Modeling and Representing Conceptual Change in the Learning of Successive Theories: The Case of the Classical-Quantum Transition

Most educational literature on conceptual change concerns the process by which introductory students acquire scientific knowledge. However, with modern developments in science and technology, the social significance of learning successive theories is steadily increasing, thus opening new areas of interest to discipline-based education research, e.g., quantum logic, quantum information and communication. Here we present an initial proposal for modeling the transition from the understanding of a theory to the understanding of its successor and explore its generative potential by applying it to a concrete case: the classical-quantum transition in physics. In pursue of such task, we make coordinated use of contributions not only from research on conceptual change in education, but also on the history and philosophy of science, on the teaching and learning of quantum mechanics, on mathematics education. By means of analytical instruments developed for characterizing conceptual trajectories at different representational levels, we review empirical literature in the search for the connections between theory change and cognitive demands. The analysis shows a rich landscape of changes and new challenges that are absent in the traditionally considered cases of conceptual change. In order to fully disclose the educational potential of the analysis, we visualize categorical changes by means of dynamic frames, identifying recognizable patterns that answer to students' need of comparability between the older and the new paradigm. Finally, we show how the frame representation can be used to suggest pattern-dependent strategies to promote the understanding of the new content, and may work as a guide to curricular design.Comment: Submitted to Science & Educatio

Suggestions on the teaching of atmospheric pressure at university and secondary school levels

The distinction between pressure in a liquid and in a gas is often treated in a cursory way, or not treated at all, even in university level textbooks. Most texts fail to point out the relation between pressure and density in a gas as compared to pressure in a—virtually incompressible—liquid. In many instances this also results in a dismissive treatment of atmospheric pressure. In this paper we suggest that in the physics curriculum of university and secondary school students, kinetic theory of gases be treated before fluid mechanics and thermodynamics. In this way, the definitions of pressure P and absolute temperature T in a gas can be derived consistently, with the remarkable advantage that the links between the macroscopic parameters P and T and the velocity of molecules—a microscopic parameter—are made clear at an early stage, as well as the relation between P and density ρ

Algorithmic Impact Assessments Under the GDPR: Producing Multi-Layered Explanations

Policy-makers, scholars, and commentators are increasingly concerned with the risks of using profiling algorithms and automated decision-making. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has tried to address these concerns through an array of regulatory tools. As one of us has argued, the GDPR combines individual rights with systemic governance, towards algorithmic accountability. The individual tools are largely geared towards individual “legibility”: making the decision-making system understandable to an individual invoking her rights. The systemic governance tools, instead, focus on bringing expertise and oversight into the system as a whole, and rely on the tactics of “collaborative governance,” that is, use public-private partnerships towards these goals. How these two approaches to transparency and accountability interact remains a largely unexplored question, with much of the legal literature focusing instead on whether there is an individual right to explanation.The GDPR contains an array of systemic accountability tools. Of these tools, impact assessments (Art. 35) have recently received particular attention on both sides of the Atlantic, as a means of implementing algorithmic accountability at early stages of design, development, and training. The aim of this paper is to address how a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) links the two faces of the GDPR’s approach to algorithmic accountability: individual rights and systemic collaborative governance. We address the relationship between DPIAs and individual transparency rights. We propose, too, that impact assessments link the GDPR’s two methods of governing algorithmic decision-making by both providing systemic governance and serving as an important “suitable safeguard” (Art. 22) of individual rights.After noting the potential shortcomings of DPIAs, this paper closes with a call — and some suggestions — for a Model Algorithmic Impact Assessment in the context of the GDPR. Our examination of DPIAs suggests that the current focus on the right to explanation is too narrow. We call, instead, for data controllers to consciously use the required DPIA process to produce what we call “multi-layered explanations” of algorithmic systems. This concept of multi-layered explanations not only more accurately describes what the GDPR is attempting to do, but also normatively better fills potential gaps between the GDPR’s two approaches to algorithmic accountability

Algorithmic Impact Assessments Under the GDPR: Producing Multi-Layered Explanations

Policy-makers, scholars, and commentators are increasingly concerned with the risks of using profiling algorithms and automated decision-making. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has tried to address these concerns through an array of regulatory tools. As one of us has argued, the GDPR combines individual rights with systemic governance, towards algorithmic accountability. The individual tools are largely geared towards individual “legibility”: making the decision-making system understandable to an individual invoking her rights. The systemic governance tools, instead, focus on bringing expertise and oversight into the system as a whole, and rely on the tactics of “collaborative governance,” that is, use public-private partnerships towards these goals. How these two approaches to transparency and accountability interact remains a largely unexplored question, with much of the legal literature focusing instead on whether there is an individual right to explanation.The GDPR contains an array of systemic accountability tools. Of these tools, impact assessments (Art. 35) have recently received particular attention on both sides of the Atlantic, as a means of implementing algorithmic accountability at early stages of design, development, and training. The aim of this paper is to address how a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) links the two faces of the GDPR’s approach to algorithmic accountability: individual rights and systemic collaborative governance. We address the relationship between DPIAs and individual transparency rights. We propose, too, that impact assessments link the GDPR’s two methods of governing algorithmic decision-making by both providing systemic governance and serving as an important “suitable safeguard” (Art. 22) of individual rights.After noting the potential shortcomings of DPIAs, this paper closes with a call — and some suggestions — for a Model Algorithmic Impact Assessment in the context of the GDPR. Our examination of DPIAs suggests that the current focus on the right to explanation is too narrow. We call, instead, for data controllers to consciously use the required DPIA process to produce what we call “multi-layered explanations” of algorithmic systems. This concept of multi-layered explanations not only more accurately describes what the GDPR is attempting to do, but also normatively better fills potential gaps between the GDPR’s two approaches to algorithmic accountability

Il dolore dell’anima separata. Giovanni di Napoli e il consolidamento dell’escatologia tomista

q. 16 of John of Naples’ Quodlibet III – Utrum dolor vel passio damnatae animae separatae sit, sicut in subiecto immediato, in eius essentia vel potentia – evokes one of the most delicate debates, both from a theological and philosophical point of view, of scholastic eschatology between the end of the 13th century and the first decades of the 14th: that relating to the action of hellfire (considered, due to the auctoritas of Gregory the Great, corporeal and identical in essence to sublunar fire) on an immaterial reality such as the soul in its state of separation (i.e. in the period between the individual death and the final judgement). The article retraces the way in which (in the well-known q. 2 of Quodlibet VI) John of Naples defends Thomas Aquinas from the suspicion of incurring, with his position, the condemnations of Tempier in 1270 and 1277, and how Aquinas himself tries to explain (especially in q. 26 of his Quaestiones disputatae de veritate) the passio or pain of the soul (both in the state of separation and in that of conjunction), through the double distinction between passio corporalis and passio animalis, and, within the former, between laesio and experimentalis perceptio laesionis. It then analyses q. 16 of Quodlibet III, in which John of Naples identifies the rational appetite – i.e. the will – as the immediate subject of the separate soul’s pain. In the appendix, an edition of John’s question is provided on the basis of the manuscripts Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, VII.B. 28 (= N) and Tortosa, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 244 (= T)

Il dolore dell’anima separata. Giovanni di Napoli e il consolidamento dell’escatologia tomista

q. 16 of John of Naples’ Quodlibet III – Utrum dolor vel passio damnatae animae separatae sit, sicut in subiecto immediato, in eius essentia vel potentia – evokes one of the most delicate debates, both from a theological and philosophical point of view, of scholastic eschatology between the end of the 13th century and the first decades of the 14th: that relating to the action of hellfire (considered, due to the auctoritas of Gregory the Great, corporeal and identical in essence to sublunar fire) on an immaterial reality such as the soul in its state of separation (i.e. in the period between the individual death and the final judgement). The article retraces the way in which (in the well-known q. 2 of Quodlibet VI) John of Naples defends Thomas Aquinas from the suspicion of incurring, with his position, the condemnations of Tempier in 1270 and 1277, and how Aquinas himself tries to explain (especially in q. 26 of his Quaestiones disputatae de veritate) the passio or pain of the soul (both in the state of separation and in that of conjunction), through the double distinction between passio corporalis and passio animalis, and, within the former, between laesio and experimentalis perceptio laesionis. It then analyses q. 16 of Quodlibet III, in which John of Naples identifies the rational appetite – i.e. the will – as the immediate subject of the separate soul’s pain. In the appendix, an edition of John’s question is provided on the basis of the manuscripts Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, VII.B. 28 (= N) and Tortosa, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 244 (= T)

Vulnerable data subjects

Discussion about vulnerable individuals and communities spread from research ethics to consumer law and human rights. According to many theoreticians and practitioners, the framework of vulnerability allows formulating an alternative language to articulate problems of inequality, power imbalances and social injustice. Building on this conceptualisation, we try to understand the role and potentiality of the notion of vulnerable data subjects. The starting point for this reflection is wide-ranging development, deployment and use of data-driven technologies that may pose substantial risks to human rights, the rule of law and social justice. Implementation of such technologies can lead to discrimination systematic marginalisation of different communities and the exploitation of people in particularly sensitive life situations. Considering those problems, we recognise the special role of personal data protection and call for its vulnerability-aware interpretation. This article makes three contributions. First, we examine how the notion of vulnerability is conceptualised and used in the philosophy, human rights and European law. We then confront those findings with the presence and interpretation of vulnerability in data protection law and discourse. Second, we identify two problematic dichotomies that emerge from the theoretical and practical application of this concept in data protection. Those dichotomies reflect the tensions within the definition and manifestation of vulnerability. To overcome limitations that arose from those two dichotomies we support the idea of layered vulnerability, which seems compatible with the GDPR and the risk-based approach. Finally, we outline how the notion of vulnerability can influence the interpretation of particular provisions in the GDPR. In this process, we focus on issues of consent, Data Protection Impact Assessment, the role of Data Protection Authorities, and the participation of data subjects in the decision making about data processing

Pricing privacy – the right to know the value of your personal data

Effective Protection of Fundamental Rights in a pluralist worl