Categorical models for equivariant classifying spaces

Starting categorically, we give simple and precise models of equivariant classifying spaces. We need these models for work in progress in equivariant infinite loop space theory and equivariant algebraic K-theory, but the models are of independent interest in equivariant bundle theory and especially equivariant covering space theory.Comment: 29 pages. Revised version, to appear in AGT. Considerable changes of notation and organization and other changes aimed at making the paper more user friendl

Diagram spaces, diagram spectra, and spectra of units

This article compares the infinite loop spaces associated to symmetric spectra, orthogonal spectra, and EKMM S-modules. Each of these categories of structured spectra has a corresponding category of structured spaces that receives the infinite loop space functor \Omega^\infty. We prove that these models for spaces are Quillen equivalent and that the infinite loop space functors \Omega^\infty agree. This comparison is then used to show that two different constructions of the spectrum of units gl_1 R of a commutative ring spectrum R agree.Comment: 62 pages. The definition of the functor \mathbb{Q} is changed. Sections 8, 9, 17 and 18 contain revisions and/or new materia

Embodiment, Transparency and the Disclosiveness of Failure

In this paper, I want to argue that embodiment is characterised by a plasticity which entails that it can include both the biological limb and the ‘artificial’ tool, as evidenced by recent research in cognitive science. Moreover, I want to claim that it is only in failure that the embodied limb and tool are phenomenologically distinct. I will go on to argue that this claim is essential for understanding the phenomenon of failed embodiment, such as that found within the clowning tradition, before concluding with a short provocation regarding the social and political implications of such a view

Deconstructing the instrumental/identity divide in language policy debates

Debates about language and literacy policies are increasingly constructed at national levels in relation to their potential contribution to the ‘knowledge economy’, and to the ability of nation-states to compete economically in an increasingly globalised world. Invariably, this instrumental approach to language privileges the role of English as the current world language. Thus, in contexts where English is not spoken as a first language, English is increasingly viewed as the most important and/or useful additional language. In English-dominant contexts, monolingualism in English is seen as being a sufficient, even an ideal language model, while literacy in English comes to stand for literacy (and related social mobility) per se. Where other languages are countenanced at all in these latter contexts, the instrumentalist approach continues to dominate, with so-called international and/or trading languages being constructed as the languages other than English most worth learning, or perhaps even as the only other languages worth learning. The growing dominance of economistic, instrumental approaches to language policy, and the valorisation of English that is associated with them, clearly militate against ongoing individual and societal multilingualism. The languages most at risk here are so-called minority languages, particularly indigenous languages. In the new globalised world dominated by English, and where the perceived ‘usefulness’ of language is elided with language value, such languages are increasingly constructed as having neither. This paper deconstructs and critiques this positioning of indigenous and other minority languages, along with the wider instrumentality of much language and literacy policy of which it forms a part. In light of this, it also explores how such languages can be actively, justifiably and effectively maintained and promoted, particularly in English-dominant contexts

Repugnance as Performance Error: The Role of Disgust in Bioethical Intuitions

An influential argument in bioethics involves appeal to disgust, calling on us to take it seriously as a moral guide (e.g. Kass, Miller, Kahan). Some argue, for example, that genetic enhancement, especially via human reproductive cloning, is repellant or grotesque. While objectors have argued that repugnance is morally irrelevant (e.g. Nussbaum, Kelly), I argue that the problem is more fundamental: it is psychologically irrelevant. Examining recent empirical data suggests that disgust’s influence on moral judgment may be like fatigue: an exogenous influence, yielding a “performance error” that does not reflect our understanding of moral matters. This conclusion also challenges appeals to repugnance on other topics (such as homosexuality) and generally downplays the importance of disgust in moral discourse

House of Commons Select Committee on Transport: Inquiry into Urban Congestion Charging

INTRODUCTION This evidence, submitted to the Select Committee for its inquiry into Urban Congestion Charging, is based on my research into the subject, and professional involvement in studies of methods for managing the demand for urban travel, over the last twenty years. In the 1970s I was responsible, within the Greater London Council, for their studies of the use of comprehensive parking control, physical restriction of road space, and supplementary licensing (a low technology method of congestion charging) as methods of traffic restraint. At the same time, I was an adviser to the World Bank in its study of Singapore's area licensing scheme which is still the only congestion charging system in operation. In the 1980s I was an adviser to the US Transport Research Board in its investigation of appropriate methods for managing urban traffic, and to The MVA Consultancy in its study of electronic road pricing for Hong Kong. Since 1987 I have been involved, as a director of The MVA Consultancy, in a series of integrated transport studies in London (for the London Planning Advisory Committee), Birmingham, Edinburgh, Bristol and Merseyside, each of which has investigated the role of congestion charging as part of a wider transport strategy. I am currently directing a programme of research, funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, which is assessing the relative impact on urban road networks of different methods of imposing congestion charging, on their own and in combination with traffic signal control and bus priorities. This research has used Cambridge and York as case studies. In addition, I am currently acting as one of the technical advisers to the Department of Transport's study of congestion charging in London. (Continues..

Rearticulating the case for minority language rights

While advocacy of minority language rights (MLR) has become well established in sociolinguistics, language policy and planning and the wider human rights literature, it has also come under increased criticism in recent times for a number of key limitations. In this paper, I address directly three current key criticisms of the MLR movement. The first is a perceived tendency towards essentialism in articulations of language rights. The second is the apparent utopianism and artificiality of 'reversing language shift' in the face of wider social and political 'realities'. And the third is that the individual mobility of minority-language speakers is far better served by shifting to a majority language. While acknowledging the perspicacity of some of these arguments, I aim to rearticulate a defence of minority language rights that effectively addresses these key concerns. This requires, however, a sociohistorical/sociopolitical rather than a biological/ecological analysis of MLR. In addition, I will argue that a sociohistorical/sociopolitical defence of MLR can problematise the positions often adopted by minority language rights' critics themselves, particularly those who defend majoritarian forms of linguistic essentialism and those who sever the instrumental/identity aspects of language. Implications for language policy and planning will also be discussed

The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment

I argue that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions aren’t integral to moral judgment. There’s ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral. I conclude that, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these shouldn’t be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components. Non-cognitive elements in our psychology may be required for normal moral development and motivation but not necessarily for mature moral judgment