Higher-level goals in the processing of human action events

The concept of a goal critically separates dynamic events involving humans from other events. Human behaviours are motivated by goals, which are known to the actor but typically inferred on the part of the observer. Goals can be hierarchical in nature, such that a collection of sub-goals (e.g., getting a mug, boiling water) can be nested under a higher-level goal (e.g., making tea), which can be further nested under an even higher-level goal (e.g., making breakfast). The diverse set of talks in this symposia all highlight the foundational role that goals play in action processing and representation. Eisenberg et al. detail how online prediction of others’ goals shapes observers’ sampling of information during action observation. Howard and Woodward provide evidence that children’s memory for non-human events can be facilitated by priming children with their own goal-directed actions. Loucks and Meltzoff highlight the importance of goal structure in children’s memory for complex action sequences. Finally, Cooper presents a computational model to explain the emergence of goal-directed action hierarchies

Is It Rational to Assume that Infants Imitate Rationally? A Theoretical Analysis and Critique

It has been suggested that preverbal infants evaluate the efficiency of others' actions (by applying a principle of rational action) and that they imitate others' actions rationally. The present contribution presents a conceptual analysis of the claim that preverbal infants imitate rationally. It shows that this ability rests on at least three assumptions: that infants are able to perceive others' action capabilities, that infants reason about and conceptually represent their own bodies, and that infants are able to think counterfactually. It is argued that none of these three abilities is in place during infancy. Furthermore, it is shown that the idea of a principle of rational action suffers from two fallacies. As a consequence, is it suggested that it is not rational to assume that infants imitate rationally. Copyright (C) 2012 S. Karger AG, Base

Three-month-olds, but not newborns, prefer own-race faces

Adults are sensitive to the physical differences that define ethnic groups. However, the age at which we become sensitive to ethnic differences is currently unclear. Our study aimed to clarify this by testing newborns and young infants for sensitivity to ethnicity using a visual preference (VP) paradigm. While newborn infants demonstrated no spontaneous preference for faces from either their own- or other-ethnic groups, 3-month-old infants demonstrated a significant preference for faces from their own-ethnic group. These results suggest that preferential selectivity based on ethnic differences is not present in the first days of life, but is learned within the first 3 months of life. The findings imply that adults’ perceptions of ethnic differences are learned and derived from differences in exposure to own- versus other-race faces during early developmen

The parent?infant dyad and the construction of the subjective self

Developmental psychology and psychopathology has in the past been more concerned with the quality of self-representation than with the development of the subjective agency which underpins our experience of feeling, thought and action, a key function of mentalisation. This review begins by contrasting a Cartesian view of pre-wired introspective subjectivity with a constructionist model based on the assumption of an innate contingency detector which orients the infant towards aspects of the social world that react congruently and in a specifically cued informative manner that expresses and facilitates the assimilation of cultural knowledge. Research on the neural mechanisms associated with mentalisation and social influences on its development are reviewed. It is suggested that the infant focuses on the attachment figure as a source of reliable information about the world. The construction of the sense of a subjective self is then an aspect of acquiring knowledge about the world through the caregiver's pedagogical communicative displays which in this context focuses on the child's thoughts and feelings. We argue that a number of possible mechanisms, including complementary activation of attachment and mentalisation, the disruptive effect of maltreatment on parent-child communication, the biobehavioural overlap of cues for learning and cues for attachment, may have a role in ensuring that the quality of relationship with the caregiver influences the development of the child's experience of thoughts and feelings

Towards an understanding of neuroscience for science educators

Advances in neuroscience have brought new insights to the development of cognitive functions. These data are of considerable interest to educators concerned with how students learn. This review documents some of the recent findings in neuroscience, which is richer in describing cognitive functions than affective aspects of learning. A brief overview is presented here of the techniques used to generate data from imaging and how these findings have the possibility to inform educators. There are implications for considering the impact of neuroscience at all levels of education – from the classroom teacher and practitioner to policy. This relatively new cross-disciplinary area of research implies a need for educators and scientists to engage with each other. What questions are emerging through such dialogues between educators and scientists are likely to shed light on, for example, reward, motivation, working memory, learning difficulties, bilingualism and child development. The sciences of learning are entering a new paradigm

The influence of media violence on youth

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/83429/1/2003.Anderson_etal.InfluenceofMediaViolenceonYouth.PsychologicalScienceinthePublicInterest.pd