there should have been a more effective confiscation of weapons in Somalia, a nongovernmental humanitarian organization has, perhaps inadvertently, emphasized the complexity and duration of the process. African Rights saw the process as entailing: negotiations with each faction for mutual, reciprocal reductions in weaponry; arms embargoes and effective border controls to prevent new weapons from entering the country; "setting up local police forces . . . [and] a judicial system" that issued permits for individuals to carry weapons and forcibly confiscated unlicensed arms.[29] The point here is not that weapons confiscation is a bad idea but that it is necessarily beyond the scope of early intervention, in terms of both its duration and resource requirements. A process like the one African Rights recommends, that the United Nations attempted in Somalia, and that the Clinton administration seems now to favor in the early stages of future crises would require a large and long-term commitment of resources.

As noted above, inflammatory radio broadcasts were widely judged to have contributed to violence in Burundi in 1995–96, as they did in Rwanda in 1994, but the Secretary-General decided against intervention primarily out of concern for the safety of UN personnel. The irony is that relative to the other forms of early intervention the UN could have considered in Burundi, establishing a radio station certainly posed little risk. Most other options (such as patrolling hot spots, or disarming and detaining agitators) would have exposed even more UN officials to physical hazard.

Disrupting agitprop by extremists requires more than temporarily shutting down an offensive broadcaster. It can mean long-term involvement in the establishment and operation of separate media outlets, continual monitoring and censorship of existing radio stations, and locating and closing "pirate" broadcasters, who may change locations in order to stay on the air. Bosnia is a good example of this. Even after several years of intense peacekeeping, radio and television stations in Bosnia have continued to broadcast inflammatory statements about various ethnic factions in the country and, more recently, about the motives of the peacekeepers themselves.[30] Further complicating this issue is the fact that an offending station may be operated by the national government itself. For example, UN sources reported in August 1998 that a Congolese government station was broadcasting calls for the people to kill Tutsis, with "machete, spear, arrow, hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, irons, barbed wire, stones and the like."[31]

Costs and Complexities

This article has attempted to advance two general arguments. One is that a review of recent humanitarian emergencies in Africa suggests that the UN and U.S. emphasis on improving humanitarian early warning systems is misguided, because actionable early warning is (and was in 1994) already available. In more economically advanced or strategically important parts of the world, early warning is even more readily obtainable from established government and private-sector organizations.

The second general argument is that the lessons supposedly learned from Rwanda about specific types of early military intervention seriously underestimate the complexity and cost of such early intervention actions as disrupting the plans and preparations of extremists and silencing "hate radio" and other forms of ethnic agitprop. This is not to say that early military intervention in humanitarian crises is never warranted. There may well be situations where it is appropriate; these will be rare, however, and policy makers ought not to make this judgment without first having reached a clear understanding of its exigencies—in other words, without having first taken a fresh look at the lessons learned from the Rwanda and subsequent crises.

On a more philosophical level, facile assumptions about early military intervention measures ultimately do the international community a disservice. They may create unrealistic expectations about UN and U.S. responsiveness in the future, and when those expectations are not met, they may engender cynicism about Western motives in Africa and commitment to humanitarian ideals. These assumptions also distract policy makers from the important but hard work of developing innovative, nonmilitary capabilities for intervention in any stage of a humanitarian crisis. In any event, the "apparent lessons" are erroneous. There is no need for additional "warning systems" of internal civil unrest; further, any intervention, particularly by military forces, that focuses on even-handed assistance and the suppression of symptoms overlooks the central issue at stake in civil unrest: who can effectively wield power? While the intervening force must do that itself, at least initially, its goal should be restoration of effective and just domestic civil authority.

Notes

1. Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, "Weekly Round-up" reports, cited as "IRIN no.__ covering the period__." These reports are available on the internet at http://www.reliefweb.int/. IRIN no. 2-98, covering the period 2–8 January 1998, p. 3; IRIN no. 5-98, covering the period 23–29 January 1998, p. 2.; IRIN no. 7-98, covering the period 6–12 February 1998, pp. 1–2; IRIN no. 10-98, covering the period 27 February–5 March 1998, p. 1; IRIN no. 12-98, covering the period 13–19 March 1998, p. 2; IRIN no. 14-98, covering the period 27 March–2 April 1998, p. 3; IRIN no. 16-98, covering the period 10–16 April 1998, p. 3. IRIN no. 24-98, covering the period 5–11 June 1998, p. 1; IRIN no. 29-98, covering the period 10–16 July 1998, p. 3; IRIN no. 31-98, covering the period 24–30 July

1998, p. 3; IRIN no. 32-98, covering the period 31 July–6 August 1998, pp. 1–2.; IRIN no. 37-98, covering the period 4–11 September 1998, p. 4; and IRIN no. 42-98, covering the period 9–15 October 1998, p. 3.

2. IRIN no. 25-97, covering the period 3–9 October 1997, p. 3; IRIN no. 31-97, covering the period 14–20 November 1997, p. 1; IRIN no. 32-97, covering the period 21–27 November 97, p. 3.

3. IRIN no. 21-98, covering the period 15–21 May 1998, p. 4; IRIN no. 22-98, covering the period 22–28 May 1998, p. 3; IRIN no. 32-98, covering the period 31 July–6 August 1998, pp. 1–2.

4. IRIN no. 2-98, covering the period 2 January–8 January 1998, p. 1.

5. IRIN no. 14-98, covering the period 8–14 May 1998, p. 3; IRIN no. 30-98, covering the period 17–23 July 1998, p. 1; IRIN no. 33-98, covering the period 7–13 August 1998, p. 3.

6. IRIN, Daily "Update No. 402," April 23, 1998, p. 1. Archived at http://www.reliefweb.int/.

7. IRIN no. 32-98, covering the period 31 July–6 August 1998, p. 1.

8. For example, a study funded by the Belgian government and conducted by the University of Ghent Research Group Study of the Third World advocated an early warning system explicitly oriented toward conflict prevention but implicitly addressing the full range of humanitarian crises. The report, "Early warning and crisis prevention: Minerva's Wisdom?" was posted on the internet by the Journal of Humanitarian Assistance at http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/ on 7 July 1997. A similar point has been made in after-action analyses of the 1994 Rwanda intervention sponsored by the Danish government and conducted by an international steering committee of representatives from the United States, numerous European states, United Nations agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. The "Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda" conducted several studies of the Rwanda crisis; the most pertinent of them concluded that an early warning system should be developed. The studies were self-published in five volumes. Volume 2, "Early Warning and Conflict," was written by Howard Adelman of York University, Toronto, and Astri Suhrke of the Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway, with contributions by Bruce Jones of the London School of Economics. Their conclusion about early warning was reiterated in the Steering Committee's "Synthesis Report" (vol. 5). A copy of the Steering Committee report has been reproduced on the internet by the Journal of Humanitarian Assistance at http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/.

9. White House, press release, "Remarks by the President to Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers, and U.S. and Rwanda Government Officials," 25 March 1998. Available at the White House Virtual Library website, http://library.whitehouse.gov.

10. IRIN no. 19-98, covering the period 1–7 May 1998, p. 1.

11. Many 1994 documents are archived on the internet at http://www.reliefweb.int. It has been speculated that the internet availability of current field reports from places like Rwanda could have an impact on government policy. Some have even proposed that the internet become the backbone of an early warning system. An example is Gavan Duffy, "An Early Warning System for the United Nations: Internet Or Not?" *Mershon International Studies Review*, October 1995, pp. 315–8.

12. R. A. Dallaire and B. Poulin, "UNAMIR Mission to Rwanda," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1995, pp. 66–71.

13. Philip Gourevitch, "The Genocide Fax," *New Yorker*, 11 May 1998, pp. 42–5.

14. The *New York Times* ran articles and editorials on Rwanda in March, April, and May 1994 before the international community intervened: "State Department Issues Warning against Travel to Rwanda," 13 March 1994, p. V3; "Anarchy Rules in Kigali, Rwanda," 14 April 1994, pp. A1, A3; "Lull in Rwanda Fighting Allows Aid Deliveries," 13 May 1994, p. A5; and "Tribal Fighting Flares Again around the Rwandan Capital," 16 May 1995, p. A3. Similar coverage was provided by *The Economist* in Great Britain: "The Bleeding of Rwanda," 16 April 1994, p. 45; "Genocide in Rwanda," 21 May 1994, p. 45.

15. White House, press release, 25 March 1998.

16. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience," Study 2, pp. 38–9 (see note 8, above); Steven Metz, *Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda* (Carlisle Barracks, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), p.7; and Gourevitch, pp. 42–5.

17. James F. Miskel and Richard J. Norton, "Humanitarian Early Warning Systems," *Global Governance*, July–September 1998, pp. 317–29.

18. The UN agencies were the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Food Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and UNICEF. The nongovernmental organizations included Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Medicins sans Frontières, Oxfam, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the American Red Cross, World Vision, American Refugee Committee, Save the Children, and the Lutheran World Federation.

19. United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in Africa*, UN GA A 51/367, 25 September 1996, para. 45.

20. United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, *Report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees*, UN GA A 51/12, 4 September 1996, paras. 79–80.

21. Ibid., para. 81.

22. Office of the Resident Coordinator, Kigali, Rwanda, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Rwanda "Monthly Information Report," 31 July 1996, p. 2. See also UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Situation Report for Period 16–31 July 1996," 31 July 1996, p. 2.

23. *Economist*, "Burundi: The Next Bloodbath," 14 October 1995, pp. 49–50; *UN Chronicle*, Spring 1996, p. 11, and Summer 1996, pp. 43–4; Oxfam (a British NGO) press release, "Oxfam Says Do Not Let the 'Shadow of Rwanda Fall on Burundi,'" 25 July 1996. Also on 25 July, the Organization for African Unity expressed "deep concern" over the violence consuming Burundi. The Oxfam and OAS documents are archived on the internet, at http://www.reliefweb.int.

24. *UN Chronicle*, Summer 1996, pp. 43–4. The UN decision to commission the study is described in the Spring 1996 issue, p. 11.

25. This point is related to the "pivotal states" policy advocated by Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, in "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, January–February 1996, pp. 33–51. This article calls for preemptive actions "to prevent calamity rather than react to it" (p. 49), but only in the handful of nations that are strategically important to the United States. An implication of this article is that the United States would *unilaterally* collect early warning information about pivotal states, instead of relying upon a UN system that would monitor humanitarian developments worldwide.

26. World Bank, *World Development Report, 1994* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), p. 162.

27. IRIN no. 17-98, covering the period 17–23 April 1998, p. 1. The first four were reportedly executed in a Kigali soccer stadium before a crowd of a hundred thousand cheering spectators.

28. Refugee Policy Group, *Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990–1994* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugee Issues, November 1994), pp. 74–5; Jonathan T. Dworken, "Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief Operation," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1995, pp. 17–8.

29. Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment* (London: African Rights, May 1993), p. 22.

30. Philip Shenon, "Allies Creating Agency to Rule Press in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 24 April 1998, pp. A1, A8.

31. IRIN no. 33-98, covering the period 7–13 August 1998, p. 1.

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