The Basic Liberties: An Essay on Analytical Specification

We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the “analytical” method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e., the liberty principle). We argue that the general conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical method, which employ the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the theory’s fundamental ideas

NICMOS Observations of Low-Redshift Quasar Host Galaxies

We have obtained Near-Infrared Camera and Multi-Object Spectrometer images of 16 radio quiet quasars observed as part of a project to investigate the ``luminosity/host-mass limit.'' The limit results were presented in McLeod, Rieke, & Storrie-Lombardi (1999). In this paper, we present the images themselves, along with 1- and 2-dimensional analyses of the host galaxy properties. We find that our model-independent 1D technique is reliable for use on ground-based data at low redshifts; that many radio-quiet quasars live in deVaucouleurs-law hosts, although some of the techniques used to determine host type are questionable; that complex structure is found in many of the hosts, but that there are some hosts that are very smooth and symmetric; and that the nuclei radiate at ~2-20% of the Eddington rate based on the assumption that all galaxies have central black holes with a constant mass fraction of 0.6%. Despite targeting hard-to-resolve hosts, we have failed to find any that imply super-Eddington accretion rates.Comment: To appear in ApJ, 28 pages including degraded figures. Download the paper with full-resolutio figures from http://www.astro.wellesley.edu/kmcleod/mm.p

Catch allocation in a shared fishery with a minimally managed recreational sector

A prevalent problem in shared fisheries is competition between commercial and recreational fishers for access to a resource that is subject to increasing utilisation pressure. For most shared fisheries in New Zealand, the commercial sector is efficiently managed with a regime of individual transferable quota (ITQ), but the recreational fishing is only minimally managed. A model is developed that can be used to explore the size of the total allowable catch (TAC) that is both sustainable AND maximises the value to the NZ economy of the combined commercial and recreational catch when the commercial catch is regulated via a total allowable commercial catch (TACC) while the recreational catch (RC) is self regulating. Determinants of the optimal catch allocation include: • the relative size of annual value to recreational fishers vis-à-vis the value of one unit of ACE to the commercial fishing sector from a unit decrease in the TACC • the relation between value to recreational fishers and size of stock biomass • the biology, and in particular the population dynamics of the fishery • the nature of the functional relationship between the self regulating recreational catch and stock biomass. The model can be applied to a fishery of interest by quantifying the above variables and relationships.economics management shared fishery catch allocation, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

What is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment?

Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the best form of the objection asserts that, in attempting to entrap, law-enforcement agents lapse into a form of practical incoherence that involves the attempt simultaneously to pursue contrary ends. We then argue that the objection, in this form, encompasses all cases of legal entrapment only if it is supplemented by appeal to the premise that law-enforcement agents have an absolute duty never to create crimes

The Concept of Entrapment

Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law- enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit a crime that possess this neutrality. We point out some problems with the extensional correctness of these definitions and propose a new definition that resolves these problems. We then extend our definition to provide a more general definition of entrapment, encompassing both civil and legal cases. Our definition is, we believe, closer to being extensionally correct and will, we hope, provide a clearer basis for future discussions about the ethics of entrapment than do the definitions upon which it improves

Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism

AbstractBy the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than the second. Contrary to received opinion, the paper argues, the considerations Kripke adduces concerning truths purported to be necessary a posteriori do not disprove the logical positivist thesis that necessary truth and a priori truth are co-extensive.</jats:p