Close-Range Photogrammetric Measurement of Static Deflections for an Aeroelastic Supercritical Wing

Close range photogrammetric measurements were made for the lower wing surface of a full span aspect ratio 10.3 aeroelastic supercritical research wing. The measurements were made during wind tunnel tests for quasi-steady pressure distributions on the wing. The tests were conducted in the NASA Langley Transonic Dynamics Tunnel at Mach numbers up to 0.90 and dynamic pressures up to 300 pounds per square foot. Deflection data were obtained for 57 locations on the wing lower surface using dual non-metric cameras. Representative data are presented as graphical overview to show variations and trends of spar deflection with test variables. Comparative data are presented for photogrammetric and cathetometric results of measurements for the wing tip deflections. A tabulation of the basic measurements is presented in a supplement to this report

Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure

We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if $U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}<U_{min}$ an individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. The cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures; added figures and revised tex

Chains of large gaps between primes

Let $p_n$ denote the $n$-th prime, and for any $k \geq 1$ and sufficiently large $X$, define the quantity $$G_k(X) := \max_{p_{n+k} \leq X} \min( p_{n+1}-p_n, \dots, p_{n+k}-p_{n+k-1} ),$$ which measures the occurrence of chains of $k$ consecutive large gaps of primes. Recently, with Green and Konyagin, the authors showed that $$G_1(X) \gg \frac{\log X \log \log X\log\log\log\log X}{\log \log \log X}$$ for sufficiently large $X$. In this note, we combine the arguments in that paper with the Maier matrix method to show that $$G_k(X) \gg \frac{1}{k^2} \frac{\log X \log \log X\log\log\log\log X}{\log \log \log X}$$ for any fixed $k$ and sufficiently large $X$. The implied constant is effective and independent of $k$.Comment: 16 pages, no figure

Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new strategy. For positive $w$ players with high payoffs will be considered more likely, while for negative $w$ the opposite holds. Setting $w$ equal to zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest player within reach, i.e. setting $w$ positive, promotes the evolution of cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction network. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact that positive values of $w$ facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of $w$ effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Explorer 45 (S 3-A) observations of the magnetosphere and magnetopause during the 4-5 August 1972, magnetic storm period

The Explorer 45 satellite performed extensive field and particle measurements in the heart of the magnetosphere during the double magnetic storm period of August 4-5, 1972. Both ground level magnetic records and the magnetic field deformations measured along the orbit by the satellite indicated the existence of only a moderate ring current. This was confirmed by the measurements of the total proton energy density less than those observed during the December 1971 and June 1972 magnetic storms. The plasmapause in the noon quadrant was eroded continuously from the onset of the first storm at the beginning of August 4 to an altitude below L = 2.07 at about 18 hours on August 5. During the orbit containing the second sudden commencement a large amount of low frequency electric and magnetic field noise was encountered throughout the entire orbit. A noteworthy observation during this orbit was the contraction of the magnetopause to distances inside the satellite at L = 5.2

Quantum mechanics gives stability to a Nash equilibrium

We consider a slightly modified version of the Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game from the point of view of evolutionary stability. In its classical version the game has a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) not stable against mutants. We find a quantized version of the RSP game for which the classical mixed NE becomes stable.Comment: Revised on referee's criticism, submitted to Physical Review

Chaos and unpredictability in evolutionary dynamics in discrete time

A discrete-time version of the replicator equation for two-strategy games is studied. The stationary properties differ from that of continuous time for sufficiently large values of the parameters, where periodic and chaotic behavior replace the usual fixed-point population solutions. We observe the familiar period-doubling and chaotic-band-splitting attractor cascades of unimodal maps but in some cases more elaborate variations appear due to bimodality. Also unphysical stationary solutions have unusual physical implications, such as uncertainty of final population caused by sensitivity to initial conditions and fractality of attractor preimage manifolds.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure