Lobbying the European Parliament: a necessary evil. CEPS Policy Brief No. 242, May 2011

While the European Parliament is in many ways more transparent and more accessible than many of the EU’s national parliaments, the code of conduct for lobbyists and the Parliament’s own Rules of Procedure are rather vague. As a result of the ‘cash for laws’ scandal, the EP President, Jerzy Buzek, has established a working group to draw up a new set of rules to govern the access and behaviour of lobbyists and to formulate a code of conduct for MEPs

The influence of interest groups in the European Parliament: does policy shape politics?

For a long time, the European Parliament (EP) was viewed as a lobbying sideshow mainly to be targeted if interest groups were unsuccessful at getting their demands included in the European Commission’s proposal. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have a reputation for being particularly open to diffuse interests who, due to their limited resources, use ‘friendly’ MEPs to put pressure on the European Commission and the Council. The notion of the EP representing diffuse interests conflicts with the broader political science literature on interest groups, which dwells on business bias. There are, however, good reasons to doubt the EP’s reputation as a defender of diffuse interests. Much of our current knowledge about the EP’s interest group politics stems from a time when the EP’s legislative powers were more limited. Within the last twenty years, the EP has evolved from a ‘multilingual talking shop’ to a genuine co-legislator with the Council. The increased powers of the EP raise the question of whether EP interest group politics has normalised, whereby the assumptions of the interest group literature would seem to reflect the reality of the EP. A common assumption in the interest group literature is that diffuse interests carry limited weight in decision-making because their resources and interests remain subordinate to that of business. However, business influence differs across policy fields depending on how the costs and benefits related to policies are distributed. The aim of my thesis is to investigate how the distribution of costs and benefits of legislative proposals influence interest groups’ likelihood of winning particular conflicts in the EP. This is done by examining four legislative dossiers in the areas of employment, consumer, and environmental policies. The thesis draws on the process-tracing of EU documents, and 144 interviews with MEPs, EP officials, and interest groups

The battle for influence: The politics of Business Lobbying in the European Parliament

The European Parliament (EP) has become an increasingly important lobbying venue for business due to the recent enhancement of its regulatory powers. Existing research, however, disagrees on the extent to which the intensified business lobbying has resulted in increased business influence on EP policy outcomes. Some studies find a ‘business bias’ in the EP, while others still perceive it to be a forceful promoter of diffuse interests (such as consumer and environmental groups)

We’re in the middle of it: Consultants' role in risk management in the Norwegian petroleum sector

Most risk management research focuses on owner/operators and regulators, and ignores other actors. Preventing major accidents in the offshore oil and gas sector is a key responsibility of the companies that own and operate the infrastructure. Regulatory oversight of their activities comes in the form of industry-specific goal-based regulation administered by a specialist regulatory agency. In this paper we focus on a third actor in the system – the consultants who provide specialist services regarding safety and risk. Our study draws on interviews with experienced consultants in the Norwegian oil and gas sector (n = 11, average experience 20+ years). Power’s concept of riskwork is used to examine how consultants interact with their clients and how they see their role in relation to risk management. The analysis shows that the role of experienced consultants goes well beyond metaphor of the fox guarding the hen house. Rather, consultants contribute to regulatory compliance on the part of their clients but, further, they try to positively influence decision makers beyond simple compliance in order to promote what they believe to be the best safety decision making. The paper argues that consultants’ role in the system is under examined and under theorized. Alongside earlier research, our study indicates that consultants play a big role in risk management, which should be both recognized and scrutinized.We’re in the middle of it: Consultants' role in risk management in the Norwegian petroleum sectorpublishedVersio