Domestic Institutions and Credible Signals 1

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/95160/1/j.1468-2478.2012.00746.x.pd

The Accountability Effects of Political Institutions and Capitalism on Interstate Conflict

Selectorate theory posits that leader accountability increases with the size of the winning coalition. Recent research contends that capitalism also increases leader accountability because leaders are more dependent on the public for revenue in more capitalist economies. The authors argue that extant tests of accountability arguments of interstate conflict initiation and targeting are flawed. Accountability theories of foreign policy expect leaders to selectively initiate disputes based on their probability of winning. Accountability arguments, then, expect a conditional relationship between the accountability mechanism and the balance of power. For example, if capitalism produces peace through accountability, then more capitalist states should be less likely to initiate militarized disputes as their power advantage decreases. The authors find that this is not the case. At the same time, the authors find robust support for selectorate theory’s contention that larger winning coalitions are more selective about using military force. Political institutions induce accountability; capitalism does not.democratic peace; selectorate theory; capitalist peace; conflict

Replication data for: Regime Similarity and Rivalry

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Reneging on alliances: Experimental evidence

To what extent can democratic leaders mitigate the costs of reneging on alliance agreements? Previous research suggests that democratic leaders suffer from domestic backlash if they decide to renege on alliance treaties. However, less is known about whether and to what extent leaders can mitigate the domestic costs of reneging on alliance commitments. We study strategies leaders use to mitigate these costs. Specifically, we experimentally investigate whether and how much the costs of reneging are affected by different sidestepping strategies and the costs of fulfilling an alliance commitment. Results show that the potential costs of fulfilling commitments can dilute the domestic backlash for reneging on alliances, but various sidestepping strategies that work in the standard audience-cost context of reneging on a public threat do not work for reneging on a formal alliance. These findings expand our understanding of the reliability of democratic alliances and show that reneging costs are contingent on the context

Replication Data for: Diversion for All? Domestic Political Problems and Relative Power

The rationalist version of diversionary uses of military force expects targets to strategically avoid states with diversionary incentives. When first advanced this argument helped account for the weak support for diversionary behavior. However, in recent years, a significant body of research has found support for diversionary theory. Given incentives to strategically avoid, this is puzzling. We address this puzzle by focusing on the strategic context in which diversion may take place. We argue that there is heterogeneity in the incentives actors have to engage in strategic conflict avoidance. Specifically, targets that are very strong or have their own domestic problems have less incentive to strategically avoid a potential diverter. Further, and contrary to extant research, we contend that relative power also influences the probability of being preyed upon when suffering domestic problems. In brief, by more fully examining the strategic context, we specify the conditions under which diversionary uses of force are likely to occur as well as when strategic conflict avoidance and preying about the vulnerable are likel

Power At Sea: A Naval Dataset, 1865-2011

Naval power is a crucial element of state power, yet existing naval datasets are limited to a small number of states and ship types. Here, we present 147 years of naval data on all the world's navies from 1865-2011. This country-year dataset focuses on warships with ship-based weapons capable of using kinetic force to inflict damage on other structures or peoples. This dataset provides variables of interest for use in country-year, dyadic, or systemic studies