How do children value animals? A developmental review

From a young age, children are deeply curious about animals. Stable patterns exist in the types of attitudes children display towards different kinds of animals: they love pets, value animals that are beautiful, and fear snakes and spiders (Borgi & Cirulli, 2015, https://doi.org/10.2752/089279315X14129350721939). Until recently, we’ve known little about what children think about the moral standing of animals, particularly relative to other entities, including humans. In this review, we synthesize the literature examining children’s perceptions of the moral worth of animals. We present factors about the animal, and factors about the judge (the child), shown to impact children’s evaluations of animal moral worth. Based on current evidence, we make the claim that children grant animals a high moral standing early on in childhood, but that this decreases during late childhood, throughout adolescence, and into adulthood. We provide some suggestions for the cognitive and cultural mechanisms that might drive these differences, and make recommendations for the field going forward

The relative importance of target and judge characteristics in shaping the moral circle

People's treatment of others (humans, nonhuman animals, or other entities) often depends on whether they think the entity is worthy of moral concern. Recent work has begun to investigate which entities are included in a person's moral circle, examining how certain target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) shape moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of target and judge characteristics in predicting moral inclusion remains unclear. When predicting whether a person will deem an entity worthy of moral consideration, how important is it to know who is making the judgment (i.e., characteristics of the judge), who is being judged (i.e., characteristics of the target), and potential interactions between the two factors? Here, we address this foundational question by conducting a variance component analysis of the moral circle. In two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (N = 836), we test how much variance in judgments of moral concern is explained by between-target differences, between-judge differences, and by the interaction between the two factors. We consistently find that all three components explain substantial amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. Our findings provide two important insights. First, an increased focus on interactions between target and judge characteristics is needed, as these interactions explain as much variance as target and judge characteristics separately. Second, any theoretical account that aims to provide an accurate description of moral inclusion needs to consider target characteristics, judge characteristics, and their interaction.</p

Does helping now excuse cheating later? An investigation into moral balancing in children

We often use our previous good behaviour to justify current immoral acts, and likewise perform good deeds to atone for previous immoral behaviour. These effects, known as moral self-licensing and moral cleansing (collectively, moral balancing), have yet to be observed in children. Thus, the aim in the current study was to investigate the developmental foundations of moral balancing. We examined whether children aged 4–5 years (N = 96) would be more likely to cheat on a task if they had previously helped a puppet at personal cost, and less likely to cheat if they had refused to help. This hypothesis was not supported, suggesting either that 4–5-year-old children do not engage in moral balancing or that the methodology used was not appropriate to capture this effect. We discuss implications and future research directions

Extending perspective taking to nonhuman animals and artificial entities

Perspective taking can have positive effects in a range of intergroup contexts. In two experiments, we tested whether these effects generalize to two yet-to-be-studied nonhuman groups: animals and intelligent artificial entities. We found no overall effects of either taking the perspective of a farmed pig or an artificial entity on moral attitudes, compared to instructions to stay objective and a neutral condition. However, in both studies, mediation analysis indicated that perspective taking positively affected moral attitudes via empathic concern and self-other overlap, supporting two mechanisms well-established in the literature. The lack of overall effects may be partly explained by positive effects of staying objective on moral attitudes that offset the positive effects of perspective taking via empathic concern and self-other overlap. These findings suggest that perspective taking functions differently in the context of nonhuman groups relative to typical intergroup contexts. We consider this an important area for future research

Developmental changes in perceived moral standing of robots

We live in an age where robots are increasingly present in the social and moral world. Here, we explore how children and adults think about the mental lives and moral standing of robots. In Experiment 1 (N = 116), we found that children granted humans and robots with more mental life and vulnerability to harm than an anthropomorphized control (i.e., a toy bear). In Experiment 2 (N = 157), we found that, relative to children, adults ascribed less mental life and vulnerability to harm to robots. In Experiment 3 (N = 152), we modified our experiment to be within-subjects and measured beliefs concerning moral standing. Though younger children again appeared willing to assign mental capacities — particularly those related to experience (e.g., being capable of experiencing hunger) — to robots, older children and adults did so to a lesser degree. This diminished attribution of mental life tracked with diminished ratings of robot moral standing. This informs ongoing debates concerning emerging attitudes about artificial life

Meat and morality:The moral foundation of purity, but not harm, predicts attitudes toward cultured meat

Cultured meat (also referred to as cultivated, cell-based, or cell-cultured meat) is a novel food technology that is presented as a method of meat production without reliance on large-scale industrial farming. The pro-cultured meat narrative rests, in part, on a moral foundation: cultured meat is purported to alleviate the environmental and animal welfare harms associated with farmed meat. Despite this narrative, no research has examined which moral values underpin attitudes towards cultured meat. To examine this, we surveyed 1861 participants from the United States and Germany about their moral foundations and their attitudes towards cultured meat. In line with predictions, people who more strongly endorse moral values about purity (i.e., had higher scores on the purity subscale of the moral foundations scale) held more negative attitudes towards cultured meat. However, this relationship was much more consistent among participants from the United States than participants from Germany. Against predictions, attitudes towards cultured meat were not reliably associated with the extent to which people focus on harm as a moral foundation. The latter finding was particularly surprising in light of harm-reduction narratives around cultured meat. These findings demonstrate the need for a more nuanced discussion about, and understanding of, consumer concerns around cultured meat and the values that underpin them