Disentangling an Elusive Relationship: How Democratic Value Orientations Affect Political Trust in Different Regimes

The question whether democratic values are on the rise or in decline has received much attention in political-culture research. Yet, few scholars have studied the consequences either of these trends has for political trust. Although political trust has long been attributed a central role for the functioning and stability of any political system, we still know little about the relationship between citizens' value orientations and political trust. Recent advances have furthered the discussion by conceptualizing this relationship to be conditional on the respective country's level of democracy; yet this literature does not take into account findings that demonstrate citizens rarely have an accurate grasp of their country’s democratic quality. Integrating the two strands of literature, this contribution suggests a relationship between democratic value orientations and political trust that is universally contingent on citizens' perceptions of democratic quality. Testing this proposition for over one hundred democracies and autocracies, it finds that democratic value orientations decrease political trust whenever citizens perceive their regime's democratic quality as lacking and increase political trust whenever citizens perceive their political regime as being of high democratic quality. In contrast, the actual level of democracy plays no role for the effect of democratic value orientations on political trust

Rebuilding Trust in Broken Systems? Populist Party Success and Citizens’ Trust in Democratic Institutions

What effect does the recent rise of populist parties harnessing an anti-system rhetoric have on political trust? Will citizens become disenchanted with and lose trust in the political system, or could populist party success even stimulate a growth of political trust? Arguing that populist parties may well be conceived as a corrective force giving voice to and addressing citizen concerns about the established political system, this contribution hypothesizes that populist party success will increase political trust among the general public, especially in countries lacking democratic quality, with weak corruption control, and meagre government performance. Empirically, it combines ParlGov data with survey data from the European Social Survey (2002–2016) as well as aggregate data from the Varieties-of-Democracy project and the World Development Indicators to investigate how political trust has changed in relation to the growing success of populist parties and how democratic quality, corruption control, and government performance have moderated this relationship in 23 European democracies. Its main findings indicate that, at least in the short run, political trust increases rather than decreases following populist party success and that this increase in trust is most pronounced in political systems that lack democratic quality, struggle with corruption, and deliver only meager government performance

Quality of Democracy Makes a Difference, but Not for Everyone: How Political Interest, Education, and Conceptions of Democracy Condition the Relationship Between Democratic Quality and Political Trust

In light of recent crises, not least the COVID-19 pandemic, citizen trust in the political system has been highlighted as one of the central features ensuring citizen compliance and the functioning of democracy. Given its many desirable consequences, one of the key questions is how to increase political trust among ordinary citizens. This paper investigates the role of democratic quality in determining citizens' trust in the political system. While we know that citizens’ evaluations of democratic performance are a strong predictor of political trust, previous research has shown that trust is not always higher in political systems with higher democratic quality, indicating that democratic performance evaluations do not always correspond to actual democratic quality. Several moderating factors may account for this disconnect between democratic quality and citizens' evaluations of democratic performance and, ultimately, political trust. For one, citizens may receive different information about the political system; second, they may process this information in different ways; and third, they may have different standards of what democratic quality ought to be. Using survey data from three rounds of the World Values Survey (2005-2020) and aggregate data on democratic quality and other macro determinants of political trust from the V-Dem project and World Development Indicators for 50 democracies around the world, this contribution empirically investigates the complex relationship between democratic quality, democratic performance evaluations, and political trust in multi-level moderated mediation models. Its findings demonstrate that democratic quality affects political trust indirectly through citizens' democratic performance evaluations and that this indirect effect is stronger for citizens with higher political interest, higher education, and especially those with more liberal conceptions of democracy

Electoral integrity matters: how electoral process conditions the relationship between political losing and political trust

This contribution adds a new perspective to the debate on electoral integrity by asking how electoral integrity affects the way in which election results translate into citizen attitudes towards the political system. It introduces a causal mechanism that links political losing to political trust via evaluations of electoral fairness: citizens who voted for the losing camp are more likely to view the electoral process as unfair than citizens who voted for the winning camp, resulting in political distrust. It further suggests that the effects of political losing on political trust depend on the level of electoral integrity. In conditions where the elections were conducted in a free and fair manner, even those who voted for the losing camp have little reason to suspect foul play and therefore political losing should barely affect perceptions of the electoral process. Whenever there are actual indications of electoral malpractice, however, political losers have much more reason to doubt the integrity of the electoral process than those who are content with the outcome of the election. The contribution makes use of a unique dataset that ex-post harmonizes survey data from three cross-national survey projects (Asian Barometer Survey, European Social Survey, Latinobarómetro) and macro-level data from the Varieties-of-Democracy Project to cover 45 democracies in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America. Using multi-level modeling, it finds that political losing indeed decreases political trust indirectly via perceptions of electoral fairness. Confirming its key proposition, the empirical analysis shows that political losing has a weaker effect on political trust in countries where electoral integrity is high

Electoral integrity matters: how electoral process conditions the relationship between political losing and political trust

This contribution adds a new perspective to the debate on electoral integrity by asking how electoral integrity affects the way in which election results translate into citizen attitudes towards the political system. It introduces a causal mechanism that links political losing to political trust via evaluations of electoral fairness: citizens who voted for the losing camp are more likely to view the electoral process as unfair than citizens who voted for the winning camp, resulting in political distrust. It further suggests that the effects of political losing on political trust depend on the level of electoral integrity. In conditions where the elections were conducted in a free and fair manner, even those who voted for the losing camp have little reason to suspect foul play and therefore political losing should barely affect perceptions of the electoral process. Whenever there are actual indications of electoral malpractice, however, political losers have much more reason to doubt the integrity of the electoral process than those who are content with the outcome of the election. The contribution makes use of a unique dataset that ex-post harmonizes survey data from three cross-national survey projects (Asian Barometer Survey, European Social Survey, Latinobarómetro) and macro-level data from the Varieties-of-Democracy Project to cover 45 democracies in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America. Using multi-level modeling, it finds that political losing indeed decreases political trust indirectly via perceptions of electoral fairness. Confirming its key proposition, the empirical analysis shows that political losing has a weaker effect on political trust in countries where electoral integrity is high

Online Disinformation Predicts Inaccurate Beliefs About Election Fairness Among Both Winners and Losers

Electoral disinformation is feared to variously undermine democratic trust by inflaming incorrect negative beliefs about the fairness of elections, or to shore up dictators by creating falsely positive ones. Recent studies of political misperceptions, however, suggest that disinformation has at best minimal effects on beliefs. In this article, we investigate the drivers of public perceptions and misperceptions of election fairness. We build on theories of rational belief updating and motivated reasoning, and link public opinion data from 82 national elections with expert survey data on disinformation and de facto electoral integrity. We show that, overall, people arrive at largely accurate perceptions, but that disinformation campaigns are indeed associated with less accurate and more polarized beliefs about election fairness. This contributes a cross-nationally comparative perspective to studies of (dis)information processing and belief updating, as well as attitude formation and trust surrounding highly salient political institutions such as elections.Es wird befürchtet, dass Desinformation bei Wahlen das demokratische Vertrauen untergräbt, indem sie falsche negative Überzeugungen über die Fairness von Wahlen schürt. Neuere Studien über politische Fehleinschätzungen deuten jedoch darauf hin, dass Desinformation bestenfalls minimale Auswirkungen auf die Überzeugungen hat. In diesem Artikel untersuchen die Autor*innen die Triebkräfte der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung und Fehlwahrnehmung der Fairness von Wahlen

Einstellungen zur Demokratie in Kambodscha : Niveau und Determinanten der Demokratieunterstützung

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie stark die Unterstützung eines demokratischen politischen Systems in der kambodschanischen Bevölkerung ist und welche Faktoren auf der Mikroebene die Demokratieunterstützung in Kambodscha beeinflussen. Hierfür werden das Unterstützungsmodell von Dieter Fuchs und die Modernisierungstheorie von Seymour Lipset für die Analyse von Einstellungen in einem autoritären politischen System modifiziert und entsprechend angepasste Hypothesen [zum Einfluss der Modernisierungsfaktoren auf die Demokratieunterstützung] formuliert. Nachdem die im Datensatz vorhandenen Einzelindikatoren zu Faktoren verdichtet und Probleme des Demokratieverständnisses und der Item-Nonresponse diskutiert wurden, werden Daten der zweiten Welle der Asian Barometer Survey 2008 analysiert. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen zwar, dass eine substantielle Minderheit das autoritäre Regime des Landes und seine Entscheidungsträger kritisch betrachtet, die Bindung an liberal-demokratische Werte aber eher schwach ausgeprägt ist. Bi- und multivariate Analysen deuten auf einen Einfluss von Faktoren wie Bildung, Einkommen und Wohnort hin und bestätigen somit weitgehend die Modernisierungstheorie, allerdings mit einer bedeutsamen Abweichung: Größere Zufriedenheit mit der eigenen wirtschaftlichen Lage führt zwar zu einer stärkeren Bindung an demokratische Werte, gleichzeitig aber auch zu einer größeren Unterstützung des autoritären Regimes und seiner Entscheidungsträger.This thesis deals with the question how high the level of support for a democratic political system is in Cambodia and which factors influence democratic support at the micro level. In order to approach these questions the author uses the model of support developed by Dieter Fuchs to analyze whether the modernization factors postulated by Seymour Lipset have an influence on democratic support at the individual level. To analyze those attitudes in the authoritarian context of the Cambodian political system some modifications are made to the theoretical concepts used. After condensing the single indicators available from the data to several factors representing the different levels of Fuchs’s concept and discussing problems of varying conceptions of democracy and item nonresponse the analysis is then conducted using data from the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey. The empirical results show a substantial minority being critical of both the authoritarian regime and its incumbents but support for liberal democratic values remains shallow. Bi- and multivariate analyses suggest an influence of modernization factors such as education or income, confirming Lipset’s theory with one important exception: Higher satisfaction with their personal economic situation does indeed lead to stronger support for democratic values among Cambodians, but at the same time also boosts/strengthens/increases support for the authoritarian regime and its incumbents

How Populism and Polarization Affect Europe's Liberal Democracies

In recent years, two phenomena have put Europe's liberal democracies under strain: populism and polarization. The rise of populist parties, the increasing radicalization of publics and political discourse, as well as the expansion of hyperpartisan media have caused concern among observers and citizens alike. While lively academic discussions have revolved around the causes of these phenomena, research regarding their real-world consequences has been sparse. This thematic issue wants to address this gap in the literature and contribute to developing strategies for mitigating potential threats populism and polarization may pose to liberal democracies. To this end, it examines how populism and polarization affect citizens across Europe. It links research on audiences of hyperpartisan media with work on elite-induced polarization, populist conceptions of democracy, election results and support for the democratic system, and policy-making by populist governments

How Populism and Polarization Affect Europe’s Liberal Democracies

In recent years, two phenomena have put Europe’s liberal democracies under strain: populism and polarization. The rise of populist parties, the increasing radicalization of publics and political discourse, as well as the expansion of hyperpartisan media have caused concern among observers and citizens alike. While lively academic discussions have revolved around the causes of these phenomena, research regarding their real-world consequences has been sparse. This thematic issue wants to address this gap in the literature and contribute to developing strategies for mitigating potential threats populism and polarization may pose to liberal democracies. To this end, it examines how populism and polarization affect citizens across Europe. It links research on audiences of hyperpartisan media with work on elite-induced polarization, populist conceptions of democracy, election results and support for the democratic system, and policy-making by populist governments