On Littoral Warfare

The lack of adequate capabilities for littoral warfare could cost a blue-water force like the U.S. Navy dearly in a high-intensity conventional war. So might the lack of a sound theory of littoral warfare, operational concepts, and doctrine; these require much effort and time and cannot be produced in a hurry after hostilities start

The Soviet Envelopment Option on the Northern Flank

Nowhere is the Soviet threat to the NATO alliance more acute than to its northern flank, an area which extends from the Elbe-Trave canal in the south to the North Cape in the north

The Destruction of Convoy PQ17: 27 June–10 July 1942

The most critical problem for the Western Allies in the northern European theater in 1941–42 was the urgent need to secure the war matériel being sent to the Soviet Union. Initially, the Germans did not react strongly against the Allied convoys sailing to northern Russia. However, that began to change quickly after February 1942, when the Germans redeployed almost all their heavy surface forces and a large number of U-boats from home waters to northern Norway

Submarines in Soviet ASW Doctrine and Tactics

Soviet naval doctrine views antisubmarine warfare as the basic experience of war at sea as a whole. and it says that victory will be achieved by the one who will consistently know the location of the submarines of the opposing side and who has the necessary means at his disposal to destroy them. 1 Antisubmarine defense, or PLO (Protivo­lodochnaya oborona), is a struggle against submarines in a maritime theater of military activitie

On Naval Theory

Too many naval officers mistrust, neglect, or even ignore the importance of naval theory, instead placing too much reliance on advanced technologies. Yet without full understanding of naval theory, it is very difficult to have the broad outlook necessary to develop naval doctrine, train one’s naval forces, and employ those forces successfully in a war

On Operational Art

The main purpose of any combat is to achieve a quick and decisive result and thereby avoid high losses in personnel and materiel. The enemy can be defeated by weakening his forces over time. However, such an approach to warfare would generally lead to high losses and require a lot of time. The gap between tactics on one hand and strategy and policy on the other cannot be overcome by physical combat alone. The tactical framework is too narrow to ensure the most decisive of one’s forces. This is the main reason for the need for an intermediate field of study in practice between strategy and tactics known as operations or operational art. This third component of art of war serves as both a bridge and an interface between policy and strategy on the one hand and tactics on the other. Generally, the smaller the forces, the more critical is to apply operational art properly. The history of past wars has demonstrated that neither superior technology nor superb tactics can ensure, by themselves, victory in a war

Major Convoy Operation to Malta, 10–15 August 1942 (OperationPEDESTAL)

The desperate Allied resupply convoy to Malta of August 1942 was required even though the British had to assume its objective, route, and timing would be transparent to the Axis. How did they plan the operation under such constraints, and how did they deal with their built-in disadvantages

German War Gaming

Modern war gaming arose in Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and greatly contributed to the superb quality of the German military in the twentieth. Aspects of the German approach would have substantial value for the U.S. military today

HM 22: Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945

Major naval operations represent an area of study of operational art that Western naval theoreticians and planners have generally neglected. Too much emphasis is given instead to advanced technologies and tactics of weapons, at the expense of combined-arms tactics. The absence of an immediate and serious threat at sea today should not be allowed to prevent the development of sound naval theory and doctrine and the training of naval forces to prepare, plan, and execute major naval/joint operations as part of land campaigns in the littorals or a maritime campaign.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs/1021/thumbnail.jp

On Naval Power

Naval power played an extremely important and often vital role in the lives of many maritime nations. This is not going to change in the future. Its influence is felt both in time of peace and in time of war. Naval power is one of the key factors in deterring a strong opponent from going to war. In case of war, naval power is a prerequisite for successful conduct of operations on land. And the final outcome of a war is invariably on land; it is there where the humans live. Naval power also plays a critical role across the spectrum of operations short of war. The range of threats in the maritime domain is broad. The conventional threats in peacetime include claims of the riparian states in regard to the boundaries of the economic exclusion zone (EEZ) and activities there, the extent of the territorial waters and the rights of innocent passage, and illicit fishing. Navies and coast guards can be employed in routine activities in peacetime, operations short of war, low-intensity conflict, and high-intensity conventional war. Today and for the immediate future, naval forces will be predominantly employed in carrying out multiple and diverse missions in what are arbitrarily called “operations short of war.” However, a navy, no matter how strong, cannot carry out all the missions alone but needs to proceed in combination with other elements of naval power, such as a coast guard. Naval power will continue to play a critical and perhaps vital role in protecting and preserving a nation’s interests at sea. This will especially be the case for countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and others whose prosperity and economic wellbeing depend on the free and uninterrupted use of the sea. Naval power is undoubtedly a powerful tool in support of foreign policy, military or theater strategy, and various peace operations. It is an integral part of homeland security. In concert with other sources of the country’s military and nonmilitary power, naval power has a large role in deterring the outbreak of large- scale hostilities. Finally, in the case of a regional or global conflict, forces on land cannot ultimately succeed without secure use of the sea. Obtaining, maintaining, and exercising control of the oceans are objectives that cannot be accomplished without a strong and effective naval power