Public Participation in Risk Regulation

After discussing the increasing recognition of different kinds of claims for public participation in Risk regulation, this paper discusses a spectrum of approaches and examines six points along its range

On Making Judges Do the Right Thing

Denna rapport beskriver arbetet med att sammanställa ångförbrukande processer på Norrmejeriers Mejeri i Umeå som skulle kunna konverteras till fjärrvärmedrift. En del arbete har också lagts ner på att hitta förbättringsförslag på mejeriets ångsystem och beräkna nödvändig maxeffekt på en ny biobränsleeldad panna som är planerad att driftsättas före slutet på 2017. Processdata, som till stor del uppmätts av Sweco Systems för en energikartläggning av mejeriet, har använts till att undersöka 23 olika processer med en årlig energianvändning på ca 22 000 MWh. 11 av dessa processer har så låga temperaturkrav att fjärrvärme skulle kunna driva dessa året om, de anses därför vara mer lämpade för fjärrvärmedrift än de övriga. Dessa 11 processer har ett sammanlagt årligt energibehov på ca 15 000 MWh och hit hör bland annat uppvärmning av vatten till processer och tapp, värme till mejeriets ventilationssystem och förvärmning av nytt pannvatten. Resterande processer anses olämpliga att driva med fjärrvärme då kostnaden för att göra detta troligen blir högre än i dagsläget och en del av dessa processer enbart kan drivas med fjärrvärme en begränsad del av året. Till dessa processer hör värmning av mjölk och grädde vid några av mejeriets pastörer och återuppvärmning av diskvatten. I arbetet presenteras 3 olika förslag på hur fjärrvärmen kan kopplas in till undersökta processer. De två första förslagen ger framtida visioner om hur alla 23 undersöka processer kan konverteras till fjärrvärme. Det tredje förslaget visar däremot hur en fjärrvärmeanslutning kan se ut inom en snar framtid och i detta förslag ansluts endast de 11 mest lämpade processerna till fjärrvärmen. Det tredje förslaget användes till att göra en ekonomisk jämförelse mellan att värma processerna med ånga eller fjärrvärme. Det enda som jämfördes i beräkningarna var kostnaden för uppvärmning av processerna och ingen hänsyn togs till installationskostnader av fjärrvärmen eller den nya pannan. Beräkningarna visade att störst ekonomisk vinst kunde göras genom att använda sig av fjärrvärme för basbehovet och sedan toppa på detta med ånga när värmeförbrukningen var hög. Med ångproduktion i de befintliga pannorna skulle Norrmejerier kunna spara 1,8 miljoner kr/år med denna lösning. När den nya biobränslepannan installeras så sjunker däremot den möjliga besparingen till någonstans mellan 420 000- 860 000 kr/år. Förutom de besparingar som skulle kunna göras med en fjärrvärmeinstallation har flera förlustfaktorer identifierats i gångsystemet. Bland annat förloras ca 9 000 MWh årligen som flashånga eller genom att kondensat inte återförs till pannorna. Förbättringsförslag för att minska förlorade energimängder och effektivisera andra processer tas därför upp. Med nuvarande kostnadsbild på fjärrvärmen anses investeringskostnaden för denna inte väga upp den möjliga årliga besparingen efter att biobränslepannan konstruerats. Fjärrvärmen ses däremot som ett bättre miljömässigt alternativ och genom att installera fjärrvärme skulle maxeffekten på den nya biobränslepannan kunna minskas. Hur maxeffekten på den nya pannan bör dimensioneras vid en möjlig fjärrvärmeinkoppling och vid olika effektiviseringsförslag diskuteras därför också.This report describes the work of compiling steam consuming processes that could be converted to district heating in the dairy plant Norrmejerier in Umeå. Some work has also been put into finding possible improvement for the dairy's steam system and calculating the necessary maximum output of a new biofuel boiler that is to be built before the end of 2017.   Process data, which has been gathered by Sweco systems for an energy audit of the dairy, has been used to further investigate 23 different processes with an annual energy consumption of approximately 22 000 MWh. 11 of these processes have such low temperature requirements that district heating could be utilized to power them throughout the whole year. These 11 processes are those considered most suitable for a district heating installation and they have an annual energy consumption of about 15 000 MWh. The processes include heat to process- and tap-water, preheating new boiler water and heat to the dairy’s ventilation. The remaining processes are considered less suitable for a district heating installation since the cost of using district heating to power these probably would be more expensive than using self-produced steam. Some of these processes also have such high temperatures that district heating only could power them for a short period of the year. These processes include heating of milk and cream at some of the dairy's pasteurs and reheating dish water in the dairy’s dish system. Three different proposals for connecting the dairy to the district heating network have been suggested. Two of these proposals provide a futuristic vision for how Norrmejerier could connect district heating in the future to access all 23 investigated processes. The last proposal shows how a district heating installation could be utilized in the near future and in this suggestion only the 11 most suitable processes are connected.   The basic data from the last connection suggestion was used to make a financial comparison between district heating and self-generated steam for heating. The only thing compared in the calculations are the energy costs for heating and no consideration was taken to the installation costs of district heating or the new boiler. The calculations showed that the largest economical gain could be achieved by using district heating for the base load and then adding self-produced steam for peak loads. With steam productions in the current boilers Norrmejerier could save 1.8 million SEK annually with this solution. However, with the installation of a new biofuel boiler the possible savings drops to somewhere between 420 000 to 860 000 SEK/year. In addition to the savings that could be made with a district heating installation, several loss factors have been identified in the steam system. Among other things, about 9,000 MWh are annually lost as flash steam or condensate that disappears from the system. Suggestions to reduce losses in the system and improving energy use in different processes are therefore presented.   The possible savings that can be achived by installing district heating are not considered to be worth the big investment cost once the new steam boiler is installed. District heating is however seen as a better environmental option and by installing district heating the new boiler would be able to be constructed with a smaller maximum output, which would lower the installation costs. How suggested improvements to the steam system and a possible district heating installation would affect the new boiler is therefor also discussed

The Role of Government Attorneys in Regulatory Agency Rulemaking

The many roles that agency lawyers can play in the internal processes of developing proposed rules and responding to public comments on those rules are discussed

The End Game of Deregulation: Myopic Risk Management and the Next Catastrophe

By using the Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant’s spill into the Emory River as a case study, this article offers several explanations for why the twentieth century dynamic of crisis and reform has disappeared in the early twenty-first century. In Part I, it is argued that regulated industries dominate regulatory debates on Capitol Hill and at the federal agencies to an unprecedented extent. Part II examines what is known about the Kingston spill and the implications of that information for recurrence of such events. Part III explains how the EPA and Congress responded to this disaster, highlighting how politics driven by a deregulatory ideology eventually took over the EPA’s science-based rulemaking process. Part IV offers suggestions for rebuilding regulatory agencies like the EPA and for restoring public trust in government.The Kay Bailey Hutchison Center for Energy, Law, and Busines

Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight

This Article highlights the. hazards of hindsight analysis of the causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and particularly on the theory that the levee failures were caused by a 1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the standard project hurricane risk assessment model that lay at the heart of the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 decisionmaking process. The Article then offers a detailed analysis. of how and why Hurricane Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking, whether the parameter is a standard project hurricane when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical lawsuit that sunk New Orleans when attempting to allocate responsibility for the plan\u27s failure some forty years later

Deregulation Using Stealth “Science” Strategies

In this Article, we explore the “stealth” use of science by the Executive Branch to advance deregulation and highlight the limited, existing legal and institutional constraints in place to discipline and discourage these practices. Political appointees have employed dozens of strategies over the years, in both Democratic and Republican administrations, to manipulate science in ends-oriented ways that advance the goal of deregulation. Despite this bald manipulation of science, however, the officials frequently present these strategies as necessary to bring “sound science” to bear on regulatory decisions. To begin to address this problem, it is important to reconceptualize how the administrative state addresses science-intensive decisions. Rather than allow agencies and the White House to operate as a cohesive unit, institutional bounds should be drawn around the scientific expertise lodged within the agencies. We propose that the background scientific work prepared by agency staff should be firewalled from the evaluative, policymaking input of the remaining officials, including politically appointed officials, in the agency

Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight

This Article highlights the. hazards of hindsight analysis of the causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and particularly on the theory that the levee failures were caused by a 1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the standard project hurricane risk assessment model that lay at the heart of the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 decisionmaking process. The Article then offers a detailed analysis. of how and why Hurricane Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking, whether the parameter is a standard project hurricane when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical lawsuit that sunk New Orleans when attempting to allocate responsibility for the plan\u27s failure some forty years later

The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking

The EPA\u27s evolving internal decisionmaking structures as they relate to the agency\u27s primary function of promulgating rules and regulations are examined. As an agency addressing complex scientific, economic and technological issues, the EPA must draw upon many different kinds of expertise and has developed a unique version of bureaucratic pluralism as manifested in the team model that dominates the EPA\u27s institutional thought process

President Obama’s Executive Order on Chemical Facility Safety Is a Step in the Right Direction

The Kay Bailey Hutchison Center for Energy, Law, and Busines