289 research outputs found
AAAI: an Argument Against Artificial Intelligence
The ethical concerns regarding the successful development of an Artificial Intelligence have received a lot of attention lately. The idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of an AI causing extreme human suffering is important enough to warrant serious consideration. Others look at this problem from the opposite perspective, namely that of the AI itself. Here the idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of humanity causing extreme suffering to an AI is important enough to warrant serious consideration. This paper starts from the observation that both concerns rely on problematic philosophical assumptions. Rather than tackling these assumptions directly, it proceeds to present an argument that if one takes these assumptions seriously, then one has a moral obligation to advocate for a ban on the development of a conscious AI
Consciousness, Action Selection, Meaning and Phenomenic Anticipation
Phenomenal states are generally considered the ultimate sources of intrinsic motivation for autonomous biological agents. In this article, we will address the issue of the necessity of exploiting these states for the design and implementation of robust goal-directed artificial systems. We will provide an analysis of consciousness in terms of a precise definition of how an agent "understands" the informational flows entering the agent and its very own action possibilities. This abstract model of consciousness and understanding will be based in the analysis and evaluation of phenomenal states along potential future trajectories in the state space of the agents. This implies that a potential strategy to follow in order to build autonomous but still customer-useful systems is to embed them with the particular, ad hoc phenomenality that captures the system-external requirements that define the system usefulness from a customer-based, requirements-strict engineering viewpoint
The death and the resurrection of (psy)critique: the case of neuroeducation
A rapidly emerging hegemonic neuro-culture and a booming neural subjectivity signal the entry point for an inquiry into the status of the signifier neuro as a universal passe-partout. The wager of this paper is that the various (mis)appropriations of the neurosciences in the media and in academia itself point to something essential, if not structural, in connection with both the discipline of the neurosciences and the current socio-cultural and ideological climate. Starting from the case of neuroeducation (the application of neuroscience within education), the genealogy of the neurological turn is linked to the history of psychology and its inextricable bond with processes of psychologisation. If the neurological turn risks not merely neglecting the dimension of critique, but also obviating its possibility, then revivifying a psy-critique (understanding the academified modern subject as grounded in the scientific point of view from nowhere) might be necessary in order to understand today’s neural subjectivity and its place within current biopolitics
Origin of Secretin Receptor Precedes the Advent of Tetrapoda: Evidence on the Separated Origins of Secretin and Orexin
At present, secretin and its receptor have only been identified in mammals, and the origin of this ligand-receptor pair in early vertebrates is unclear. In addition, the elusive similarities of secretin and orexin in terms of both structures and functions suggest a common ancestral origin early in the vertebrate lineage. In this article, with the cloning and functional characterization of secretin receptors from lungfish and X. laevis as well as frog (X. laevis and Rana rugulosa) secretins, we provide evidence that the secretin ligand-receptor pair has already diverged and become highly specific by the emergence of tetrapods. The secretin receptor-like sequence cloned from lungfish indicates that the secretin receptor was descended from a VPAC-like receptor prior the advent of sarcopterygians. To clarify the controversial relationship of secretin and orexin, orexin type-2 receptor was cloned from X. laevis. We demonstrated that, in frog, secretin and orexin could activate their mutual receptors, indicating their coordinated complementary role in mediating physiological processes in non-mammalian vertebrates. However, among the peptides in the secretin/glucagon superfamily, secretin was found to be the only peptide that could activate the orexin receptor. We therefore hypothesize that secretin and orexin are of different ancestral origins early in the vertebrate lineage
I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience
In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three notions in question, under the labels of “for-me-ness”, “me-ness” and “mineness”. Next, I argue that these notions are not equivalent; in particular, there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ness or mineness. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties (although the claim of conceptual non-equivalence does not depend on this further point). The aim is clarificatory, cautionary but also critical: I examine four existing arguments from subjective character that are fuelled by an undifferentiated use of the three notions, and find them to be flawed for this reason
Epistemic Constraints on Autonomous Symbolic Representation in Natural and Artificial Agents
We set out to address, in the form of a survey, the fundamental constraints upon self-updating representation in cognitive agents of natural and artificial origin. The foundational epistemic problem encountered by such agents is that of distinguishing errors of representation from inappropriateness of the representational framework. Resolving this conceptual difficulty involves ensuring the empirical falsifiability of both the representational hypotheses and the entities so represented, while at the same time retaining their epistemic distinguishability. We shall thus argue that perception-action frameworks provide an appropriate basis for the development of an empirically meaningful criterion for validating perceptual categories. In this scenario, hypotheses about the agent’s world are defined in terms of environmental affordances (characterised in terms of the agent’s active capabilities). Agents with the capability to hierarchically-abstract this framework to a level consonant with performing syntactic manipulations and making deductive conjectures are consequently able to form an implicitly symbolic representation of the environment within which new, higher-level, modes of environment manipulation are implied (e.g. tool-use). This abstraction process is inherently open-ended, admitting a wide-range of possible representational hypotheses — only the form of the lowest-level of the hierarchy need be constrained a priori (being the minimally sufficient condition necessary for retention of the ability to falsify high-level hypotheses). In biological agents capable of autonomous cognitive-updating, we argue that the grounding of such a priori ‘bootstrap’ representational hypotheses is ensured via the process of natural selection
Keeping in Touch with One's Self: Multisensory Mechanisms of Self-Consciousness
BACKGROUND: The spatial unity between self and body can be disrupted by employing conflicting visual-somatosensory bodily input, thereby bringing neurological observations on bodily self-consciousness under scientific scrutiny. Here we designed a novel paradigm linking the study of bodily self-consciousness to the spatial representation of visuo-tactile stimuli by measuring crossmodal congruency effects (CCEs) for the full body. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We measured full body CCEs by attaching four vibrator-light pairs to the trunks (backs) of subjects who viewed their bodies from behind via a camera and a head mounted display (HMD). Subjects made speeded elevation (up/down) judgments of the tactile stimuli while ignoring light stimuli. To modulate self-identification for the seen body subjects were stroked on their backs with a stick and the felt stroking was either synchronous or asynchronous with the stroking that could be seen via the HMD. We found that (1) tactile stimuli were mislocalized towards the seen body (2) CCEs were modulated systematically during visual-somatosensory conflict when subjects viewed their body but not when they viewed a body-sized object, i.e. CCEs were larger during synchronous than during asynchronous stroking of the body and (3) these changes in the mapping of tactile stimuli were induced in the same experimental condition in which predictable changes in bodily self-consciousness occurred. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: These data reveal that systematic alterations in the mapping of tactile stimuli occur in a full body illusion and thus establish CCE magnitude as an online performance proxy for subjective changes in global bodily self-consciousness
Embodying the mind and representing the body
Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further analyse how and to what extent body representations can be said to be embodied. Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational issues (How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is embodiment compatible with representationalism? To what extent and in what sense are sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several cognitive domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition)
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