20 research outputs found
The European Commissionâs White Paper Governance: A âTool-Kitâ for closing the legitimacy gap of EU policymaking? ZEI Discussion Papers: 2001, C 94
[Introduction]. Reflecting on European Governance and its problems is in fashion these days. Given that the European Commission has a double function as a European executive in the "heart of the Union" and as a promoter of new ideas and concepts it is not surprising that the Commission recently contributed to the intense academic and political debate over this problem. Romano Prodi himself announced at the outset of his new 2000-2005 Commission its purpose of "promoting new forms of European governance" as one of the key strategic objectives. Obviously, given the scandals of the previous Santer Commission, this goal setting was motivated by, and was a necessary reaction to, growing concerns for the legitimacy of the Unionâs framework of governance. Besides Neil Kinnockâs institutional reform programme, which is concentrated on the Commissionâs internal problems, the provisional result of these broader inter-institutional reflections on governance is the publication of the White Paper. Unfortunately, for many reasons, the White Paperâs contribution towards understanding and towards closing the legitimacy gap of European governance is not very helpful. In this paper I try to figure out the shortcomings and probably unintentional negative implications of many proposals the Commission made on the subject. It can be demonstrated that the Commissionâs good intention to reinforce its role in European policy-making, both in preparing policy actions and implementing them, could do serious damage to the fragile institutional set-up of the Union. Moreover, it is likely that adopting its governance proposals could lead to an even deeper legitimacy crisis in the future than the EU is already suffering today. I will develop my argument in three steps. First, I will give an overview on the multifarious aspects of European governance and its legitimacy problems in the shadow of the imminent enlargement. Against this background, it is easier to evaluate the usefulness of the Commission proposals culminating in the advice to "revitalise the Community method" (p. 29). Secondly, I will introduce the Commissionâs approach, its problem perception and its proposed solutions. In a third step I will highlight some analytical shortcomings and overlooked negative implications of the proposals made by the Commission
The Trilemma of Legitimacy. Multilevel Governance in the EU and the Problem of Democracy. ZEI Discussion Papers: 1998, C 11
[Introduction]. As the European Communities have unquestionably been exercising govermental power for many years, there is a need for democratic legitimation of this specific "Governance without Statehood." To a far greater extent than ordinary international organizations, the European Union has crossed the boundary from horizontal interstate cooperation to vertical policy-making in a dynamic multi-level system, in which the member states are but one level of the polity. The European Union has developed into a new type of political system which lacks many of the features we associate with democratic governance. Whereas in the past the EC relied on indirect legitimacy based on its member states and their complete control of European policy-making, the "uneven denationalization" evoked by the European integration indicates that the sovereign state cannot remain the sole focus of normative reflection. Since the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the forced transfer of political decisions and allocations from the national to the European level has weakened democratic influence and control at the national level without having been compensated by equally strong democratic institutions and processes at the European level. Therefore, the European Union is a new subject for theories of legitimacy which poses fundamental questions to the established principles and concepts of democratic theory. In this discussion paper I try to develop an argument why neither politicians nor academics still have not found any satisfactory solutions concerning the legitimacy problem of European Governance. First, I will give an overview of the main sources of legitimacy in the Euro-Polity (II.). It will be shown that the strict observation of formal rules of democracy at the European level is not the sole method in which multi-level governance in the EU might gain legitimacy. Regardless of this assumption, it is obvious that European policy-making suffers from a democratic deficit which must be taken seriously from a normative point of view. The academic debate about this democratic deficit is centered on the two dimensions of the problem, which will be presented in chapter III. On the one hand, the institutional arrangement of the EU often is interpreted as non-democratic. On the other hand, it is argued that the EU is unable to be a ârealâ democracy in principle because the structural and social prerequisites on which democratic rule depends are missing at the European level. These are the main challenges for European constitutional engineering. The final part (IV.) consists of a discussion of varying reform options dealing with the multidimensional legitimacy problem
Stille Revolution im Namen des Rechts? Zur Rolle des EuropÀischen Gerichtshofes (EuGH) im Prozess der europÀischen Integration = Silent Revolution in the Name of Law? The role of the European Court of Justice in the Process of European Integration. ZEI Discussion Paper: 2000, C 78
[From the Introduction]. Lange Zeit hat die politikwissenschaftliche Integrationsforschung dem EuropĂ€ischen Gerichtshof (EuGH) nicht die ihm gebĂŒhrende Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Um die Dynamik und die Eigenart des europĂ€ischen Einigungsprozesses erklĂ€ren zu können, lenkte die Politikwissenschaft den Blick vielmehr auf die groĂen politischen Grundsatzentscheidungen und Vertragsrevisionen, die auf den internationalen Regierungskonferenzen beschlossen wurden. Erst die scharfsinnigen Analysen einiger Juristen haben deutlich gemacht, dass dieses Organ der dritten Gewalt als "unsung hero" auch von besonderer politischer Bedeutung fĂŒr den Verlauf der europĂ€ischen Integration war und ist. Fast unbemerkt von Politik und Wissenschaft sind es vor allem die Richter in Luxemburg gewesen, die kontinuierlich an der Transformation der Römischen VertrĂ€ge hin zu einem verfassungsĂ€hnlichen Dokument gearbeitet haben. Erst diese "Konstitutionalisierung" der VertrĂ€ge wiederum hat das rechtliche Fundament fĂŒr das sich zunehmend integrierende politische Gemeinwesen mit dem Namen "EuropĂ€ische Union" gelegt, zu dem sich das Einigungsprojekt inzwischen entwickelt hat. Zwar haben die Integrationsgemeinschaften in ihrer Gesamtheit lĂ€ngst nicht das Stadium der Staatlichkeit erreicht; dass die EU aber mehr ist als eine bloĂe zwischenstaatliche Einrichtung - d.h. eine Internationale Organisation, die die SouverĂ€nitĂ€t ihrer Mitglieder völlig unberĂŒhrt lĂ€sst -, ist allerorten erkannt und auch anerkannt worden
Richter contra Richter: Sondervoten beim EuGH als Alternative zum âCourt Curbingâ
Kritiker des EuGH weisen darauf hin, dass die Asymmetrie zwischen negativer und positiver Integration in der EU vor allem auf die extensive Interpretation der vier Grundfreiheiten durch den EuGH zurĂŒckzufĂŒhren ist. MaĂnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten, mit denen diese legitime gesellschaftspolitische Zwecke verfolgen, werden oft zu einseitig und nicht auf Basis einer ausgewogenen AbwĂ€gung zwischen der mit ihnen verbundenen IntensitĂ€t der Wettbewerbs- bzw. MobilitĂ€tsbeschrĂ€nkung einerseits und der Bedeutung der MaĂnahme fĂŒr die Verwirklichung der gliedstaatlichen Ziele andererseits gewichtet und entsprechend als gemeinschaftsrechtswidrig eingestuft. Aus empirischer Sicht kann dies durchaus bestĂ€tigt werden. Der daraus abgeleitete Vorschlag, politische Interventionsmöglichkeiten seitens des EuropĂ€ischen Rates zur Revision unliebsamer Urteile vorzusehen, ĂŒberzeugt jedoch nicht: Er ist nicht nur kaum durchsetzbar, sondern auch normativ fragwĂŒrdig. Statt auf exogenen politischen Druck auf ein Gericht zu setzen, das zur Aufrechterhaltung seiner Rechtsprechungsfunktionen auf seine institutionelle UnabhĂ€ngigkeit dringend angewiesen ist, sollte nach einer die Autonomie supranationaler Rechtsprechung schonenden und insoweit gemeinschaftsvertrĂ€glichen Lösung des Problems gesucht werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird mittels einer systematischen vergleichenden Analyse fĂŒr die EinfĂŒhrung abweichender Voten beim EuGH plĂ€diert. Durch Sondervoten kann es dem Gericht leichter gemacht werden, mittel- und langfristig Recht zu sprechen, das von lange etablierten Rechtsprechungslinien abweicht und so in der Lage ist, die notwendige Korrelation von (supranationaler) Rechtsprechung und gesellschaftlich-politischer Wirklichkeit gerade in den von negativer Integration (durch Recht) besonders betroffenen kontinentalen und skandinavischen Sozial- und Wohlfahrtstaaten wieder herzustellen
Niti sapo jemajoÄe niti poti utirajoÄe
Romano Prodi announced at the outset of his new 2000-2005 Commission its purpose of promoting new forms of European governance as one of the key strategic objectives. Obviously, given the scandals of the previous Santer Commission such goal-setting was motivated by, and was a necessary reaction to, growing concerns for the legitimacy of the European Union\u27s framework of governance. The provisional result of these broader institutional reflections on governance is the publication of the White Paper on Governance. Unfortunately, the White PaperÄs contribution to understanding and to closing the legitimacy gap of European governance is not very helpful. It can be demonstrated that the Commission\u27s good intentions of reinforcing its role in European policy-making, in both preparing and implementing policy actions, could do serious damage to the Union\u27s fragile institutional set-up. This is because the CommissionÄs White Paper reveals a lack of understanding of the pre-conditions for successful governance in the multi-layered system of the European Union. Therefore, it is likely that adopting its governance proposals could in fact lead to an even deeper legitimacy crisis in the future than the European Union currently suffers from.Romano Prodi je na zaÄetku mandata nove Evropske komisije (2000-2005) napovedal spodbujanje novih oblik evropskega upravljanja kot enega kljuÄnih strateĆĄkih ciljev. UpoĆĄtevajoÄ ĆĄkandale prejĆĄnje, Santerjeve komisije, je imela takĆĄna postavitev ciljev, ki je posledica naraĆĄÄajoÄe zaskrbljenosti v zvezi z legitimnostjo upravljalskega okvira Evropske unije, dovolj motivacij in je bila pravzaprav nujna. ZaÄasen rezultat tovrstnih ĆĄirĆĄih razmiĆĄljanj je objava Bele knjige o upravljanju. Na ĆŸalost ta ne prispeva veliko k razumevanju in zmanjĆĄevanju legitimnostne vrzeli evropskega upravljanja. MogoÄe je pokazati, da dobri nameni komisije v zvezi z okrepitvijo njene vloge v evropskem sprejemanju politik, tako v pripravljalni fazi kot v fazi implementacije politik, lahko povzroÄijo resno ĆĄkodo krhkemu institucionalnemu okviru Unije, saj Bela knjiga razkriva pomanjkanje razumevanja temeljnih pogojev za uspeĆĄno upravljanje v veÄplastnem sistemu Evropske unije. Zatorej je verjetno, da bi sprejetje predlogov Komisije o upravljanju v prihodnosti privedlo do ĆĄe globlje legitimacijske krize, kot je ta, ki trenutno prizadeva Evropsko unijo