Social working memory: neurocognitive networks and directions for future research.

Navigating the social world requires the ability to maintain and manipulate information about people's beliefs, traits, and mental states. We characterize this capacity as social working memory (SWM). To date, very little research has explored this phenomenon, in part because of the assumption that general working memory systems would support working memory for social information. Various lines of research, however, suggest that social cognitive processing relies on a neurocognitive network (i.e., the "mentalizing network") that is functionally distinct from, and considered antagonistic with, the canonical working memory network. Here, we review evidence suggesting that demanding social cognition requires SWM and that both the mentalizing and canonical working memory neurocognitive networks support SWM. The neural data run counter to the common finding of parametric decreases in mentalizing regions as a function of working memory demand and suggest that the mentalizing network can support demanding cognition, when it is demanding social cognition. Implications for individual differences in social cognition and pathologies of social cognition are discussed

Why social pain can live on: Different neural mechanisms are associated with reliving social and physical pain

Although social and physical pain recruit overlapping neural activity in regions associated with the affective component of pain, the two pains can diverge in their phenomenology. Most notably, feelings of social pain can be re-experienced or relived, even when the painful episode has long passed, whereas feelings of physical pain cannot be easily relived once the painful episode subsides. Here, we observed that reliving social (vs. physical) pain led to greater self-reported re-experienced pain and greater activity in affective pain regions (dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula). Moreover, the degree of relived pain correlated positively with affective pain system activity. In contrast, reliving physical (vs. social) pain led to greater activity in the sensory-discriminative pain system (primary and secondary somatosensory cortex and posterior insula), which did not correlate with relived pain. Preferential engagement of these different pain mechanisms may reflect the use of different top-down neurocognitive pathways to elicit the pain. Social pain reliving recruited dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, often associated with mental state processing, which functionally correlated with affective pain system responses. In contrast, physical pain reliving recruited inferior frontal gyrus, known to be involved in body state processing, which functionally correlated with activation in the sensory pain system. These results update the physical-social pain overlap hypothesis: while overlapping mechanisms support live social and physical pain, distinct mechanisms guide internally-generated pain. © 2015 Meyer et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited

Gender diversity of editorial boards and gender differences in the peer review process at six journals of ecology and evolution

Despite substantial progress for women in science, women remain underrepresented in many aspects of the scholarly publication process. We examined how the gender diversity of editors and reviewers changed over time for six journals in ecology and evolution (2003–2015 for four journals, 2007–2015 or 2009–2015 for the other two), and how several aspects of the peer review process differed between female and male editors and reviewers. We found that for five of the six journals, women were either absent or very poorly represented as handling editors at the beginning of our dataset. The representation of women increased gradually and consistently, with women making up 29% of the handling editors (averaged across journals) in 2015, similar to the representation of women as last authors on ecology papers (23% in 2015) but lower than the proportion of women among all authors (31%) and among members of the societies that own the journals (37%–40%). The proportion of women among reviewers has also gradually but consistently increased over time, reaching 27% by 2015. Female editors invited more female reviewers than did male editors, and this difference increased with age of the editor. Men and women who were invited to review did not differ in whether they responded to the review invitation, but, of those that responded, women were slightly more likely to agree to review. In contrast, women were less likely than men to accept invitations to serve on journal editorial boards. Our analyses indicate that there has been progress in the representation of women as reviewers and editors in ecology and evolutionary biology, but women are still underrepresented among the gatekeepers of scholarly publishing relative to their representation among researchers.We examined how the gender diversity of editors and reviewers changed over time for six journals in ecology and evolution, and how several aspects of the peer review process differed between female and male editors and reviewers. Our analyses indicate that there has been progress in the representation of women as reviewers and editors in ecology and evolutionary biology, but women are still underrepresented among the gatekeepers of scholarly publishing relative to their representation among researchers.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/153720/1/ece35794_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/153720/2/ece35794.pd

Evidence that the Evoked Response of Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex to Fixation Baseline Periods Facilitates Future Social (But not Nonsocial) Inferential (But not non-Inferential) Judgments

People draw inferences about each other with great efficiency. Such inferences are typically executed in order to refer transient observed behaviors ( e.g.,“smiling”) to relatively more permanent unobservable states (e.g.,“friendly”). A large body of evidence has delineated a set of brain regions that are reliably correlated with the performance of such mental state inferences: the mentalizing system. Intriguingly, this system shows considerable anatomical overlap with the default mode network, so-called because it is exhibits strong, integrated activity when people are at rest, for instance, duration fixation baseline periods. Here, we used fMRI to test the hypothesis that activity of the mentalizing system during these fixation periods prior to social inferential judgments would increase the efficiency of such judgments. 21 healthy adults underwent event-related fMRI while executing three types of judgments: social inferential (evaluating a mental description of a photographed behavior); social non-inferential (evaluating a motor description of a photographed behavior); or non-social (evaluating an arithmetical expression). Social inferential judgments robustly activated the mentalizing system, and many of the same areas were robustly de-activated by the non-social task when compared to the fixation baseline periods in between each trial. A parametric analysis of response time revealed that increased activity during these pre-trial periods in one of these regions, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, was associated with faster response times to accurate social (but not non-social) inferential (but not non-inferential) judgments. This provides the best support yet for a functional link between default activity of the mentalizing system and the execution of social inferences

The Default Mode of Human Brain Function Primes the Intentional Stance

■ Humans readily adopt an intentional stance to other people, comprehending their behavior as guided by unobservable mental states such as belief, desire, and intention. We used fMRI in healthy adults to test the hypothesis that this stance is primed by the de-fault mode of human brain function present when the mind is at rest. We report three findings that support this hypothesis. First, brain regions activated by actively adopting an intentional rather than nonintentional stance to a social stimulus were anatomically similar to those demonstrating default responses to fixation base-line in the same task. Second, moment-to-moment variation in default activity during fixation in the dorsomedial PFC was re-lated to the ease with which participants applied an intentional— but not nonintentional—stance to a social stimulus presentedmo-ments later. Finally, individuals who showed stronger dorsomedial PFC activity at baseline in a separate task were generally more ef-ficient when adopting the intentional stance and reported having greater social skills. These results identify a biological basis for the human tendency to adopt the intentional stance. More broadly, they suggest that the brain’s default mode of function may have evolved, in part, as a response to life in a social world.

The Default Mode of Human Brain Function Primes the Intentional Stance

Humans readily adopt an intentional stance to other people, comprehending their behavior as guided by unobservable mental states such as belief, desire, and intention. We used fMRI in healthy adults to test the hypothesis that this stance is primed by the default mode of human brain function present when the mind is at rest. We report three findings that support this hypothesis. First, brain regions activated by actively adopting an intentional rather than nonintentional stance to a social stimulus were anatomically similar to those demonstrating default responses to fixation baseline in the same task. Second, moment-to-moment variation in default activity during fixation in the dorsomedial PFC was related to the ease with which participants applied an intentional—but not nonintentional—stance to a social stimulus presented moments later. Finally, individuals who showed stronger dorsomedial PFC activity at baseline in a separate task were generally more efficient when adopting the intentional stance and reported having greater social skills. These results identify a biological basis for the human tendency to adopt the intentional stance. More broadly, they suggest that the brain's default mode of function may have evolved, in part, as a response to life in a social world

Preliminary investigation of the influence of dopamine regulating genes on social working memory

Working memory (WM) refers to mental processes that enable temporary retention and manipulation of information, including information about other people (“social working memory”). Previous studies have demonstrated that nonsocial WM is supported by dopamine neurotransmission. Here, we investigated in 131 healthy adults whether dopamine is similarly involved in social WM by testing whether social and nonsocial WM are influenced by genetic variants in three genes coding for molecules regulating the availability of dopamine in the brain: catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT), dopamine active transporter (DAT), and monoamine-oxidase A (MAOA). An advantage for the Met allele of COMT was observed in the two standard WM tasks and in the social WM task. However, the influence of COMT on social WM performance was not accounted for by its influence on either standard WM paradigms. There was no main effect of DAT1 or MAOA, but a significant COMT x DAT1 interaction on social WM performance. This study provides novel preliminary evidence of effects of genetic variants of the dopamine neurotransmitter system on social cognition. The results further suggest that the effects observed on standard WM do not explain the genetic effects on effortful social cognition