Book Review

Reviewing, Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law, (Annelise Riles ed., Hart Publishing 2001

How Asian Should Asian Law Be? – An Outsider’s View

Is there an Asian identity of Asian law, comparable to European identity and therefore similarly useful as a justification for unification projects? If so, what does it look like? And if so, does this make Asia more like Europe, or less so? Or is this question itself already a mere European projection? This chapter tries to address such questions. In particular, I look at a concrete project of Asian law unification—the Principles of Asian Comparative Law—and connect discussions about its Asian identity with four concepts of Asia. The first such concept is a European idea of Asia and Asian law, which defines a presumably homogeneous Asia on the basis of its level of difference from Europe. The next three concepts are concepts that emerged from Asian debates. Two off them explicitly invoke leadership of one country. A sinocentric concept of Asian law attempts to reinvigorate concepts from the time of Chinese dominance of East Asia prior to colonization. A Japanese concept of Pan-Asian law by contrast is built on Japanese modernization, which in turn was influenced by Europe. Finally, the idea of Asian values attempts to avoid leadership by any one country in favor of a truly Asian identity. None of these three chapters can fully avoid the central problems of the European projection: they are all defined by their relation to the West, and all of them invoke a relative degree of homogeneity as basis for identity. I close, therefore, with an alternative concept of Asia “as method” that attempts to overcome these two shortcomings and may offer a more promising path towards an idea of Asian law

EU Law as Private International Law? Re-Conceptualising the Country-Of-Origin Principle as Vested Rights Theory

One of the most pertinent issues in contemporary European conflict of laws is the tension between Community law and traditional choice of law rules. The biggest problem comes not from the transposition of member state rules on choice of law into methodologically comparable EC Regulations, but rather from the so-called country-of-origin principle. This principle holds, broadly, that EU member states may not impose obligations on a provider of goods and services that go beyond the obligations imposed by the provider\u27s home state. Originally conceived mainly with public law obligations in mind, the principle has an impact on choice of law insofar as it bars member states from applying their own law to the provider\u27s conduct, even if they have the closest connections to this conduct. The exact relationship between the so called country of origin principle, and private international law, has long puzzled scholars and courts. Yet attempts at explanation and reconciliation have so far been unsuccessful because they started from an inappropriately narrow understanding of private international law. Integrating comparative legal history, this paper proposes a broader understanding of private international law beyond the current post-Savignyan approach. Thus broader approach makes it possible to recognize how the country of origin principle is remarkably similar to an almost forgotten and universally rejected private international law approach - the vested rights theory. The article demonstrates the parallels between the country of origin principle and US, English, French and German historical versions theories of vested rights. This insight presents an interesting challenge. The vested rights theory is now universally rejected because the criticism brought forward against it was and is felt to be irrefutable. One might think the same criticism would be able to bring the country of origin principle down, too. Indeed, the article shows how current criticism of the country of origin principle replicates to a large degree earlier criticism made against the vested rights theory. Remarkably, however, it shows also that the country of origin principle can refute the criticism. The return of vested rights, and its regained ability to overcome seemingly irrefutable criticism, hold a broader lesson. The rise and fall (and rebirth) of private international law approaches depends less on abstract considerations and more on general ideas and ideologies of the times - in this case, economic liberalism

“One Size Can Fit All” – On the Mass Production of Legal Transplants

Law reformers like the World Bank sometimes suggest that optimal legal rules and institutions can be recognized and then be recommended for law reform in every country in the world. Comparative lawyers have long been skeptical of such views. They point out that both laws and social problems are context-specific. What works in one context may fail in another. Instead of “one size fits all,” they suggest tailormade solutions. I challenge this view. Drawing on a comparison with IKEA’s global marketing strategy, I suggest that “one size fits all” can sometimes be not only a successful law reform strategy, but also not as objectionable as critics make it to be. First, whereas, “one size fits all” is deficient a functionalist position, it proves to be surprisingly successful as a formalist conception. Second, critics of legal transplants often insists on what can be called “best law” approach, whereas in law reform, what we sometimes need is law that is just” good enough” law. “Third, legal transplants no longer happen in isolation but rather on a global scale, so that context-specific rules are no longer necessarily local. This is not a plea for formal law, for commodification of laws, and for “one size fits all”. But it is a plea to overcome the romanticism and elitism that may lurk behind the seemingly benign suggestion that law reform must always be tailored to the specific societal context