Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond

We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing models. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mechanism in this setting consists of an assignment, determining for each item the set of players who are granted service, together with respective payments. Although there are several works studying specialized versions of such problems, there has been almost no progress for general combinatorial cost sharing domains until recently [S. Dobzinski and S. Ovadia, 2017]. Still, many questions about the interplay between strategyproofness, cost recovery and economic efficiency remain unanswered. The main goal of our work is to further understand this interplay in terms of budget balance and social cost approximation. Towards this, we provide a refinement of cross-monotonicity (which we term trace-monotonicity) that is applicable to iterative mechanisms. The trace here refers to the order in which players become finalized. On top of this, we also provide two parameterizations (complementary to a certain extent) of cost functions which capture the behavior of their average cost-shares. Based on our trace-monotonicity property, we design a scheme of ascending cost sharing mechanisms which is applicable to the combinatorial cost sharing setting with symmetric submodular valuations. Using our first cost function parameterization, we identify conditions under which our mechanism is weakly group-strategyproof, O(1)-budget-balanced and O(H_n)-approximate with respect to the social cost. Further, we show that our mechanism is budget-balanced and H_n-approximate if both the valuations and the cost functions are symmetric submodular; given existing impossibility results, this is best possible. Finally, we consider general valuation functions and exploit our second parameterization to derive a more fine-grained analysis of the Sequential Mechanism introduced by Moulin. This mechanism is budget balanced by construction, but in general only guarantees a poor social cost approximation of n. We identify conditions under which the mechanism achieves improved social cost approximation guarantees. In particular, we derive improved mechanisms for fundamental cost sharing problems, including Vertex Cover and Set Cover

On the Inefficiency of the Uniform Price Auction

We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient multi-unit Vickrey auction, the Uniform Price Auction encourages strategic bidding and is socially inefficient in general. The uniform pricing rule is, however, widely popular by its appeal to the natural anticipation, that identical items should be identically priced. In this work we study equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction for bidders with (symmetric) submodular valuation functions, over the number of units that they win. We investigate pure Nash equilibria of the auction in undominated strategies; we produce a characterization of these equilibria that allows us to prove that a fraction 1-1/e of the optimum social welfare is always recovered in undominated pure Nash equilibrium -- and this bound is essentially tight. Subsequently, we study the auction under the incomplete information setting and prove a bound of 4-2/k on the economic inefficiency of (mixed) Bayes Nash equilibria that are supported by undominated strategies.Comment: Additions and Improvements upon SAGT 2012 results (and minor corrections on the previous version

Integrality gaps of semidefinite programs for Vertex Cover and relations to ℓ1\ell_1 embeddability of Negative Type metrics

We study various SDP formulations for {\sc Vertex Cover} by adding different constraints to the standard formulation. We show that {\sc Vertex Cover} cannot be approximated better than $2-o(1)$ even when we add the so called pentagonal inequality constraints to the standard SDP formulation, en route answering an open question of Karakostas~\cite{Karakostas}. We further show the surprising fact that by strengthening the SDP with the (intractable) requirement that the metric interpretation of the solution is an $\ell_1$ metric, we get an exact relaxation (integrality gap is 1), and on the other hand if the solution is arbitrarily close to being $\ell_1$ embeddable, the integrality gap may be as big as $2-o(1)$. Finally, inspired by the above findings, we use ideas from the integrality gap construction of Charikar \cite{Char02} to provide a family of simple examples for negative type metrics that cannot be embedded into $\ell_1$ with distortion better than 8/7-\eps. To this end we prove a new isoperimetric inequality for the hypercube.Comment: A more complete version. Changed order of results. A complete proof of (current) Theorem

Thermodynamics of magnetized binary compact objects

Binary systems of compact objects with electromagnetic field are modeled by helically symmetric Einstein-Maxwell spacetimes with charged and magnetized perfect fluids. Previously derived thermodynamic laws for helically-symmetric perfect-fluid spacetimes are extended to include the electromagnetic fields, and electric currents and charges; the first law is written as a relation between the change in the asymptotic Noether charge \dl Q and the changes in the area and electric charge of black holes, and in the vorticity, baryon rest mass, entropy, charge and magnetic flux of the magnetized fluid. Using the conservation laws of the circulation of magnetized flow found by Bekenstein and Oron for the ideal magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) fluid, and also for the flow with zero conducting current, we show that, for nearby equilibria that conserve the quantities mentioned above, the relation \dl Q=0 is satisfied. We also discuss a formulation for computing numerical solutions of magnetized binary compact objects in equilibrium with emphasis on a first integral of the ideal MHD-Euler equation.Comment: 21 pages, to appear in PR

Paradoxes in Social Networks with Multiple Products

Recently, we introduced in arXiv:1105.2434 a model for product adoption in social networks with multiple products, where the agents, influenced by their neighbours, can adopt one out of several alternatives. We identify and analyze here four types of paradoxes that can arise in these networks. To this end, we use social network games that we recently introduced in arxiv:1202.2209. These paradoxes shed light on possible inefficiencies arising when one modifies the sets of products available to the agents forming a social network. One of the paradoxes corresponds to the well-known Braess paradox in congestion games and shows that by adding more choices to a node, the network may end up in a situation that is worse for everybody. We exhibit a dual version of this, where removing available choices from someone can eventually make everybody better off. The other paradoxes that we identify show that by adding or removing a product from the choice set of some node may lead to permanent instability. Finally, we also identify conditions under which some of these paradoxes cannot arise.Comment: 22 page