Animals as reflexive thinkers: The aponoian paradigm

The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive thought is required in this pervasive way and holds that supposing that it is derives from a tendency among philosophers and scientists toward overcomplication. Against this tendency, it recommends an aponoian framework, from apó, “away from” and noûs, “intelligence” or “thought,” arguing that seemingly complex psychological abilities are often not as complex as they seem, and do not require the ability to engage in reflexive thought

The Wolf and the Philosopher

Some years ago, I wrote a book called The Philosopher and the Wolf. It should really have been called The Wolf and the Philosopher. The wolf is the star, the philosopher an insignificant extra bumbling around in the background. The book is about many things, but fundamentally, I suppose, it is about growing up. I’ve recently finished a sequel of sorts. It’s called Running with the Pack and it’s a book about growing old. There is, I suspect, a natural trilogy to be written here, but I hope I don’t have to write the final part for some time yet. The Philosopher and the Wolf is a memoir: a book of memories. In this paper, I shall talk about this book, but I shall also talk with it. I shall talk not just about the memories the book contains but use these to examine the idea of memory

Feel or perspective?

The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument

Consciousness and the unity of mind

Several types of objection have been raised against the arguments I presented in my target article, “Are animals persons?” Among the objections are the following: (1) the claim that animals are persons is of little significance, (2) my use of the Lockean conception of the person is questionable, (3) whether a creature qualifies as a person is a matter of social construction rather than objective fact, (4) reflective consciousness is more important than I realize, (5) my reliance on implicit self-awareness in the account of personhood is ill-advised, (6) my account entails that too many creatures qualify as persons, and (7) types of objection that resist categorization (but I shall argue are sundry misunderstandings). I respond to these objections

Mentality and animal welfare

In this commentary I discuss the concept of sentience as used in Broom’s book Sentience and Animal Welfare (2014). Broom’s understanding of sentience is, I suggest, both misleading and revealing. Appreciating why this is so is important for understanding the connection between the mental life of animals and their moral status

Are animals persons?

It is orthodox to suppose that very few, if any, nonhuman animals are persons. The category “person” is restricted to self-aware creatures: humans (above a certain age) and possibly some of the great apes and cetaceans. I argue that this orthodoxy should be rejected, because it rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. Replacing this with a sense of self-awareness that is relevant requires us to accept that personhood is much more widely distributed through the animal kingdom

Consciousness and the unity of mind

Several types of objection have been raised against the arguments I presented in my target article, “Are animals persons?” Among the objections are the following: (1) the claim that animals are persons is of little significance, (2) my use of the Lockean conception of the person is questionable, (3) whether a creature qualifies as a person is a matter of social construction rather than objective fact, (4) reflective consciousness is more important than I realize, (5) my reliance on implicit self-awareness in the account of personhood is ill-advised, (6) my account entails that too many creatures qualify as persons, and (7) types of objection that resist categorization (but I shall argue are sundry misunderstandings). I respond to these objections

Representing Without Representations

There is a problem of representation and an apparatus of representations that was devised to solve this problem. This paper has two purposes. First, it will show why the problem of representation outstrips the apparatus of representations in the sense that the problem survives the demise of the apparatus. Secondly, it will argue that the question of whether cognition does or not involve representations is a poorly defined question, and far too crude to be helpful in understanding the nature of cognitive processes

Up-beat UK: a programme of research into the relationship between coronary heart disease and depression in primary care patients.

Coronary heart disease and depression are both common health problems and by 2020 will be the two leading causes of disability worldwide. Depression has been found to be more common in patients with coronary heart disease but the nature of this relationship is uncertain. In the United Kingdom general practitioners are now being remunerated for case-finding for depression in patients with coronary heart disease, however it is unclear how general practitioners should manage these patients. We aim to explore the relationship between coronary heart disease and depression in a primary care population and to develop an intervention for patients with coronary heart disease and depression