Metodo e valutazione in economia : dall'apriorismo a Friedman

This paper aims at reconstructing the standards of evaluation of economic theory looking at the images that economists themselves (historically) have had of their own field of enquiry: from empirical apriorism (N.W. Senior, Mill, Cairnes) to Austrian apriorism (Robbins, Von Mises), from Hutchison’s methodological critique of the Neoclassical assumptions to Machlup’s verificationist approach, and up to Milton Friedman’s influential and sui generis pragmatism. By comparing abstract theories of scientific rationality (Philosophy of Science) with the concrete research practice (Economics) the paper provides a more specific case for the general problem of the demarcation between science and pseudoscience ( it further suggests the relative merits of a dynamical approach compared to the Neopositivist or Popperian static one). It is argued that a comparison of this kind can be fruitful for both the economist and the philosopher in as much as the advocated ‘logic of scientific discovery’ is not presented in an a-historical and a-critical fashion but rather it encourages revisions and improvements

Lateral reading and monetary incentives to spot disinformation about science

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Countering vaccine hesitancy through medical expert endorsement

Scientists and medical experts are among the professionals trusted the most. Are they also the most suitable figures to convince the general public to get vaccinated? In a pre-registered experiment, we tested whether expert endorsement increases the effectiveness of debunking messages about COVID-19 vaccines. We monitored a sample of 2,277 people in Italy through a longitudinal study along the salient phases of the vaccination campaign. Participants received a series of messages endorsed by either medical researchers (experimental group) or by generic others (control). In order to minimise demand effects, we collected participants’ responses always at ten days from the last debunking message. Whereas we did not find an increase in vaccination behaviour, we found that participants in the experimental group displayed higher intention to vaccinate, as well as more positive beliefs about the protectiveness of vaccines. The more debunking messages the participants received, the greater the increase in vaccination intention in the experimental group compared to control. This suggests that multiple exposure is critical for the effectiveness of expert-endorsed debunking messages. In addition, these effects are significant regardless of participants’ trust toward science. Our results suggest that scientist and medical experts are not simply a generally trustworthy category but also a well suited messenger in contrasting disinformation during vaccination campaigns

Understanding Others' Regret: A fMRI Study

Previous studies showed that the understanding of others' basic emotional experiences is based on a “resonant” mechanism, i.e., on the reactivation, in the observer's brain, of the cerebral areas associated with those experiences. The present study aimed to investigate whether the same neural mechanism is activated both when experiencing and attending complex, cognitively-generated, emotions. A gambling task and functional-Magnetic-Resonance-Imaging (fMRI) were used to test this hypothesis using regret, the negative cognitively-based emotion resulting from an unfavorable counterfactual comparison between the outcomes of chosen and discarded options. Do the same brain structures that mediate the experience of regret become active in the observation of situations eliciting regret in another individual? Here we show that observing the regretful outcomes of someone else's choices activates the same regions that are activated during a first-person experience of regret, i.e. the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and hippocampus. These results extend the possible role of a mirror-like mechanism beyond basic emotions

La metodologia di Imre Lakatos e la crescita della conoscenza in economia

Dottorato di ricerca in filosofia (filosofia della scienza). A.a. 1994-95Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche - Biblioteca Centrale - P.le Aldo Moro, 7, Rome; Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale - P.za Cavalleggeri, 1, Florence / CNR - Consiglio Nazionale delle RichercheSIGLEITItal

In search of the neurobiological basis of decision making: explanation, reduction and emergence

In recent years, the study of decision making has provided a paradigmatic case of "crossbreeding" of different disciplines. The integration of economics, psychology and neurosciences within neuroeconomics calls for more accurate and comprehensive models of human rationality, which may be obtained by combining diverse theoretical approaches and experimental techniques. In this respect, neuroeconomics contributes to a naturalistic, brain-based, explanation of human agency. However, although contemporary naturalism insists on the unitary aspect of reality, we stress that supporting unitary study of nature is not the same as supporting a single, fundamental discipline to which all higher-order analyses could (or should) be reduced. We argue for integration, rather than reduction, as the best approach to a naturalistic explanation of human decision making, and we claim that supporting epistemological pluralism does not mean being committed to any specific ontological position. However, we suggest that an "emergentist" ontology is the best candidate to integrate the epistemological analysis here endorsed

“Questioning” the Truth Effect: Processing information in interrogative form reduces (but does not cancel) repetition-induced truth

People attribute higher truth to statements they have previously been exposed to, as compared to new ones. This “truth effect” is pervasive and resistant to many interventions aimed to reduce it. In two pre-registered experiments, we explored whether processing unknown information in an interrogative form can contrast repetition-induced truth. In Experiment 1 (N=100), participants judged the truth value of both repeated and unrepeated sentences. For half of the participants, sentences appeared in a declarative form; for the other half, sentences appeared in an interrogative form, both at exposure and at judgment. Whereas in the declarative condition participants showed the classic truth effect, the effect was not significant in the interrogative condition. In Experiment 2 (N=325), an additional interrogative condition was introduced whereby sentences were presented to participants as questions at exposure, but not at judgment. Compared to the declarative condition, the truth effect was reduced, but still significant, in the two interrogative conditions. Moreover, comparing the two interrogative conditions showed that the truth effect was smaller when sentences were presented as questions only in the exposure phase. We discuss the potential explanations for the impact of questioning on the truth effect, as well as the implications for debiasing strategies

Countering vaccine hesitancy through medical expert endorsement

Scientists and medical experts are among the professionals trusted the most. Are they also the most suitable figures to convince the general public to get vaccinated? In a pre-registered experiment, we tested whether expert endorsement increases the effectiveness of debunking messages about COVID-19 vaccines. We monitored a sample of 2,277 people in Italy through a longitudinal study along the salient phases of the vaccination campaign. Participants received a series of messages endorsed by either medical researchers (experimental group) or by generic others (control). In order to minimise demand effects, we collected participants' responses always at ten days from the last debunking message. Whereas we did not find an increase in vaccination behaviour, we found that participants in the experimental group displayed higher intention to vaccinate, as well as more positive beliefs about the protectiveness of vaccines. The more debunking messages the participants received, the greater the increase in vaccination intention in the experimental group compared to control. This suggests that multiple exposure is critical for the effectiveness of expert-endorsed debunking messages. In addition, these effects are significant regardless of participants' trust toward science. Our results suggest that scientist and medical experts are not simply a generally trustworthy category but also a well suited messenger in contrasting disinformation during vaccination campaigns. (C) 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.Peer reviewe