Beliefs about bad people are volatile

People form moral impressions rapidly, effortlessly and from a remarkably young age1,2,3,4,5. Putatively \u2018bad\u2019 agents command more attention and are identified more quickly and accurately than benign or friendly agents5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12. Such vigilance is adaptive, but can also be costly in environments where people sometimes make mistakes, because incorrectly attributing bad character to good people damages existing relationships and discourages forming new relationships13,14,15,16. The ability to accurately infer the moral character of others is critical for healthy social functioning, but the computational processes that support this ability are not well understood. Here, we show that moral inference is explained by an asymmetric Bayesian updating mechanism in which beliefs about the morality of bad agents are more uncertain (and therefore more volatile) than beliefs about the morality of good agents. This asymmetry seems to be a property of learning about immoral agents in general, as we also find greater uncertainty for beliefs about the non-moral traits of bad agents. Our model and data reveal a cognitive mechanism that permits flexible updating of beliefs about potentially threatening others, a mechanism that could facilitate forgiveness when initial bad impressions turn out to be inaccurate. Our findings suggest that negative moral impressions destabilize beliefs about others, promoting cognitive flexibility in the service of cooperative but cautious behaviour

Social judgments from faces

Item does not contain fulltextPeople make rapid and consequential social judgments from minimal (non-emotional) facial cues. There has been rapid progress in identifying the perceptual basis of these judgments using data-driven, computational models. In contrast, our understanding of the neural underpinnings of these judgments is rather limited. Meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies find a wide range of seemingly inconsistent responses in the amygdala that co-vary with social judgments from faces. Guided by computational models of social judgments, these responses can be accounted by positing that the amygdala (and posterior face selective regions) tracks face typicality. Atypical faces, whether positively or negatively evaluated, elicit stronger responses in the amygdala. We conclude with the promise of data-driven methods for modeling neural responses to social judgments from faces

Context-Dependent Learning in Social Interaction: Trait Impressions Support Flexible Social Choices

How do humans learn, through social interaction, whom to depend on in different situations? We compared the extent to which inferred trait attributes-as opposed to learned reward associations previously examined as part of feedback-based learning-could adaptively inform cross-context social decision-making. In four experiments, participants completed a novel task in which they chose to "hire" other players to solve math and verbal questions for money. These players varied in their trait-level competence across these contexts and, independently, in the monetary rewards they offered to participants across contexts. Results revealed that participants chose partners primarily based on context-specific traits, as opposed to either global trait impressions or material rewards. When making choices in novel contexts-including determining who to choose for social and emotional support-participants generalized trait knowledge from past contexts that required similar traits. Reward-based learning, by contrast, demonstrated significantly weaker context-sensitivity and generalization. These findings suggest that people form context-dependent trait impressions from interactive feedback and use this knowledge to make flexible social decisions. These results support a novel theoretical account of how interaction-based social learning can support context-specific impression formation and adaptive decision-making

The role of morality in social cognition

Over the past few decades, two-factor models of social cognition have emerged as the dominant framework for understanding impression formation. Despite the differences in the labels, there is wide agreement that one dimension reflects sociability potential, and the other, competence. One way in which the various two-factor models do clearly differ, however, is in the way the dimensions incorporate or produce evaluations of morality. Aristotle saw morality as the most important basis on which to form positive evaluations, because competence and sociability could only be virtuous, sincere, and trustworthy if expressed through a moral character. This chapter highlights research demonstrating the unique and possibly primary role of morality in social cognition. We clarify the dynamic, interactive, and conjoint effects of morality on social perception, and argue morality, competence, and sociability are three influential and interactive dimensions of social perception

The time-course of moral perception: An ERP investigation of the moral pop-out effect

Humans are highly attuned to perceptual cues about their values. A growing body of evidence suggests that people selectively attend to moral stimuli. However, it is unknown whether morality is prioritized early in perception or much later in cognitive processing. We use a combination of behavioral methods and electroencephalography to investigate how early in perception moral words are prioritized relative to non-moral words. The behavioral data replicate previous research indicating that people are more likely to correctly identify moral than non-moral words in a modified lexical decision task. The electroencephalography data reveal that words are distinguished from non-words as early as 200 milliseconds after onset over frontal brain areas, and moral words are distinguished from non-moral words 100 milliseconds later over left-posterior cortex. Further analyses reveal that differences in brain activity to moral vs. non-moral words cannot be explained by differences in arousal associated with the words. These results suggest that moral content might be prioritized in conscious awareness after an initial perceptual encoding but before subsequent memory processing or action preparation. This work offers a more precise theoretical framework for understanding how morality impacts vision and behavior

The time-course of moral perception: An electroencephalography investigation

Humans are highly attuned to perceptual cues about their values. A growing body of evidence suggests that people selectively attend to moral stimuli. However, it is unknown whether morality is prioritized early in perception or much later in cognitive processing. We use a combination of behavioral methods and electroencephalography to investigate how early in perception moral words are prioritized relative to non-moral words. The behavioral data replicate previous research indicating that people are more likely to correctly identify moral than non-moral words in a modified lexical decision task. The electroencephalography data reveal that words are distinguished from non-words as early as 200 milliseconds after onset over frontal brain areas, and moral words are distinguished from non-moral words 100 milliseconds later over left-posterior cortex. Further analyses reveal that differences in brain activity to moral vs. non-moral words cannot be explained by differences in arousal associated with the words. These results suggest that moral content might be prioritized in conscious awareness after an initial perceptual encoding but before subsequent memory processing or action preparation. This work offers a more precise theoretical framework for understanding how morality impacts vision and behavior