Insuring Canada’s Exports: The Case for Reform at Export Development Canada

Export Development Canada competes with private companies in providing trade credit insurance. Is it time to rethink the Crown agency's mandate?trade credit insurance

Bribing in First-Price Auctions: Corrigendum

We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013). Rachmilevitch (2013), henceforth R13, studies the following game. Two ex ante identical players are about to participate in an independent-private-value first-price, sealed bid auction for one indivisible object. After the risk-neutral players learn their valuations but prior to the actual auction, player 1 can offer a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) bribe to his opponent in exchange for the opponent dropping out of the contest. If the offer is accepted, player 1 is the only bidder and obtains the item for free; otherwise, both players compete non-cooperatively in the auction as usual. This is called the first-price TIOLI game.1 R13 shows that under the restriction to continuous and monotonic bribing strategies for player 1, any equilibrium of this game must be trivial—the equilibrium bribing function employed by player 1, if it is continuous and non-decreasing, must be identically zero. In this note, we clarify the sufficient conditions under which a trivial equilibrium exists. These are less stringent than originally proposed

On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed

All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints

Consider an all-pay auction with interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. We characterize a symmetric equilibrium for the case of two players. In contrast with the second-price auction, making budgets more severe can depress the bids of unconstrained bidder

All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints

Consider an all-pay auction with interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. We characterize a symmetric equilibrium for the case of two players. In contrast with the second-price auction, making budgets more severe can depress the bids of unconstrained bidder

On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders and we investigate its properties. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two mechanisms is generally not possible

On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders and we investigate its properties. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two mechanisms is generally not possible

Audits as Signals

A broad array of law enforcement strategies, from income tax to bank regulation, involve self-reporting by regulated agents and auditing of some fraction of the reports by the regulating bureau. Standard models of self-reporting strategies assume that although bureaus only have estimates of the of an agent’s type, agents know the ability of bureaus to detect their misreports. We relax this assumption, and posit that agents only have an estimate of the auditing capabilities of bureaus. Enriching the model to allow two-sided private information changes the behavior of bureaus. A bureau that is weak at auditing, may wish to mimic a bureau that is strong. Strong bureaus may be able to signal their capabilities, but at a cost. We explore the pooling, separating, and semi-separating equilibria that result, and the policy implications. Important possible outcomes are that a cap on penalties increases compliance, audit hit rates are not informative of the quality of bureau behavior, and by mimicking strong bureaus even weak bureaus can induce compliance

Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks

This paper studies a model of intermediated exchange with liquidity-constrained traders. Intermediaries are embedded in a trading network and their financial capacities are private information. We characterize our model’s monotone, pure-strategy equilibrium. Agents earn positive intermediation rents in equilibrium. An experimental investigation supports the model’s baseline predictions concerning agents’ strategies, price dynamics, and the division of surplus. While private financial constraints inject uncertainty into the trading environment, our experiment suggests they are also a behavioral speed-bump, preventing traders from experiencing excessive losses due to overbidding

Safety and feasibility of Lin- cells administration to ALS patients : a novel view on humoral factors and miRNA profiles

Therapeutic options for amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) are still limited. Great hopes, however, are placed in growth factors that show neuroprotective abilities (e.g., nerve growth factor (NGF), brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), and vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF)) and in the immune modulating features, in particular, the anti-inflammatory effects. In our study we aimed to investigate whether a bone marrow-derived lineage-negative (Lin-) cells population, after autologous application into cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), is able to produce noticeable concentrations of trophic factors and inflammatory-related proteins and thus influence the clinical course of ALS. To our knowledge, the evaluation of Lin- cells transplantation for ALS treatment has not been previously reported. Early hematopoietic Lin- cells were isolated from twelve ALS patients’ bone marrow, and later, the suspension of cells was administered into the subarachnoid space by lumbar puncture. Concentrations of selected proteins in the CSF and plasma were quantified by multiplex fluorescent bead-based immunoassays at different timepoints post-transplantation. We also chose microRNAs (miRNAs) related to muscle biology (miRNA-1, miRNA-133a, and miRNA-206) and angiogenesis and inflammation (miRNA-155 and miRNA-378) and tested, for the first time, their expression profiles in the CSF and plasma of ALS patients after Lin- cells transplantation. The injection of bone marrow cells resulted in decreased concentration of selected inflammatory proteins (C3) after Lin- cells injection, particularly in patients who had a better clinical outcome. Moreover, several analyzed miRNAs have changed expression levels in the CSF and plasma of ALS patients subsequent to Lin- cells administration. Interestingly, the expression of miR-206 increased in ALS patients, while miR-378 decreased both in the CSF and plasma one month after the cells’ injection. We propose that autologous lineage-negative early hematopoietic cells injected intrathecally may be a safe and feasible source of material for transplantations to the central nervous system (CNS) environment aimed at anti-inflammatory support provision for ALS adjuvant treatment strategies. Further research is needed to evaluate whether the observed effects could significantly influence the ALS progression