Reforming the International Monetary System in the 1970s and 2000s: Would an SDR Substitution Account Have Worked

This paper analyzes the discussion of a substitution account in the 1970s and how the account might have performed had it been agreed in 1980. The substitution account would have allowed central banks to diversify away from the dollar into the IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR), comprised of US dollar, Deutschmark, French franc (later euro), Japanese yen and British pound, through transactions conducted off the market. The account’s dollar assets could fall short of the value of its SDR liabilities, and hedging would have defeated the purpose of preventing dollar sales. In the event, negotiators were unable to agree on how to distribute the open-ended cost of covering any shortfall if the dollar’s depreciation were to exceed the value of any cumulative interest rate premium on the dollar. As it turned out, the substitution account would have encountered solvency problems had the US dollar return been based on US treasury bill yields, even if a substantial fraction of the IMF’s gold had been devoted to meet the shortfall at recent high prices for gold. However, had the US dollar return been based on US treasury bond yields, the substitution account would have been solvent even without any gold backing

Reforming the international monetary system in the 1970s and 2000s: would an SDR substitution account have worked?

Advocates of a more pluralistic international monetary and financial system seek to reduce reliance on a single national currency and to bring international liquidity under collective control. One recently revived proposal would transform US dollar official reserves into claims denominated in the IMF's key currency basket, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Drawing on new archival evidence and simulations, this article highlights issues that derailed earlier agreement on such an account and shortcomings of design and ambition revealed by subsequent developments. One design issue was account losses if US dollar yields failed to exceed SDR yields enough to offset dollar depreciation. In fact, uncovered interest parity did not hold and could well have left the account persistently insolvent. Another shortcoming was ambition: the proposed account proved simply too small to achieve the desired lowering of the dollar's share of foreign exchange reserves. Any new proposal needs to address these shortcomings

Reforming the International Monetary System in the 1970s and 2000s: Would an SDR Substitution Account Have Worked

This paper analyzes the discussion of a substitution account in the 1970s and how the account might have performed had it been agreed in 1980. The substitution account would have allowed central banks to diversify away from the dollar into the IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR), comprised of US dollar, Deutschmark, French franc (later euro), Japanese yen and British pound, through transactions conducted off the market. The account’s dollar assets could fall short of the value of its SDR liabilities, and hedging would have defeated the purpose of preventing dollar sales. In the event, negotiators were unable to agree on how to distribute the open-ended cost of covering any shortfall if the dollar’s depreciation were to exceed the value of any cumulative interest rate premium on the dollar. As it turned out, the substitution account would have encountered solvency problems had the US dollar return been based on US treasury bill yields, even if a substantial fraction of the IMF’s gold had been devoted to meet the shortfall at recent high prices for gold. However, had the US dollar return been based on US treasury bond yields, the substitution account would have been solvent even without any gold backing

Cosmic-ray Monte Carlo predictions for forward particle production in p-p, p-Pb, and Pb-Pb collisions at the LHC

We present and compare the predictions of various cosmic-ray Monte Carlo models for the energy (dE/deta) and particle (dN/deta) flows in p-p, p-Pb and Pb-Pb collisions at sqrt(s) = 14, 8.8, and 5.5 TeV respectively, in the range covered by forward LHC detectors like CASTOR or TOTEM (5.2<|eta|<6.6) and ZDC or LHCf (|eta|>8.1 for neutrals).Comment: 5 pages, 5 figs. Poster proceedings Quark-Matter'08, Jaipur. To appear in Indian J. of Phy

Risk-On/Risk-Off, Capital Flows, Leverage, and Safe Assets

This paper describes the international flow of funds associated with calm and volatile global equity markets. During calm periods, portfolio investment by real money and leveraged investors in advanced countries flows into emerging markets. When central banks in the receiving countries resist exchange rate appreciation and buy dollars against domestic currency, they end up investing in medium-term bonds in reserve currencies. In the process they fund themselves (or "sterilize" the expansion of local bank reserves) by issuing safe assets in domestic currency to domestic investors. Thus, calm periods, marked by leveraged investing in emerging markets, lead to an asymmetric asset swap (risky emerging market assets against safe reserve currency assets) and leveraging up by emerging market central banks. In declining and volatile global equity markets, these flows reverse, and, contrary to some claims, emerging market central banks draw down reserves substantially. In effect emerging market central banks then release safe assets from their reserves, supplying safe havens to global investors

FK506 IN PEDIATRIC KIDNEY-TRANSPLANTATION - PRIMARY AND RESCUE EXPERIENCE

Between December 14, 1989, and December 17, 1993,43 patients undergoing kidney transplantation alone at the Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh received FK506 as the primary immunosuppressive agent. The mean recipient age was 10.2 ± 4.8 years (range 0.7–17.4), with 7 (16%) children under 5 years of age and 2 (5%) under 2 years of age. Fifteen (35%) children underwent retransplantation, and 5 (12%) had a panel reactive antibody level greater than 40%. Twenty-two (51%) cases were with cadaveric donors, and 21 (49%) were with living donors. The mean follow-up is 25 ± 14 months. There were no deaths. One and three year actuarial graft survival was 98% and 85%. The mean serum creatinine and BUN were 1.2 ± 0.6 mg/dl and 26 ± 11 mg/dl; the calculated creatinine clearance was 75 ± 23 ml/min/1.73 m(2). Twenty-four (62%) patients have been successfully withdrawn from steroids, and 24 (62%) require no anti-hypertensive medication. Improved growth was seen, particularly in pre-adolescent children off steroids. Between July 28, 1990, and December 2, 1993, 24 children were referred for rescue therapy with FK506, 14.6 ± 16.4 months (range 1.1–53.2) after transplantation. Nineteen (79%) were referred because of resistant rejection; 4 (17%) were referred because of proteinuria; 1 (4%) was switched because of steroid-related obesity. There were no deaths. One and two year graft survival was 75% and 68%. Seventeen (71%) patients were successfully rescued, including 1 of 2 patients who arrived on dialysis. Four (24%) of the successfully rescued patients were weaned off steroids. While not without side effects, which include nephrotoxicity, neurotoxicity, diabetogenicity, and viral complications, FK506 appears to be an effective immunosuppressive agent for both primary and rescue therapy after kidney transplantation. Its steroid-sparing qualities may be of particular importance in the pediatric population

Outcomes of Salvage Arthrodesis and Arthroplasty for Failed Osteochondral Allograft Transplantation of the Ankle

Background: Osteochondral allograft (OCA) transplantation is a useful treatment for posttraumatic ankle arthritis in young patients, but failure rates are high and reoperations are not uncommon. The aim of this study was to evaluate the outcomes of failed ankle OCA transplantation converted to ankle arthrodesis (AA) or total ankle arthroplasty (TAA). Methods: We evaluated 24 patients who underwent salvage procedures (13 AA and 11 TAA) after primary failed ankle OCA transplantation. Reoperations were assessed. Failure of the salvage procedure was defined as an additional surgery that required a revision AA/TAA or amputation. Evaluation among nonfailing ankles included the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons Foot and Ankle Module (AAOS-FAM), pain, and satisfaction. Results: In the salvage AA cohort, 3 patients were classified as failures (2 revision AA and 1 amputation). The 10 nonfailing patients had a mean follow-up of 7.4 years. Eighty-eight percent were satisfied with the procedure, but 63% reported continued problems with their ankle (eg, pain, swelling, stiffness). Mean pain level was 1.9 and AAOS-FAM core score was 83±13. In the salvage TAA cohort, 2 patients were classified as failures (both revision TAA). The 9 nonfailing patients had a mean follow-up of 3.8 years. Fifty percent were satisfied with the procedure, but 40% reported continued problems with their ankle. The mean pain level was 1.3, and the median AAOS-FAM core score was 82±26. Conclusion: Revision and reoperation rates for salvage procedures following failed OCA transplantation of the ankle are higher compared to published data for primary AA and TAA procedures. However, we believe OCA transplantation can serve as an interim procedure for younger patients with advanced ankle joint disease who may not be ideal candidates for primary AA or TAA at the time of initial presentation. Level of Evidence: Level IV, case series

Outcomes of Salvage Arthrodesis and Arthroplasty for Failed Osteochondral Allograft Transplantation of the Ankle

Background: Osteochondral allograft (OCA) transplantation is a useful treatment for posttraumatic ankle arthritis in young patients, but failure rates are high and reoperations are not uncommon. The aim of this study was to evaluate the outcomes of failed ankle OCA transplantation converted to ankle arthrodesis (AA) or total ankle arthroplasty (TAA). Methods: We evaluated 24 patients who underwent salvage procedures (13 AA and 11 TAA) after primary failed ankle OCA transplantation. Reoperations were assessed. Failure of the salvage procedure was defined as an additional surgery that required a revision AA/TAA or amputation. Evaluation among nonfailing ankles included the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons Foot and Ankle Module (AAOS-FAM), pain, and satisfaction. Results: In the salvage AA cohort, 3 patients were classified as failures (2 revision AA and 1 amputation). The 10 nonfailing patients had a mean follow-up of 7.4 years. Eighty-eight percent were satisfied with the procedure, but 63% reported continued problems with their ankle (eg, pain, swelling, stiffness). Mean pain level was 1.9 and AAOS-FAM core score was 83±13. In the salvage TAA cohort, 2 patients were classified as failures (both revision TAA). The 9 nonfailing patients had a mean follow-up of 3.8 years. Fifty percent were satisfied with the procedure, but 40% reported continued problems with their ankle. The mean pain level was 1.3, and the median AAOS-FAM core score was 82±26. Conclusion: Revision and reoperation rates for salvage procedures following failed OCA transplantation of the ankle are higher compared to published data for primary AA and TAA procedures. However, we believe OCA transplantation can serve as an interim procedure for younger patients with advanced ankle joint disease who may not be ideal candidates for primary AA or TAA at the time of initial presentation. Level of Evidence: Level IV, case series