Toward a comprehensive and potentially cross-cultural model of why people engage in collective action:A quantitative research synthesis of four motivations and structural constraints

Sociopsychological theorizing and research on collective action (e.g., social protests) has mushroomed over the last decade, studying a wide variety of groups, contexts, and cultures. Through a quantitative research synthesis of four motivations for collective action (1,235 effects from 403 samples; total N = 123,707), we summarize and synthesize this body of research into the dual chamber model, a comprehensive and potentially cross-cultural model of collective action. We aim to replicate previous meta-analytic conclusions (about identity, injustice, and efficacy) and break new theoretical ground by (a) integrating a fourth motivation (morality) into the very heart of the psychology of collective action, (b) extending these four motivations to advantaged group members acting in solidarity with the disadvantaged, and (c) integrating theoretically relevant structural (i.e., cultural and other contextual) constraints. Results substantiated the dual chamber model as all four motivations yielded unique, positive, medium-sized effects and interrelationships were positive (particularly among morality and identity, conceptualized as the dual chambers of the protester’s beating heart). Meta-analytic structural equation modeling supported the added value of including morality. Moreover, findings confirmed that the strongest specific motivations were emotional injustice and politicized identification, while newly adding moral conviction to that list. Finally, the four motivations extended to advantaged group members acting in solidarity with the disadvantaged, while only the identity motivation was constrained by theoretically relevant cultural dimensions and values (e.g., collectivism and hierarchy). We discuss the implications and limitations of the dual chamber model for integrative theorizing, innovative research, and the practice of collective action

Mistrust and negative self‐esteem:Two paths from attachment styles to paranoia

OBJECTIVES: Paranoia is known to be associated with insecure attachment, with negative self‐esteem as a mediator, but this pathway is insufficient to explain the paranoid individual’s beliefs about malevolent others. Mistrust is a likely additional factor as it is a core feature of paranoid thinking also associated with insecure attachment styles. In this study, we tested whether mistrust – operationalized as judgements about the trustworthiness of unfamiliar faces – constitutes a second pathway from insecure attachment to paranoia. DESIGN: The design of the study was cross‐sectional. METHODS: A nationally representative British sample of 1,508 participants aged 18–86, 50.8% female, recruited through the survey company Qualtrics, completed measurements of attachment style, negative self‐esteem, and paranoid beliefs. Usable data were obtained from 1,121 participants. Participants were asked to make trustworthiness judgements about computer‐generated faces, and their outcomes were analysed by conducting signal detection analysis, which provided measures of bias (the tendency to assume untrustworthiness in conditions of uncertainty) and sensitivity (accuracy in distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy faces). RESULTS: Results using structural equation modelling revealed a good model fit (RMSEA = .071, 95% CI: 0.067–0.075, SRMR = .045, CFI = .93, TLI = .92). We observed indirect effects through bias towards mistrust both for the relationship between attachment anxiety and avoidance (β = .003, 95% CI: 0.001–0.005,p < .001) and attachment anxiety and paranoia (β = .003, 95% CI 0.002–0.006, p < .001). We observed an indirect effect through negative self‐esteem only for the relationship between attachment anxiety and paranoia (β = .064, 95% CI: 0.053–0.077, p < .001). Trust judgements and negative self‐esteem were not associated with each other. CONCLUSIONS: We find that a bias towards mistrust is associated with greater paranoia. We also find indirect effects through bias towards mistrust between attachment styles and paranoia. Finally, we reaffirm the strong indirect effect through negative self‐esteem between attachment anxiety and paranoia. Limitations of the study are discussed. PRACTITIONER POINTS: When working with individuals suffering from paranoia, clinicians should consider not only explicit, deliberative cognitive processes of the kind addressed in cognitive behaviour therapy (e.g. cognitive restructuring) but also the way in which their patients make perceptual judgements (e.g., their immediate reactions on encountering new people) and consider interventions targeted at these judgements, for example, bias modification training. Assessment and clinical interventions for people should consider the role of trust judgements and the way in which they combine with low self‐esteem to provoke paranoid beliefs. Psychological interventions targeting paranoid beliefs should focus on both attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance

Mass shootings and the salience of guns as means of compensation for thwarted goals

Between 2016 and 2017, Americans suffered three of the deadliest mass shootings in modern history by a lone gunman: the Orlando nightclub shooting, the Las Vegas strip shooting, and the Texas church shooting. We studied American gun owners in the wakes of these tragedies, theorizing that a by-product of the salience of mass shootings is to increase the salience of guns as means of individual empowerment and significance. We hypothesized that this increase in salience would be especially relevant in the context of thwarted goals, because such individuals may be seeking a compensatory means to interact more effectively with their environment. In 4 studies of U.S. gun owners (N = 2,442), we tested whether mass shooting salience interacted with thwarted goals to predict justification to shoot suspected criminals, as well as ideas about armed vigilantism and perceptions that guns are means of empowerment. The thwarting of goals was either experimentally induced via failure on an achievement task (Study 1), or measured via perceptions of disempowerment in society (Studies 2-4). Mass shooting salience was measured via perceptions of mass shooting threat, as well as temporal proximity and social proximity to specific mass shooting events. Across studies, results indicated an interaction between thwarted goals and mass shooting salience; temporal proximity yielded mixed results. Altogether, thwarted goals motivate people to seek effectiveness and mattering, and guns are more likely to be perceived as means to such ends when mass shootings loom large in the mind

Frustration-Affirmation? Thwarted Goals Motivate Compliance With Social Norms for Violence and Nonviolence

When thwarted goals increase endorsement of violence, it may not always reflect antisocial tendencies or some breakdown of self-regulation per se; such responses can also reflect an active process of self-regulation, whose purpose is to comply with the norms of one's social environment. In the present experiments (total N 2,145), the causal link between thwarted goals and endorsement of violent means (guns and war) was found to be contingent on perceptions that violence is normatively valued. Experiments 1-3 establish that thwarted goals increase endorsement of violence primarily among U.S. adults of a lower educational background and/or men who endorse a masculine honor culture. Experiment 4 manipulates the perceived normative consensus of college educated Americans, and demonstrates that thwarted goals increase college educated Americans' endorsement of whatever norm is salient: prowar or antiwar. Generalizing the model beyond violent means, Experiment 5 demonstrates that goal-thwarted Europeans report increased willingness to volunteer for refugee support activities if they perceive strong social norms to volunteer. Altogether, these findings support a frustration-affirmation model rather than frustration-aggression, whereby thwarted goals increase compliance with perceived norms for behavior, which can increase endorsement of violent means such as guns and war, but also nonviolent charitable actions

Correction: Politicization of COVID-19 health-protective behaviors in the United States: Longitudinal and cross-national evidence

There is an error in affiliation 54 for author Adil Samekin. The correct affiliation 54 is: School of Liberal Arts, M. Narikbayev KAZGUU University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan

‘We are all in the same boat’: How societal discontent affects intention to help during the COVID-19 pandemic

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has cau-sed a global health crisis. Consequently, many countries have adopted restrictive measures that caused a substantial change in society. Within this framework, it is reasonable to suppose that a sentiment of societal discontent, defined as generalized concern about the precarious state of society, has arisen. Literature shows that collectively experienced sit-uations can motivate people to help each other. Since societal discontent is conceptualized as a collective phenomenon, we argue that it could influence intention to help others, particu-larly those who suffer from coronavirus. Thus, in the present study, we aimed (a) to explore the relationship between soci-etal discontent and intention to help at the individual level and (b) to investigate a possible moderating effect of societal discontent at the country level on this relationship. To fulfil our purposes, we used data collected in 42 countries (N = 61,734) from the PsyCorona Survey, a cross-national longitudinal study. Results of multilevel analysis showed that, when societal discontent is experienced by the entire com-munity, individuals dissatisfied with society are more prone to help others. Testing the model with longitudinal data (N = 3,817) confirmed our results. Implications for those find-ings are discussed in relation to crisis management. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this arti-cle's Community and Social Impact Statement

Impact of national pandemic lockdowns on perceived threat of immigrants: a natural quasi-experiment across 23 countries

Xenophobia and anti-immigrant attacks rose during the COVID-19 pandemic, yet this may not be solely due to the disease threat. According to theories of frustration and scapegoating, situational obstructions and deprivation can motivate prejudice against outgroups. Using a global natural quasi-experimental design, this study tests whether the restrictiveness of national lock-downs can explain higher individual-level perceptions of immigrant threat. Data of 45,894 participants from 23 countries were analyzed. Both lockdown duration and lockdown severity were positively associated with individuals’ perceived threat of immi-grants. The lockdown effects were independent of objective and subjective measures of disease threat, and there was no evi-dence that disease threat drives people’s prejudice toward immigrants. Subgroup analysis suggested the lockdown effects were reliable in Europe and the Americas, but not in Asia. These findings suggest a need to mitigate frustration and scapegoating when implementing lockdowns, and to distinguish the influence of societal restrictions from disease threat

Politicization of COVID-19 health-protective behaviors in the United States: Longitudinal and cross-national evidence

During the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. conservative politicians and the media downplayed the risk of both contracting COVID-19 and the effectiveness of recom-mended health behaviors. Health behavior theories suggest perceived vulnerability to a health threat and perceived effectiveness of recommended health-protective behaviors determine motivation to follow recommendations. Accordingly, we predicted that—as a result of politicization of the pandemic—politically conservative Americans would be less likely to enact recommended health-protective behaviors. In two longitudinal studies of U.S. residents, political conservatism was inversely associated with perceived health risk and adoption of health-protective behaviors over time. The effects of political orientation on health-protective behaviors were mediated by perceived risk of infection, perceived severity of infection, and perceived effectiveness of the health-protective behaviors. In a global cross-national analysis, effects were stronger in the U.S. (N = 10,923) than in an interna-tional sample (total N = 51,986), highlighting the increased and overt politicization of health behaviors in the U.S

Cooperation and Trust Across Societies During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Cross-societal differences in cooperation and trust among strangers in the provision of public goods may be key to understanding how societies are managing the COVID-19 pandemic. We report a survey conducted across 41 societies between March and May 2020 ( N = 34,526), and test pre-registered hypotheses about how cross-societal differences in cooperation and trust relate to prosocial COVID-19 responses (e.g., social distancing), stringency of policies, and support for behavioral regulations (e.g., mandatory quarantine). We further tested whether cross-societal variation in institutions and ecologies theorized to impact cooperation were associated with prosocial COVID-19 responses, including institutional quality, religiosity, and historical prevalence of pathogens. We found substantial variation across societies in prosocial COVID-19 responses, stringency of policies, and support for behavioral regulations. However, we found no consistent evidence to support the idea that cross-societal variation in cooperation and trust among strangers is associated with these outcomes related to the COVID-19 pandemic. These results were replicated with another independent cross-cultural COVID-19 dataset ( N = 112,136), and in both snowball and representative samples. We discuss implications of our results, including challenging the assumption that managing the COVID-19 pandemic across societies is best modeled as a public goods dilemma

Pandemic boredom:Little evidence that lockdown-related boredom affects risky public health behaviors across 116 countries

Some public officials have expressed concern that policies mandating collective public health behaviors (e.g., national/regional "lockdown") may result in behavioral fatigue that ultimately renders such policies ineffective. Boredom, specifically, has been singled out as one potential risk factor for noncompliance. We examined whether there was empirical evidence to support this concern during the COVID-19 pandemic in a large cross-national sample of 63,336 community respondents from 116 countries. Although boredom was higher in countries with more COVID-19 cases and in countries that instituted more stringent lockdowns, such boredom did not predict longitudinal within-person decreases in social distancing behavior (or vice versa; n = 8,031) in early spring and summer of 2020. Overall, we found little evidence that changes in boredom predict individual public health behaviors (handwashing, staying home, self-quarantining, and avoiding crowds) over time, or that such behaviors had any reliable longitudinal effects on boredom itself. In summary, contrary to concerns, we found little evidence that boredom posed a public health risk during lockdown and quarantine. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved). </p