22 research outputs found
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Destructive Defeat and Justificational Force: The Dialectic of Dogmatism, Conservatism, and Meta-Evidentialism
Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justification for believing that the table is red. If the answer is ‘yes’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification by destroying propositional justification. You have neither all-things-considered nor some-things-considered justification for believing that the table is red. According to dogmatism, the justificational force of perceptual experiences is indestructible. According to conservatism about sense experience, a perceptual experience ceases to have justificational force if there is evidence against its reliability. Finally, according to meta-evidentialism, a perceptual experience is blocked from being a source of justification is there is no evidence of its reliability. I argue that, of these three theories, meta-evidentialism is the most plausible.</p
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Doxastic Voluntarism and Up-To-Me-Ness
Rik Peels and I agree on the importance of the concept of epistemic responsibility. We disagree on whether responsibility for our beliefs requires the kind of control needed for responsibility for our actions. I say it does; he says it does not. This disagreement is based on another one: we hold different views on the issue of doxastic voluntarism: Does the kind of control we have over our actions extend to our beliefs? I say it does; he says it does not. I endorse doxastic voluntarism: the view that we have no less control over our beliefs than we have over our actions. He rejects this view. Consequently, we hold different views on how epistemic responsibility is grounded. I claim it is grounded in the same way practical responsibility is: in a kind of control that is direct. Peels claims that epistemic responsibility is grounded instead in indirect influence and in this way crucially differs from the kind of responsibility we bear for our actions.
In his paper ‘Against Doxastic Compatibilism’, Peels has offered two arguments in response to my defense of doxastic voluntarism: the Up-To-Me Argument and the Delay Argument (Peels 2014). In my recent paper ‘Believing Intentionally’, I have explained why I find these arguments unconvincing (Steup 2017). In his excellent book Responsible Belief, Peels defends these two arguments against my criticisms. I will here continue our debate and respond to his defense of the Up-To-Me Argument. I begin by summarizing why I take doxastic voluntarism to be true.
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Phosphorylation of C6- and C3-positions of glucosyl residues in starch is catalysed by distinct dikinases
AbstractGlucan, water dikinase (GWD) and phosphoglucan, water dikinase (PWD) are required for normal starch metabolism. We analysed starch phosphorylation in Arabidopsis wild-type plants and mutants lacking either GWD or PWD using 31P NMR. Phosphorylation at both C6- and C3-positions of glucose moieties in starch was drastically decreased in GWD-deficient mutants. In starch from PWD-deficient plants C3-bound phosphate was reduced to levels close to the detection limit. The latter result contrasts with previous reports according to which GWD phosphorylates both C6- and C3-positions. In these studies, phosphorylation had been analysed by HPLC of acid-hydrolysed glucans. We now show that maltose-6-phosphate, a product of incomplete starch hydrolysis, co-eluted with glucose-3-phosphate under the chromatographic conditions applied. Re-examination of the specificity of the dikinases using an improved method demonstrates that C6- and C3-phosphorylation is selectively catalysed by GWD and PWD, respectively
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Scepticism and Perceptual Justification
The sixteen essays in this collection are clustered around issues that arise when we engage with the following two questions: 1. Under which conditions are perceptual experiences a source of epistemic justification? 2. Are perceptual experiences a sound basis for rejecting sceptical hypotheses? Crispin Wright has championed an important way of answering them: welfare epistemology. In ‘On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology’,2 Wright offers refinements of an earlier statement of his view3 and responds to criticisms and objections Aidan McGlynn and Duncan Pritchard advance in their respective contributions. In this review, I will focus on these three papers as well as on Jonathan Vogel’s essay on the problem of misleading evidence.</p