Better Than Its Reputation. Bertelsmann Policy Brief 02.2019

In the first 18 months of its government activity, Germany’s grand coalition has already fulfilled or started on two-thirds of its 296 promises. This points to a record-breaking mid-term balance for the current government. At the same time, only ten percent of all citizens still believe that political parties and governments also keep their promises. Why is that? And what can we do to change that

Retrospective pledge voting: A comparative study of the electoral consequences of government parties’ pledge fulfilment

Does pledge fulfilment bear any electoral consequences for government parties? While previous research on retrospective voting has largely focused on electoral accountability with respect to the economy, the theoretical framework presented in this study links government parties’ performance to their previous electoral pledges. It is argued that government parties are more likely to be rewarded by voters when they have fulfilled more pledges during the legislative term. Good pledge performance of a party is associated with the ability to maximise policy benefits (accomplishment) and to be a responsible actor that will stick to its promises in the future as well (competence). Analysing data from 69 elections in 14 countries shows that a government party's electoral outcome is affected by its previous pledge performance. A government party that fulfils a higher share of election pledges is more likely to prevent electoral losses. This finding indicates that voters react at the polls to party pledge fulfilment, which highlights the crucial role of promissory representation in democratic regimes. Surprisingly and in contrast with economic voting, there is no evidence that retrospective pledge voting is moderated by clarity of responsibility

Die Ampelkoalition

Nach der Bundestagswahl 2021 kam es in Deutschland zum ersten Mal seit den 1950er-Jahren zu einer Drei-Parteien-Koalition. Was bedeutet das für die politische Repräsentation der Wähler*innen? Und wie wurden die Wahlversprechen in das Regierungsprogramm übersetzt? Die Autor*innen gehen diesen Fragen sowohl allgemein als auch für vier zentrale Politikfelder (Verkehrswende, Bildungsgerechtigkeit, Familie und Beruf, Digitalisierung in der Gesundheitspolitik) nach. Sie untersuchen, was vor den Wahlen versprochen wurde, wie dies Eingang in die Sondierungsgespräche fand und unter welchen Reibungsverlusten es schließlich im Koalitionsvertrag steht

Equal Performance of Minority and Majority Coalitions? Pledge Fulfilment in the German State of NRW: dataset

This study examines how a government’s majority status affects coalition governance and performance. Two steps are investigated: the inclusion of government parties’ electoral pledges into the coalition agreement, and the ability to translate pledges into legislative outputs. The main results of a comparative analysis of 183 pledges of a minority (without a formal support partner) and majority coalition in the German State North Rhine-Westphalia indicate that government parties with minority status include fewer pledges in the coalition agreement. But this does not mean that they also perform badly at pledge fulfilment. In fact, they show an equivalent performance in fulfilling election pledges, at least partially, when compared to majority government parties. However, there is tentative evidence that the prime minister’s party shows a lower quality of pledge fulfilment, as measured by a higher share of partially enacted pledges.This study examines how a government’s majority status affects coalition governance and performance. Two steps are investigated: the inclusion of government parties’ electoral pledges into the coalition agreement, and the ability to translate pledges into legislative outputs. The main results of a comparative analysis of 183 pledges of a minority (without a formal support partner) and majority coalition in the German State North Rhine-Westphalia indicate that government parties with minority status include fewer pledges in the coalition agreement. But this does not mean that they also perform badly at pledge fulfilment. In fact, they show an equivalent performance in fulfilling election pledges, at least partially, when compared to majority government parties. However, there is tentative evidence that the prime minister’s party shows a lower quality of pledge fulfilment, as measured by a higher share of partially enacted pledges

Equal performance of minority and majority coalitions? Pledge fulfilment in the German state of NRW

This study examines how a government’s majority status affects coalition governance and performance. Two steps are investigated: the inclusion of government parties’ electoral pledges into the coalition agreement, and the ability to translate pledges into legislative outputs. The main results of a comparative analysis of 183 pledges of a minority (without a formal support partner) and majority coalition in the German State North Rhine-Westphalia indicate that government parties with minority status include fewer pledges in the coalition agreement. But this does not mean that they also perform badly at pledge fulfilment. In fact, they show an equivalent performance in fulfilling election pledges, at least partially, when compared to majority government parties. However, there is tentative evidence that the prime minister’s party shows a lower quality of pledge fulfilment, as measured by a higher share of partially enacted pledges

Wollen wir uns streiten? Zur Legitimität von Konflikt und Kooperation im Parlament

Wieviel Konflikt, wieviel Kooperation wünschen sich die Bürgerinnen in Deutschland von ihrem Parlament? Die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen und das Verhalten von Oppositions- und Regierungsparteien sind im Deutschen Bundestag eher konsensual-kompromissorientiert ausgeprägt. Allerdings gibt es nur unzureichende Erkenntnisse, inwiefern dies mit den Erwartungen der Bürgerinnen und damit auch dem Grad an politischer Legitimität übereinstimmt. Die Analyse von drei Erwartungsaspekten anhand von Umfragedaten sorgt hier für Aufschluss: Was ist die gewünschte Machtstärke der Opposition? Wie kritisch oder mitarbeitend soll die Opposition sich verhalten? Wie kompromissbereit sollten Parteien in Koalitionen sein? Bezüglich der Stärke und des Verhaltens der Opposition nimmt die Bevölkerung im Schnitt eine eher konsensual-orientierte Erwartungshaltung ein. Im Hinblick auf intra-koalitionäre Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse tritt eine eher majoritär-konfliktuelle Einstellung zutage. Dabei zeigen sich aber auch Unterschiede nach Parteipräferenzen. Die Anhängerinnen der ,echten‘ Oppositionsparteien ohne Regierungserfahrung auf Bundesebene – die Linkspartei und in stärkerem Maße die AfD – wünschen sich eine stärkere, kritischere Opposition und betrachten Koalitionskompromisse noch kritischer als die bereits skeptisch eingestellten Anhängerinnen der anderen Parteien. Diese sich andeutende Polarisierung in den Erwartungshaltungen der Bürgerinnen, aber auch die von der Mehrheit der Bürgerinnen geteilte Forderung nach der Durchsetzung von Parteipositionen auf Kosten von Koalitionskompromissen stellen die Legitimität der derzeit in Deutschland praktizierten Demokratie unter Spannung