WDM for Multi-user Indoor VLC Systems with SCM

A system that employs wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) in conjunction with subcarrier multiplexing (SCM) tones is proposed to realize high data rate multi-user indoor visible light communication (VLC). The SCM tones, which are unmodulated signals, are used to identify each light unit, to find the optimum light unit for each user and to calculate the level of the co-channel interference (CCI). WDM is utilized to attain a high data rate for each user. In this paper, multicolour (four colours) laser diodes (LDs) are utilized as sources of lighting and data communication. One of the WDM colours is used to convey the SCM tones at the beginning of the connection to set up the connection among receivers and light units (to find the optimum light unit for each user). To evaluate the performance of our VLC system, we propose two types of receivers: an array of non-imaging receivers (NI-R) and an array of non-imaging angle diversity receivers (NI-ADR). In this paper, we consider the effects of diffuse reflections, CCI and mobility on the system performance

Improved Chaff-Based CMIX for Solving Location Privacy Issues in VANETs

Safety application systems in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) require the dissemination of contextual information about the scale of neighbouring vehicles; therefore, ensuring security and privacy is of utmost importance. Vulnerabilities in the messages and the system’s infrastructure introduce the potential for attacks that lessen safety and weaken passengers’ privacy. The purpose of short-lived anonymous identities, called “pseudo-identities”, is to divide the trip into unlinkable short passages. Researchers have proposed changing pseudo-identities more frequently inside a pre-defined area, called a cryptographic mix-zone (CMIX) to ensure enhanced protection. According to ETSI ITS technical report recommendations, the researchers must consider the low-density scenarios to achieve unlinkability in CMIX. Recently, Christian et al. proposed a Chaff-based CMIX scheme that sends fake messages under the consideration of low-density conditions to enhance vehicles’ privacy and confuse attackers. To accomplish full unlinkability, in this paper, we first show the following security and privacy vulnerabilities in the Christian et al. scheme: Linkability attacks outside the CMIX may occur due to deterministic data sharing during the authentication phase (e.g., duplicate certificates for each communication). Adversaries may inject fake certificates, which breaks Cuckoo Filters’ (CFs) updates authenticity, and the injection may be deniable. CMIX symmetric key leakage outside the coverage may occur. We propose a VPKI-based protocol to mitigate these issues. First, we use a modified version of Wang et al.’s scheme to provide mutual authentication without revealing the real identity. To this end, the messages of a vehicle are signed with a different pseudo-identity “certificate”. Furthermore, the density is increased via the sending of fake messages in low traffic periods to provide unlinkability outside the mix-zone. Second, unlike Christian et al.’s scheme, we use the Adaptive Cuckoo Filter (ACF) instead of CF to overcome the false positives’ effect on the whole filter. Moreover, to prevent any alteration of the ACFs, only RUSs distribute the updates, and they sign the new fingerprints. Third, the mutual authentication prevents any leakage from the mix zones’ symmetric keys by generating a fresh one for each communication through a Diffie–Hellman key exchange