A loss-of-function allele of OsHMA3 associated with high cadmium accumulation in shoots and grain of Japonica rice cultivars

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Photomodulating RNA cleavage using photolabile circular antisense oligodeoxynucleotides

Caged antisense oligodeoxynucleotides (asODNs) are synthesized by linking two ends of linear oligodeoxynucleotides using a photocleavable linker. Two of them (H30 and H40) have hairpin-like structures which show a large difference in thermal stability (ΔTm = 17.5°C and 11.6°C) comparing to uncaged ones. The other three (C20, C30 and C40) without stable secondary structures have the middle 20 deoxynucleotides complementary to 40-mer RNA. All caged asODNs have restricted opening which provides control over RNA/asODN interaction. RNase H assay results showed that 40-mer RNA digestion could be photo-modulated 2- to 3-fold upon light-activation with H30, H40, C30 and C40, while with C20, RNA digestion was almost not detectable; however, photo-activation triggered >20-fold increase of RNA digestion. And gel shift assays showed that it needed >0.04 μM H40 and 0.5 μM H30 to completely bind 0.02 μM 40-mer RNA, and for C40 and C30, it needed >0.2 μM and 0.5 μM for 0.02 μM 40-mer RNA binding. However, even 4 μM C20 was not able to fully bind the same concentration of 40-mer RNA. By simple adjustment of ring size of caged asODNs, we could successfully photoregulate their hybridization with mRNA and target RNA hydrolysis by RNase H with light activation

Find Me A Safe Zone:A Countermeasure for Channel State Information Based Attacks

Recently, channel state information (CSI) is shown to be an effective side-channel to perform attacks in public environments. Prior work has demonstrated that by analyzing how the CSI measurements of the wireless signal are affected by the mobile user's finger movements or gestures, an attacker can recover the user's input with a high success rate. Furthermore, the setup of this new attack is trivial, where the adversary only needs to place one or two malicious wireless devices near the target user. It would be difficult for many users to identify the nearby malicious devices while they want to continue to use mobile applications in public places. This dilemma makes protection of CSI-based attacks an urgent need. This article presents the first countermeasure for CSI-based attacks. Our key insight is that the success of any CSI-based attack requires high-quality CSI measurements; and we can significantly reduce the risk of information leakage by directing the user to a nearby location where the CSI readings are inherently noisy. To this end, we develop a regression based method to assess the risk of CSI-based attacks and exploit a well-established localization technique to identify potential malicious wireless devices. We then use this information to guide the user to a safe zone. We evaluate our approach by applying it to protect pattern lock and keystrokes in various indoor and outdoor environments. Experimental results show that our approach can effectively protect mobile users against CSI-based attacks