On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules

In this paper, whe show that the strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. Thisse and Vives (1988) show that spatial price discrimination is a dominant strategy when the mill pricing firm is the leader and the discriminatory firm is the follower. When the leader-follower roles are reversed we find that equilibrium pricing policies depend on the consumer's reservation value. The pricing policy game has two equilibria in pure strategies, either both firms price uniformly (f.o.b.) or both firms price discriminate, when the reservation value is low. For intermediate levels of the reservation value, price discrimination is a dominant strategy and the pricing policy game is similar to a Prisoner's Dilemma. When the consumer reservation value is large enough we obtain asymmetric equilibria in which one firm prices according to f.o.b. and the other price discriminates. We also analyze the case of simultaneous price competition and find a mixed strategies equilibrium for the price competition subgame such that the pricing policy game has two equilibria in pure strategies, either both firms price uniformly or both firms price discriminate.spatial price discrimination, price policy

On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules

In this paper, whe show that the strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. Thisse and Vives (1988) show that spatial price discrimination is a dominant strategy when the mill pricing firm is the leader and the discriminatory firm is the follower. When the leader-follower roles are reversed we find that equilibrium pricing policies depend on the consumer's reservation value. The pricing policy game has two equilibria in pure strategies, either both firms price uniformly (f.o.b.) or both firms price discriminate, when the reservation value is low. For intermediate levels of the reservation value, price discrimination is a dominant strategy and the pricing policy game is similar to a Prisoner's Dilemma. When the consumer reservation value is large enough we obtain asymmetric equilibria in which one firm prices according to f.o.b. and the other price discriminates. We also analyze the case of simultaneous price competition and find a mixed strategies equilibrium for the price competition subgame such that the pricing policy game has two equilibria in pure strategies, either both firms price uniformly or both firms price discriminate.Financial support from DGES (PB97-0603), UPV (035.321-HB159/98) and GV (PI-1998-86) is gratefully acknowledged

Communication policies of Spanish universities targeting prospective students: an evaluation by secondary schools

This paper presents an evaluation of the communication policies through which Spanish universities help to facilitate young people's passage from secondary to higher education. The underlying data have been gathered through a survey conducted with guidance providers at a sample of Spanish secondary schools, as well as through a series of in-depth interviews involving these same teachers. The research has led to the conclusion that the career guidance tendered by secondary schools is provided within a setting of relative precariousness in terms of information: the teachers surveyed consider that the importance of the briefing content they receive always exceeds the quality of the manner in which this information is forthcoming. The developments in the design of new university qualifications and the criteria applied by Spain's National Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation (ANECA) constitute a magnificent opportunity for improvement in this field

Bigarren hezkuntzatik unibertsitatera: beharrezko informazioa

This article contains an evaluation of the communication policies used by Spanish universities when approaching secondary schools to help students make the jump from school to university. The original information has been obtained by means of two data collection tools, firstly, a survey sent to guidance agents from a sample of schools preparing students to go up to university and a second complementary tool based on personal interviews with guidance counsellors or heads of study in a second sample of schools. The research brings us to the conclusion that although the universities make a considerable effort to send information to secondary schools, the guidance counsellors do not really rate the usefulness of the information they receive. We consider that the universities' current design processes for new courses offer a great opportunity to rethink the information policy aimed at secondary schools and focus on aspects that the schools consider to be more relevant to be able to use them as a guidance tool.Este artículo contiene una evaluación de las políticas de comunicación que utilizan las universidades españolas dirigidas a los centros de enseñanza secundaria postobligatoria para facilitar el tránsito de los estudiantes a la universidad. La información de la que se parte se ha obtenido mediante dos herramientas de recogida de datos, en primer lugar, una encuesta realizada a los agentes de orientación de una muestra de centros que imparten formación que da acceso a los estudios universitarios, y una segunda herramienta complementaria basada en entrevistas personales a orientadores o jefes de estudio de una segunda muestra de centros. La investigación nos permite concluir que si bien las universidades hacen un gran esfuerzo en enviar información a los centros de secundaria, la valoración que hacen los agentes de orientación sobre la utilidad de la información que llega a los centros no es muy buena. Consideramos que los procesos de diseño de nuevas titulaciones en las que se encuentran inmersas las universidades ofrece una buena oportunidad para dar un vuelco a las políticas informativas orientadas a los centros de secundaria y centrarse en aquellos aspectos que desde los centros consideran más relevantes para poder utilizar como herramienta de orientación.