The concept of a goal critically separates dynamic events involving humans from other events. Human behaviours are motivated by goals, which are known to the actor but typically inferred on the part of the observer. Goals can be hierarchical in nature, such that a collection of sub-goals (e.g., getting a mug, boiling water) can be nested under a higher-level goal (e.g., making tea), which can be further nested under an even higher-level goal (e.g., making breakfast).
The diverse set of talks in this symposia all highlight the foundational role that goals play in action processing and representation. Eisenberg et al. detail how online prediction of others’ goals shapes observers’ sampling of information during action observation. Howard and Woodward provide evidence that children’s memory for non-human events can be facilitated by priming children with their own goal-directed actions. Loucks and Meltzoff highlight the importance of goal structure in children’s memory for complex action sequences. Finally, Cooper presents a computational model to explain the emergence of goal-directed action hierarchies
