ARE U.S. FARM PROGRAMS GOOD PUBLIC POLICY? TAKING POLICY PERFORMANCE SERIOUSLY

Distributional analysis is employed to assess the ethical acceptability of agricultural policy along plurastic moral criteria. Using 1999 micro-data from USDA ARMS survey and the Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances, we discuss policy performance (measured as the effect of direct government payments on the distribution of incomes and profits) relative to policy goals. We show that current programs only minimally address the post-?farm problem? objective of providing a safety net, and the goal of providing an abundant supply of agricultural products is potentially well-implemented given institutional constraints.Agricultural and Food Policy,

The New Capital Adequacy Framework: Institutional Constraints and Incentive Structures

This paper considers the implementation challenges facing the Basel Committee's new proposals on bank capital standards. When compared with the existing Capital Accord, the proposals represent a shift across two intersecting dimensions-regulatory versus economic capital, and rules-based versus process-oriented regulation. On minimum capital standards, the case for using external ratings may be stronger than has been recognized, given the divergences in the purpose and design of internal ratings. On supervisory review, ensuring comparability among supervisors and building supervisory capacity will present serious challenges. On enhancing market discipline, incentives for markets to exercise discipline will be required.

Global and U.S. Wheat Gluten Industries: Structure, Competition, and Trade

Industrial Organization,

An Overview of the Wheat Gluten Industry

Production Economics,

The New Capital Adequacy Framework - Institutional Constraints and Incentive Structures

This paper considers the implementation challenges facing the Basel Committee's new proposals on bank capital standards. When compared with the existing Capital Accord, the proposals represent a shift across two intersecting dimensions-regulatory versus economic capital, and rules-based versus process-oriented regulation. On minimum capital standards, the case for using external ratings may be stronger than has been recognized, given the divergences in the purpose and design of internal ratings. On supervisory review, ensuring comparability among supervisors and building supervisory capacity will present serious challenges. On enhancing market discipline, incentives for markets to exercise discipline will be required