L’optimisation juridique du paiement pour services environnementaux en faveur de la préservation des services environnementaux : le cas du Cameroun et de la République Démocratique du Congo

The study starts from a hypothesis on the coherence and compatibility of the legal instruments in force in Cameroon and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the optimization of payment for environmental services (PES) and the preservation of environmental services. This study has employed a legal approach and interviews in order to investigate whether there is coherence and compatibility or not between the two variables of this hypothesis: (1) the legal instruments in force in Cameroon and in the DRC and (2) the optimization of PES and the preservation of environmental services. This study consists of three parts. The first part deals with the theoretical framework of PES and the place of PES in the legal order. In this first part, the definition of an optimal PES, the indicators of an optimal PES and the categories of legal frameworks on PES have been revealed. These are the fundamental elements to conduct a systematic analysis in the second and third parts. Based on these fundamental elements, the study analyses the legal instru- ments from international, regional (Africa) and domestic (Cameroon and the DRC) levels and investigates through field research two PES projects, one in Cameroon called “PES comminatory project” and another in the DRC called “REDD CBFF-Luki” respectively in the second and the third parts. From the analysis of these legal instruments and the investigation of these two PES projects, it has become apparent that there is a lack of coherence and compatibility between the legal instruments and these two PES projects in Cameroon and in the DRC, and the optimization of PES and the preservation of environmental services in the Congo Basin in general, especially in these two States. Useful recommendations have been made to eradicate these shortcomings. Key words: payment for environmental services, environmental services, Congo Basi

L’optimisation juridique du paiement pour services environnementaux en faveur de la préservation des services environnementaux dans le Bassin du Congo : le cas du Cameroun et de la République Démocratique du Congo

The study starts from a hypothesis on the coherence and compatibility of the legal instruments in force in Cameroon and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the optimization of payment for environmental services (PES) and the preservation of environmental services. This study has employed a legal approach and interviews in order to investigate whether there is coherence and compatibility or not between the two variables of this hypothesis: (1) the legal instruments in force in Cameroon and in the DRC and (2) the optimization of PES and the preservation of environmental services. This study consists of three parts. The first part deals with the theoretical framework of PES and the place of PES in the legal order. In this first part, the definition of an optimal PES, the indicators of an optimal PES and the categories of legal frameworks on PES have been revealed. These are the fundamental elements to conduct a systematic analysis in the second and third parts. Based on these fundamental elements, the study analyses the legal instru- ments from international, regional (Africa) and domestic (Cameroon and the DRC) levels and investigates through field research two PES projects, one in Cameroon called “PES comminatory project” and another in the DRC called “REDD CBFF-Luki” respectively in the second and the third parts. From the analysis of these legal instruments and the investigation of these two PES projects, it has become apparent that there is a lack of coherence and compatibility between the legal instruments and these two PES projects in Cameroon and in the DRC, and the optimization of PES and the preservation of environmental services in the Congo Basin in general, especially in these two States. Useful recommendations have been made to eradicate these shortcomings. Key words: payment for environmental services, environmental services, Congo Basi

Curbing Deforestation in the Congo Basin with the Polluter Pays Principle, the Provider Gets Principle and the REDD+ Mechanism

This paper focuses on the possible role of the polluter pays principle, the provider gets principle and the Reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and the role of conservation, sustainable management and enhancement of carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+) in the reduction of deforestation. The paper concludes with suggestions on how to efficiently implement these tools in the Congo Basin in order to curb deforestation through reducing specific driver’s factors such as small-scale subsistence farming and over logging of timber. The FAO (2010) defines deforestation as the conversion of forest to another land use or the long term reduction of three canopy cover below the minimum of 10% threshold. This definition also stipulates a minimum tree height of 5m and areas of 0.5ha and that agriculture must not be the dominant use. Reforestation and afforestation are known ways to curb deforestation. The Congo Basin countries- Cameroon, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Congo , the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea (EG)–have small-scale subsistence farming, wood fuel, over logging of timber, transportation infrastructures, oil and mining extraction as driving factors of deforestation. Small-scale subsistence farming and over logging of timber are the main deforestation factors in Cameroon, the DRC, EG and Gabon. The Congo Basin countries are implementing the international REDD+ mechanism to avoid deforestation. Some REDD+ Projects have been launched and most of them are technically related to the measurement of the canopy cover and of the carbon stocks of the forest or of land-use influences in the forest. These projects are important for the implementation of -the REDD+ payment of ecosystem services (PES) scheme model in order to fund the projects on mitigating deforestation. This PES scheme will make payments at international/national levels (generated voluntary or compliance markets/national government or intermediaries) to the service providers (governments or sub national entities /sub national government or local landowners in developing countries) for an environmental service to deliver this service or measures likely to deliver this service. Two observations could be formulated. Projects on afforestation/reforestation are scarce even if the future REDD+ PES scheme will fund those projects. Projects on enforcement of the law or reducing logging are less concerned by the REDD+ mechanism in the Congo Basin. Two principles, the polluter pays principle and the provider gets principle, could be analyzed to reinforce the REDD+ mechanism at the regional and national levels. The polluter-pays principle is an environmental principle which makes the responsible of a polluting activity bears the costs of pollution. This principle could function through elimination of subsidies, pollution taxes, tradable pollution permits, products labeling, and performance and technology standards. Four Congo Basin Countries apply this principle in waste management and water pollution. Forest management is exempted. Environmental taxes could be efficient preventive measures to avoid deforestation by reducing over logging of timber. A constraint cost of pollution in a forestry legal framework and sustainable management planning could be an incentive for mitigating deforestation. Sustainable actions could be expressed through the provider gets principle. This principle functions as a PES scheme. The description of a desired environmental quality is needed in order to evaluate environmental objectives and pay the provider of these activities. This principle could play an important role by converting small-scale subsistence farming practices to activities of enhanced environmental quality and be implemented by subsidies. The Congo Basin policy-makers, especially from countries concerned by small-scale subsistence farming and over logging of timber, could reduce their deforestation through the implementation of those principles in the forest sector. More REDD+ projects could be oriented to afforestation/reforestation and enforcement of measure or law on reducing farming and logging of timber. The Central Forest Commission Convergence Plan could facilitate this implementation at the regional scale

The Relationship of Ecosystem Services Valuation, Protection and Distribution with the Polluter-Pays Principle and the Provider-Gets Principle

This paper discusses the environmental, economic and social aspects of ecosystem services (ES) and their interactions with the polluter-pays principle and the provider-gets principle. The paper ends with observations concerning the theoretical and practical relationship of those principles with ES and Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs. ES have attracted increasing interest through PES as a mechanism which translates external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide ES. The PES approach has inspired new incentives, innovative financing for ecosystem protection. The PES seeks to internalize what would otherwise be an externality. Here, we will observe two principles whose characteristics could relate to those of ES. As a principle which makes the responsible of a polluting activity bearing the cost of pollution, the polluter-pays principle has internalizing, redistributive, preventive and curative functions that combine economic, social and environmental objectives. This makes this principle an available tool for directing sustainable activities. However, sustainable activities could also result in increased environmental quality. In relation to that, the provider-gets principle has been formulated. This principle aims to reward the provider of sustainable activities and needs the description of a desired environmental quality to determinate how much ES are delivered and how they would be compensated. Both principles promote ES protection by means of taxes on pollution or the provision of ES. The provider-gets principle is closer than the polluter- pays principle to ecosystem protection. The polluter-pays principle could be important as an incentive to minimize ecosystem damage through a constraint pollution cost. The polluter-pays principle seeks the right price of an environmental resource through the internalization of the pollution cost of a resource into its price. The interaction of this principle with the ES valuation would depend on the certainty of the internalization of the environmental resource service price into the price of the resource where this service comes from. The counterbalance of ES delivered to rewarded credits inherent to the provider-gets principle confirms its relationship with the ES valuation. There are still uncertainties regarding the rewarded fee as this depends on issues such as consent of parties and the applied law in a PES contract. The social aim of the polluter-pays principle consists of the redistribution of the internalized externality in the community. The internalized pollution costs are, in principle, equally disseminated through public actions for the common interest. The provider-gets principle distributes fees from the ES user to the ES provider and purely environmental benefits to the community depended of ES. We could observe that those two principles could theoretically interact with ES. The provider-gets principle works in practice as PES programs. The polluter-pays principle could complete, PES programs where they are not applied, as an incentive against ecosystem damage and thus , could reduce leakage. Both principles could complementary function with /in PES programs

Forest-Poverty Dynamics: Current State of Knowledge

This chapter reports on evidence about the role of forests and trees in alleviating poverty and supporting wider human well-being. It considers how, whether, where, when and for whom forests and trees are important in forest-poverty dynamics. We organise the evidence according to four possible relationships between forest products and ecosystem services and poverty: 1) helping households move out of poverty; 2) supporting well-being through subsistence, food security and cultural and spiritual values; 3) mitigating risks; and 4) decreasing well-being by generating negative externalities that could significantly contribute to trapping or moving households into poverty. The evidence shows that these relationships are strongly context-dependent, varying with geography and social, economic and political contexts. However, across contexts, we most commonly observe that forest and tree products and services help the poor to secure and stabilise their livelihoods, rather than either helping them exit poverty or driving them into poverty.Peer reviewe