When parliaments’ second chambers are reformed and the implications for democracy

In recent years there have been several attempts by Western European governments to reform second chambers, including in the UK, though the majority of proposals have failed to pass. Michelangelo Vercesi assesses the conditions when such reforms are proposed, and finds that they are often instigated during times of democratic strain when the governing party wishes to reduce the number of veto players. However, the reforms tend to fail when there is not a broad consensus for the proposals, which has implications for considering when a democracy is able to instigate reforms

The Italian Government in Pandemic Times: Between Centralized Decision-Making and Coalitional Compromises

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Italy went through a severe health crisis, which put national political institutions and public services to the test. In response to this challenge, policy-makers implemented specific health policy measures as well as policies in other fields to contain the circulation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and to mitigate negative economic effects. In this context, conflicts between coalition parties and single cabinet members arose. Against this background, this article deals with the way in which the Italian political executive made its pandemic policy-related decisions during the pandemic. In particular, it aims to test the viability of existing theoretical models of coalition governance to account for actual cabinet decision-making. The work uses formal decrees (by the prime minister, by ministers, or by the cabinet as a whole), approved between February 2020 and February 2022, as proxies of coalition governance models. It answers the following questions: when do PMs centralize or decentralize decision-making? How do crises affect power delegation in cabinet?  Four hypotheses result from the integration of literature strands on presidentialization of politics, party behavior in coalitions, and crisis management. Findings show that centralized decision-making prevailed when the prime minister enjoyed greater party support and especially in the most acute phases of the pandemic. However, the ‘coalition compromise’ model of coalition governance was more common when the intra-coalition heterogeneity of policy preferences was higher. The article contributes to the debate about mechanisms of mutual party control within coalition governments and their determinants under the pressure of exogenous shocks

The Italian Government in Pandemic Times: Between Centralized Decision-Making and Coalitional Compromises

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Italy went through a severe health crisis, which put national political institutions and public services to the test. In response to this challenge, policy-makers implemented specific health policy measures as well as policies in other fields to contain the circulation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and to mitigate negative economic effects. In this context, conflicts between coalition parties and single cabinet members arose. Against this background, this article deals with the way in which the Italian political executive made its pandemic policy-related decisions during the pandemic. In particular, it aims to test the viability of existing theoretical models of coalition governance to account for actual cabinet decision-making. The work uses formal decrees (by the prime minister, by ministers, or by the cabinet as a whole), approved between February 2020 and February 2022, as proxies of coalition governance models. It answers the following questions: when do PMs centralize or decentralize decision-making? How do crises affect power delegation in cabinet?  Four hypotheses result from the integration of literature strands on presidentialization of politics, party behavior in coalitions, and crisis management. Findings show that centralized decision-making prevailed when the prime minister enjoyed greater party support and especially in the most acute phases of the pandemic. However, the ‘coalition compromise’ model of coalition governance was more common when the intra-coalition heterogeneity of policy preferences was higher. The article contributes to the debate about mechanisms of mutual party control within coalition governments and their determinants under the pressure of exogenous shocks

Approaches and lessons in political career research: Babel or pieces of a patchwork?

Political careers are a classic subject of elite studies. Scholars have sought to understand what affects political profiles and career patterns’ formation. However, political career research is characterized by a variety of approaches and explanations, which often do not communicate each other. A framework that integrates existing contributions is lacking, and this undermines the process of accumulation of knowledge. A comprehensive assessment of the literature is necessary in view of this potentially welcomed undertaking. After a conceptual introduction, I provide here a general overview of the approaches used in political career research, classifiable into two main schools. It is stressed their theoretical arguments, methodological strategies, and deficits. The note will provide bases for developing further the research field, by underling epistemological, theoretical, and methodological lessons.</span

Confliggere cooperando. Un’analisi concettuale del conflitto politico in ambiente coalizionale

This article is available on the website of the old publisher Franco Angeli ( http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/sommario.asp?IDRivista=152 )<br/

Do Populists Govern Differently? The Management of the Italian M5S-League Coalition in Comparative Perspective: Os populistas governam de forma diferente? Perspectivas do caso italiano M5S-League em perspectiva comparativa

In West European context, the first fully-fledged populist government that entered office in Italy in 2018 (Conte I) has been presented as a peculiar case. After discussing party dilemmas within coalitions, the article analyses – in comparative perspective – how the two partners M5S and League managed inter-party relations despite their divergent policy preferences. The work focuses on both structural and dynamic mechanisms of coalition governance. Particular attention is paid to the coalition agreement, which is compared to the benchmark case of the German Merkel IV cabinet. Findings show that the Conte I cabinet diverged from the Italian tradition, but approached other European models, despite its rhetoric of exceptionality. Yet, poor definition of policy goals and ambiguous governance mechanisms are observed. Resumo No contexto da Europa Ocidental, o primeiro governo populista de pleno direito que entrou em funções na Itália em 2018 (Conte I) foi apresentado como um caso peculiar. Após discutir os dilemas partidários dentro das coligações, o artigo analisa - em perspectiva comparativa - como os dois parceiros M5S e Liga geriram as relações interpartidárias apesar das suas preferências políticas divergentes. O trabalho centra-se tanto nos mecanismos estruturais como dinâmicos de governação da coligação. É dada especial atenção ao acordo da coligação, que é comparado com o caso de referência do gabinete alemão Merkel IV. Os resultados mostram que o gabinete Conte I divergiu da tradição italiana, mas abordou outros modelos europeus, apesar da sua retórica de excepcionalidade. No entanto, observa-se uma má definição dos objetivos políticos e mecanismos ambíguos de governança.No contexto da Europa Ocidental, o primeiro governo populista de pleno direito que entrou em funções na Itália em 2018 (Conte I) foi apresentado como um caso peculiar. Após discutir os dilemas partidários dentro das coligações, o artigo analisa - em perspectiva comparativa - como os dois parceiros M5S e Liga geriram as relações interpartidárias apesar das suas preferências políticas divergentes. O trabalho centra-se tanto nos mecanismos estruturais como dinâmicos de governação da coligação. É dada especial atenção ao acordo da coligação, que é comparado com o caso de referência do gabinete alemão Merkel IV. Os resultados mostram que o gabinete Conte I divergiu da tradição italiana, mas abordou outros modelos europeus, apesar da sua retórica de excepcionalidade. No entanto, observa-se uma má definição dos objetivos políticos e mecanismos ambíguos de governança