This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino's Personhood in African Philosophy

The subject of personal identity has received substantial treatment in contemporary African philosophy. Importantly, the dominant approach to personal identity is communitarian. Bernard Matolino's new book Personhood in African Philosophy enters into this discussion by way of contesting some of the assumptions underlying communitarian approaches. His own critical assessment leads him to what I believe is an unprecedented objection in the literature; the conclusion that communitarian philosophers are involved in a category mistake when framing the question and articulating the notion of personhood. I intend to present a brief summary of the chapters of the book and reflect on some of the main philosophical issues that the book provokes, noting what I take to be refreshing insights that Matolino brings to the discussion while also engaging critically with the ones I find most contentious. In particular, I briefly assess Matolino's implicit suggestion that an Akan inspired quasi-physicalist account of mind avoids the mind-body interaction problem; I object to the category mistake charge on behalf of communitarians; and lastly, I raise questions about, and propose ways Matolino can refine, his proposal concerning a new way of thinking about personhood, which goes under the rubric of Limited Communitarianism.IS

Philosophical racism and ubuntu: In dialogue with Mogobe Ramose

This article discusses two complementary themes that play an important role in contemporary South African political philosophy: (1) the racist tradition in Western philosophy; and (2) the role of ubuntu in regaining an authentic African identity, which was systematically suppressed during the colonial past and apartheid. These are also leading themes in Mogobe Ramose’s African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. The first part concentrates on John Locke. It discusses the thesis that the reprehensible racism of many founders of liberal political philosophy has lethally infected liberal theory

A Response to Eze’s critique of Wiredu’s consensual democracy

The question of what political system best suites post colonial/independentAfrican states remain alive and ever more pertinent particularly in the face offailed attempts at democratisation. Kwasi Wiredu notes that the adversarialnature of Western democratic practices along party political lines may not bewell suited for African politics. Instead he suggests that the practice of consensual democracy as practised in the traditional Ashanti society may bemore appropriate. Emmanuel Eze raises three objections against Wiredu’saccount of consensual democracy. This paper seeks to respond to Eze’s objections and argue that consensual democracy may have more appeal thanEze is prepared to concede

Tempels' Philosophical Racialism

Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy has largely been met with hostility from African philosophers. Whilst Tempels intended to show that the Bantu were not only capable of thinking, but also that they had a distinct and coherent philosophy of their own, his project seems to have achieved exactly the opposite. Temples’ project sought to expose the racism of thinkers such as Lucien Levy-Bruhl, thereby raising the African to the same status as the Westerner. However, his efforts have been rejected for a number of reasons ranging from the view that it is a theory of magic, freely generalized to the Bantu, to the accusation that his project fails to speak on behalf of the oppressed Bantu and furthermore, that he is overly obsessed with finding the African difference at the cost of reason. In this paper, I seek to argue that a neglected critique of Tempels is one that has to do with the basis of his philosophical racialism. I seek to show that at the root of Bantu Philosophy is racialism grounded in the same assumptions as those made by Levy-Bruhl. I seek to argue that the categories that Tempels creates for Bantu thought do not simply seek to articulate a genuine difference from Western categories. The Bantu categories are coined as inferior, incoherent, inarticulate, illogical, and mystified. I argue that it is for reasons of philosophical racialism that Tempels urges his Western audience to overthrow their logical and articulable systems if they ever want to understand the Bantu system of thought

Radicals versus Moderates: A Critique of Gyekye’s Moderate Communitarianism

The communitarian conception of person is a widely accepted view in Africanthought. Kwame Gyekye thinks there is a distinction between what hecalls radical communitarianism and his own version of moderatecommunitarianism. He is of the view that radical communitarianism is facedwith insurmountable problems and ought to be jettisoned in favour of hismoderate communitarianism. Gyekye’s strategy is twofold; he firstly seeks toshow the shortcomings of radical communitarianism – particularly by attackingIfeanyi Menkiti’s position. Secondly, he seeks to show the authenticity ofhis version as well as its serious regard for individual rights as representing atriumph over radical communitarianism. In this paper, I seek to contest bothof Gyekye’s strategies

Energy Justice and Intergenerational Ethics: Theoretical Perspectives and Institutional Designs

In this work, we discuss how both contractualism, in the Western tradition, and communitarianism, in the African interpretation based on the idea of Ubuntu, conceptualise intergenerational justice. Even though both philosophical theories, taking into account differences and shortcomings, provide theoretical answers to intergenerational justice dilemmas, the implementation of actual policies in the interest of future individuals does not follow straightforwardly. Accordingly, in the second part of the chapter, we analyse what policy tools have been implemented or conceived to deliver intergenerational justice and we advocate a pragmatic approach pointing towards a mix of different policy tools